

TRANSACTIONS OF
THE CONNECTICUT ACADEMY
OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

VOLUME 23]

SEPTEMBER 1920

[PAGES 243-382


THE
Rhetorica of Philodemus

TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY

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NEW HAVEN, CONNECTICUT
PUBLISHED BY THE
CONNECTICUT ACADEMY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES
AND TO BE OBTAINED ALSO FROM THE
YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS

PREFACE.

This work is intended to be a systematic presentation of the rhetorical fragments of Philodemus, with an interpretation of the more important passages, in the hope that they may be made more accessible to the general reader than they have heretofore been. On many points of interpretation the author's judgment has changed repeatedly in the course of the work, and he is far from positive that the correct rendering has in all cases been attained. But in the present condition of the text perfection is an unattainable ideal, and some slight gain in accuracy would hardly justify a greater expenditure of time. It would perhaps be more exact to call it a paraphrase than a translation. While it has been possible in general to translate almost literally, there are many passages where the papyrus is so fragmentary that nothing more than an approximation is possible, and the gaps must in some cases be filled entirely by conjecture. Moreover at times it has seemed best to condense some of the more prolix paragraphs. It is hoped that this will in no way hinder the student who is seeking an introduction to Philodemus.

The author is profoundly grateful to his colleagues and friends, Professor G. L. Hendrickson and Dr. E. W. Nichols, who very generously read the translation in manuscript, and offered valuable criticism.

THE RHETORICA OF PHILODEMUS.

INTRODUCTION.

The excavations at Herculaneum in the eighteenth century, so rich in results for the student of classical archaeology, produced another treasure which aroused the greatest interest in the learned world, and seemed for a time likely to overshadow in its importance the additions which these excavations made to our knowledge of ancient sculpture. In one of the villas were found many charred papyrus rolls. At first they were not recognized as such, and many were destroyed before the discovery was made that they were the remains of a very extensive private library. Even then the task was hardly begun, for it was found impossible at that time to unroll the papyri; many were cut apart and sadly mutilated before a successful method was devised. Thereafter the work of unrolling and deciphering them was undertaken, and has continued, though with very serious interruptions, to the present time. Two series of *Herculanensia Volumina* totaling twenty-one volumes were published in Naples, and a third series is now planned, of which the first volume has already appeared.¹ In addition to these editions copies of many of the rolls were made under the direction of English scholars early in the last century. These copies are preserved at Oxford; some have been published.² These do not exhaust the Herculanean discoveries, but are fairly representative of the whole mass of papyri.

The expectations aroused in the scholarly world by the discovery of these papyri have been realized only to a small degree. For instead of finding the lost works of some master of Greek literature, it was seen that the library was composed of philosophical works, almost entirely of the Epicurean school; nor were the volumes written by the greatest of the Epicureans, but

¹ *Herculanensium Voluminum quae supersunt XI Tom.* Naples, 1793-1855. Vol. VII did not appear. *Herculanensium Voluminum quae supersunt collectio altera, XI Tom.* Naples, 1862-1876. *Herculanensium Voluminum quae supersunt collectio tertia, Tom. I,* Milan, 1914.

² *Herculanensium Voluminum Ps. I, II,* Oxford, 1824, 1825; W. Scott, *Fragmenta Herculanensia,* Oxford, 1885.

mainly by Philodemus, at best an authority of the second rank. In fact it has been acutely conjectured by Comparetti³ because several copies were found of the same works of Philodemus that this was Philodemus' own library, and by another ingenious bit of reasoning Comparetti concludes that the villa in which the library was found belonged to the Piso family. We know that Philodemus was for many years a member of the household of L. Calpurnius Piso cos. 58 B. C., and it may well be that at his decease his library passed into the possession of the Pisos.⁴

It is to his connection with Piso that we owe most of our knowledge of Philodemus. He was a native of Gadara, had studied with the Epicurean Zeno at Athens, had been expelled from Himera, for what cause we do not know,⁵ and settled at Rome where he became the client of Piso. From this point our knowledge of him is derived from Cicero. In the attack on Piso Cicero mentions an Epicurean who lived on terms of intimacy with Piso, and describes in no complimentary terms his activities in commemorating the grosser side of the revels in the Pisonian circle.⁶ Cicero mentions no name, but Asconius iden-

³ La villa de' Pisoni e la sua biblioteca in Pompei e la regione sotterrata di Vesuvio nell' anno LXXIX (Naples, 1879) p. 159 ff. also in Comparetti e de Petra, La villa Ercolanese dei Pisoni, Turin, 1883.

⁴ Certainty cannot be obtained, and Mommsen (Archae. Zeit., XXXVIII (1880), p. 32) has argued strongly that the villa cannot have belonged to Piso. Comparetti replied in La Bibliothèque de Philodème, in Mélanges Chatelain, 1910, p. 118 ff.

⁵ Evidence of his expulsion is given in a fragment of Aelian quoted by Suidas s. v. τιμῶνται. Another notice (s. v. σκυφαρτεῖν and Ἱμεραία) may also be from Aelian and is commonly printed with the other notice in editions of Aelian, e. g. fr. 40 Hercher. If it refers to Philodemus, it appears that epidemics and famines at Himera were supposed to have been caused by his contemptuous remarks about the gods; his expulsion followed.

⁶ In Pisonem 28, 68; Dicet aliquis: unde haec tibi nota sunt? Non mehercules contumeliae causa describam quemquam, praesertim ingeniosum hominem atque eruditum, cui generi esse ego iratus, ne si cupiam quidem, possum. Est quidam Graecus qui cum isto vivit, homo, ut vere dicam-sic enim cognovi-humanus, sed tamdiu, quam diu cum aliis est aut ipse secum. Is cum istum adolescentem iam tum hac dis irata fronte vidisset, non fastidivit eius amicitiam, cum esset praesertim appetitus: dedit se in consuetudinem, sic ut prorsus una viveret nec fere unquam ab eo discederet. Non apud indoctos, sed, ut arbitror in hominum eruditis-

tifies the object of the attack as Philodemus, and there is no reason to doubt his statement.⁷ Much of Cicero's abuse of Philodemus is undoubtedly due to the heat of the invective against Piso, and should be correspondingly discounted, but the basis of fact is probably only too true, for Philodemus has borne testimony against himself in the scabrous epigrams preserved in the Anthology. It is noticeable, too, that Cicero qualifies his

simorum et humanissimorum coetu loquor. Audistis profecto dici philosophos Epicureos omnis res, quae sint homini expetendae, voluptate metiri. Recte an secus, nihil ad nos, aut, si ad nos, nihil ad hoc tempus: sed tamen lubricum genus orationis adolescenti non acriter intelligenti est saepe praeceptum. 69. Itaque admissarius iste, simul atque auditur voluptatem a philosopho tanto opere laudari, nihil expiscatus est: sic suos sensus voluptarios omnis incitavit, sic ad illius hanc orationem adhinnivit, ut non magistrum virtutis, sed auctorem libidinis a se illum inventum arbitraretur. Graecus primo distinguere et dividere illa, quem ad modum dicerentur: iste claudus, quem ad modum aiunt, pilam: retinere quod acceperat, testificari, tabellas obsignare velle, Epicurum desertum dicere; etenim dicit, ut opinor, se nullum bonum intelligere posse demptis corporis voluptatibus. 70. Quid multa? Graecus facilis et valde venustus nimis pugna contra imperatorem populi Romani esse noluit. Est autem hic, de quo loquor, non philosophia solum, sed etiam ceteris studiis, quae fere ceteros Epicureos negligere dicunt perpolitus. Poema porro facit ita festivum, ita concinnum, ita elegans, nihil ut fieri possit argutius. In quo reprehendat eum licet si qui volet, modo leviter, non ut improbum, non ut audacem, non ut impurum, sed ut Graeculum, ut assentatorem, ut poetam. Devenit autem seu potius incidit in istum eodem deceptus supercilio Graecus atque advena, quo tot sapientes et tanta civitas. Revocare se non poterat familiaritate implicatus, et simul inconstantiae famam verebatur. Rogatus, invitatus, coactus ita multa ad istum de isto quoque scripsit, ut omnes libidines, omnia stupra, omnia cenarum conviviorumque genera, adulteria denique eius delicatissimis versibus expresserit. 71. In quibus si qui velit possit istius tamquam in speculo vitam intueri: ex quibus multa a multis lecta et audita recitarem, ni vereretur ne hoc ipsum genus orationis, quo nunc utor, ab huius loci more abhorreret: et simul de ipso, qui scripsit detrahi nihil. 72. Qui si fuisset in discipulo comparando meliore fortuna, fortasse austerior et gravior esse potuisset: sed eum casus in hanc consuetudinem scribendi induxit, philosopho valde indignam: si quidem philosophia, ut fertur, virtutis continet et officii et bene vivendi disciplinam: quam qui profitetur, gravissimam sustinere mihi personam videtur. 72. Sed idem casus illum ignarum quid profitetur, cum se philosophum esse diceret, istius impurissimae atque intemperatissimae pecudis caeno et sordibus inquinavit.

⁷ Vol. V pt. 2, p. 16, Orelli; Philodemum significat, qui fuit Epicureus illa aetate nobilissimus, cuius et poemata sunt lascivia.

condemnation of Philodemus; he grants that he is *humanus* as long as he remains in proper society. He has a breadth of culture far surpassing that of the average Epicurean, and his poetry has the charm and polish of the best society verse. However his too easy good nature has brought him into the meshes of Piso's net, from which he is unable to extricate himself. These qualifying phrases agree with the other notice in Cicero⁸ which may be taken as showing more nearly than the harsh words of the *In Pisonem* his real attitude toward Philodemus.⁹

I have mentioned that Philodemus was a disciple of Zeno. This connection is of prime importance in estimating Philodemus' position in the Epicurean sect, and in the contemporary world of letters, and necessitates a brief consideration of Zeno. Here again, we rely for our information largely upon Cicero. When the latter was a student at Athens in 79/8 he was advised by Philo to study Epicureanism under Zeno. He was probably at this time head of the school, though the fact cannot be established beyond a doubt.¹⁰ At any rate he was the ablest exponent of the Epicurean doctrine, and Cicero records that his style distinguished him from the other representatives of his sect. *Non igitur ille, ut plerique, sed isto modo ut tu, distincte, graviter, ornate.* *De Nat. Deor.* I, 21, 59. We derive further information about his style from the notice in *Diog. Laert.* VII, 1, 35. Diogenes is enumerating the different philosophers by the name of Zeno, with a line of description for each; of our Zeno he says, *ᾧδοος Σιδώνιος τὸ γένος, φιλόσοφος Ἐπικούρειος καὶ νοῆσαι καὶ ἐρμηνεύσαι σαφής.* Evidently his style was striking, otherwise we should not have two independent notices devoted so markedly to it; this characteristic is all the more remarkable because the Epicureans affected indifference to manner of presentation. Now we have seen that Philodemus

⁸ *De Fin.* II, 35, 119; *Quae cum dixissem, Habeo, inquit Torquatus, ad quos ista referam, et, quamquam aliquid ipse poteram, tamen invenire malo paratiores. Familiares nostros, credo, Sironem dicis et Philodemum, cum optimos viros, tum homines doctissimos.*

⁹ W. Crönert in an article published in the *Jahreshefte d. öst. archae. Inst.*, vol. X (1907), pp. 145-153, entitled *Die Epicureer in Syrien*, thinks that he has discovered in *Pap. ined.* 986, fr. 19 mention of the enmity between Philodemus and Cicero.

¹⁰ See the discussion in Zeller III, 1 (3rd ed.), p. 373, n. 2.

was poet to the Piso family, and his reputation in Rome rested fully as much on his poetry as on his philosophy. And we shall find in the second book of his *Περὶ ῥητορικῆς* that a strife had arisen among the Epicureans which perhaps was not serious enough to be called a schism, but at least gave rise to several controversial pamphlets, and much truly Epicurean bilingssgate. In this quarrel Zeno and Philodemus supported the thesis that a certain kind of rhetoric, to which they applied the adjective "sophistic," was an art, and this was disputed as heresy by the opposing party. The Epicureans as a whole rejected all rhetoric as useless; Zeno and Philodemus held that the epideictic branch of rhetoric was a proper subject for study because that alone could be reduced to rule, whereas the parts involving persuasion depended on the speaker's ability to catch the popular favor. The rhetorical works of Philodemus are an exposition of this doctrine. Thus the fragments which we have are the remains of a distinct literary movement in the Epicurean sect, and should be regarded as a literary pronunciamiento. The interesting point of connection here is that Zeno whom Cicero lauds a stylist was the champion of this new view which accepted that part of rhetoric which above all others was primarily concerned with style rather than with thought.

Philodemus' importance as a man of letters in Rome is shown again by his relation to the Augustan group, Horace, Vergil, Varius, Quintilius. That these poets were at one time strongly influenced by the Epicurean philosophy is too well known to need mention. But it is only recently that any close connection between this group and Philodemus has been shown. To be sure there was the allusion to Philodemus at the end of the second satire of the first book, but this did not prove anything more than that Horace was acquainted with Philodemus' epigrams. But Körte has discovered amid the almost undecipherable fragments of *Περὶ κολακείας* the names *Οἰάριε, Κοῖντίλιε, Οἰ[εργί]λιε, Ὀρά[τι]ε*, showing with great probability that Philodemus was acquainted with the Augustan group.¹¹ Still more recently Hendrickson has traced the influence of the technique of an epigram of Philodemus on Horace *Car.* I, 38.¹² It may therefore be set

¹¹ *Augusteer bei Philodem, Rhein. Mus.* XLV (1890), pp. 172-177.

¹² An Epigram of Philodemus and two Latin Congeners. *Amer. Journ. Phil.* XXXIX (1918) pp. 27-43.

down with a reasonable degree of certainty that Philodemus was a prominent figure in the literary circles of Rome of the late republic and early empire; that his interest in polite letters distinguished him as it had his master Zeno from the rest of the Epicureans, and that his interest in literature is reflected in the doctrines of the *Rhetorica*.

The latter works have attracted less attention than they deserve. The philosophical works were naturally the first to be attacked in the hope of supplementing our scanty knowledge of Epicurean doctrines. But little that was satisfactory was done on the *Rhetorica* until Sudhaus' edition.¹³ In this he collected all the fragments of the *Rhetorica*, using the Oxford and Neapolitan copies, and supplementing these with his own examination of the papyri. His results were little short of astounding, when the nature of his material is taken into consideration, though unfortunately for the general reader or even for the specialist in this field they are almost nullified by glaring faults in arrangement and presentation. He has clearly established the existence of two works, a *ὑπομνηματικόν* in one book, and *Περὶ ῥητορικῆς* in seven. The relationship between these works is as follows: The *Hypomnematicon* is the precursor of the *Περὶ ῥητορικῆς*. It was intended for private circulation, to propound to his own immediate associates at Rome his peculiar views on rhetoric, at that time a subject of lively interest and active debate in the Graeco-Roman world. These views were not original with Philodemus; he had derived them from his master, Zeno, and their source may be still higher in the Epicurean school. But Zeno was known to Roman audiences mainly through the intermediary of Romans who like Cicero had attended his lectures at Athens, and Philodemus may have found that his doctrines had the appearance of novelty at Rome. The pamphlet circulated anonymously, though we must suppose that the authorship was an open secret, at least in Rome. By accident the book fell into the hands of an Epicurean of Rhodes, who scented

¹³ Spengel published the fourth book in 1837, an admirable piece of work considering the scanty nature of his materials. Gros published the *Rhetorica* from the Oxford copies with Latin translation and commentary in 1840.

heresy, and recognizing the views as peculiar to Zeno, assumed that he was the author, and published a reply. This attack led Philodemus to return to the subject of rhetoric with a reply to his critic, and a restatement of his views now expanded to the seven books *On Rhetoric*. Naturally, then, the two works cover much of the same ground, and seem to have followed the same general plan. The *Hypomnematicon* contained criticisms of the arguments for and against rhetoric, such as we find at length in the second book *Περὶ ῥητορικῆς*, and again in the seventh book. From this section we have a considerable group of quotations from Diogenes of Babylon who appears also in the seventh book. We have also small fragments of the criticism of Nausiphanes and the Peripatetics, which forms the bulk of our fragments of the sixth book. There was also a discussion of the nature of "art," parallel to that of book I. But most important of all we have in col. XXXIX ff. a full statement of the contents of the constructive part of the work with Philodemus' definition of rhetoric.¹⁴

The *Περὶ ῥητορικῆς* may be briefly outlined as follows:

- Book I General introduction. Nature of "art."
- Book II Is rhetoric an art? Criticism of arguments for and against. Philodemus' view that sophistic i. e. epideixis is an art, but all other varieties of rhetoric, as well as politics, are not.
- Book III The sophistical school does not produce statesmen; in fact the sophistical training is often harmful.
- Book IV Criticism in detail of the claims of rhetoric, apparently as given in some manual. Philodemus denies the ability of the sophistical schools to teach a beautiful style; complains of their faulty treatment of metaphors; denies the claim of the sophists to universal knowledge, and their assumption of moral superiority.
- Book V Detailed discussion of the disadvantages of rhetoric, with a comparison of the wretched life of the rhetor with the happy life of the philosopher.
- Book VI Attacks on philosophical schools which advocated the study of rhetoric. The surviving fragments deal with Aristotle and Nausiphanes.
- Book VII Criticism of the Stoic attitude toward rhetoric. Further criticism of Aristotle. Comparison of rhetoric and philosophy.

¹⁴ In this paragraph we have followed in the main the conclusion stated by Sudhaus in the note on p. 44 of his *Supplementum*.

It will be seen that the work assumes a twofold character. On the one hand it is a discussion of the moral and educational value of rhetoric, and is a counterpart of the encomia of rhetoric prefixed to manuals such as we find in the *Rhetores Graeci*. On the other hand it is a discussion of a minor point in Epicurean philosophy, an attempt to interpret the Epicurean creed to meet the changed conditions of the time. The latter side was the immediate occasion for the work, and the one into which Philodemus throws his whole soul. But by the perversity of history it is his criticism of other works on rhetoric which is of most interest to us. For in the hazy condition of our knowledge of the development of rhetoric subsequent to Aristotle, and of the educational conflict between the rhetoricians and the philosophers, any additional facts assume an importance quite out of proportion to their original value. Nausiphanes, Alexinus, Diogenes of Babylon, these are names which Philodemus has made more than mere names. One who wishes to see how far Philodemus is of service to the history of literature should carefully study Philodemus in connection with the first chapter of von Arnim's *Dio von Prusa*, and note how much of our still meager history of the period depends on Philodemus.

If the most valuable portions of the *Rhetorica* are the quotations from earlier authors, the unique part is his definition of "sophistic rhetoric." His discussion of the value of rhetoric and its place in the educational system is concerned first with the definition of "Art." After a lengthy refutation of the views of others he presents his own definition, which he claims is sanctioned by usage, and not formed, as those of his opponent have been, for the purpose of proving the doctrines of some school. An art, he tells us, is a habit of action resulting from the observation of certain fundamental principles which apply to the majority of cases. The art produces a result that is beyond the power of those who have not studied it. Moreover, it produces this result regularly and surely, and not at random.¹⁵

On the basis of this definition he examines the claims of rhetoric, and makes a threefold division. These three divisions, he says, are not the ordinary divisions, *πανηγυρικόν*, *πολιτικόν*, *δικανικόν*, but *σοφιστική ῥητορική*, generally called by him simply *σοφι-*

στική, ῥητορική in the strict sense including forensic and deliberative oratory, and *πολιτική* or political science.¹⁶ Of these three only *σοφιστική* is used in a technical sense, which apparently originated with the Epicureans, and is restricted to the study of the principles of composition, with special reference to epideictic oratory. It is placed on a level with poetics and might be called the art of prose writing. I, 122, 29 = Suppl. 61, 12 . . . *κατ' ἀλήθειαν ἡ σοφιστικὴ ῥητορικὴ τέχνη τίς ἐστὶν περὶ τε τὰς ἐπιδείξεις οὕτως αὐτοὶ ποιοῦνται, καὶ τὰς τῶν λόγων διαθέσεις, οἷον αὐτοὶ γράφουσιν τε καὶ σχεδιάζουσιν. Φαμέν τοίνυν τὸ μεθοδικὸν ἕξιν αὐτήν, οὐ πολὺ δὲ καθάπερ οὐδὲ τὴν ποιητικὴν.*

To the other two branches, *ῥητορική* in the narrow sense and *πολιτική*, he denies the position of an art. They lack the essential characteristic, namely a definite set of principles which can be imparted from teacher to pupil. Quite the contrary, ability in oratory and politics is the result of practice and experience. The successful public speaker may be compared to a good merchant, a hunter, or even a successful thief.¹⁷ All succeed, however, as a result of their own skill based on experience, and their occupations cannot be called arts in the sense in which we speak of music as an art.

Similarly *σοφιστής* means an epideictic orator, and by a natural enlargement of its semantic area, a teacher of epideictic oratory; and *σοφιστεύειν* means to teach or practice epideictic. This meaning of "sophist" is quite different from that current down to the fourth century. The development of meaning has been worked out by Brandstätter,¹⁸ and need not be repeated here except so far as it affects our immediate discussion. Brandstätter infers from the fragments of Philodemus that Epicurus was the first to use "sophist" and related words in this sense, and that it became a part of the technical vocabulary of the school in the writings of Hermarchus and Metrodorus. But an examination of the passages on which he based his conclusion (I, 78, 2-19; 78, 19-85, 19; 85, 27-89, 10; 120, 10; 120, 22) will show that Philodemus nowhere quotes from Epicurus an example of the use of the word. The passages are in some

¹⁵ II, 245, 6.

¹⁷ I, 74, 13.

¹⁸ *Leipziger Studien*, 1894.

¹⁵ I, 69, 2 = Suppl. 35, 1.

parts hopelessly corrupt, but the general sense is clear enough. It seems that Epicurus recognized epideictic oratory as an art, and made the distinction between this and practical oratory which Philodemus makes. That he applied the term "sophistic" to epideictic oratory cannot be proved from Philodemus. The latter is arguing against an unnamed opponent who claimed to be unable to find in Epicurus a statement that sophistic was an art. But the mere fact that Philodemus is compelled to argue that Epicurus meant this, instead of quoting a short sentence that would settle the question definitely, seems to point to the conclusion that the statement was not to be found in Epicurus except by implication. As to Metrodorus the case is simpler, for we know the title *Πρὸς τοὺς σοφιστάς*,¹⁹ in which sophist probably had the meaning which it bears in Philodemus. We might conjecture that this work was the first in which the word was regularly used in the technical sense. The question is doubtful, however, for there is the possibility that *σοφιστής* was used in a different sense. Diogenes Laertius (x, 26) concludes his list of Epicureans with the words, *Ζήνων θ' ὁ Σιδώνιος ἀκροατὴς Ἀπολλοδώρου, πολυγράφος ἀνὴρ καὶ Δημήτριος ὁ ἐπικληθεὶς Λάκων, Διογένης θ' ὁ Ταρσεὺς ὁ τὰς ἐπιλέκτους σχολὰς συγγράψας, καὶ Ὠρίων καὶ ἄλλοι οὓς οἱ γνήσιοι Ἐπικούρειοι σοφιστὰς ἀποκαλοῦσιν.*

The difficulty arises first in regard to the antecedent of *οὓς*. Is it *ἄλλοι* or Demetrius, Diogenes, Orion and others? It is tempting to reason thus: Zeno invented this meaning of *σοφιστική* and *σοφιστής*; he with the others mentioned with him, and Philodemus formed a distinct group of Epicureans noted for their contention that sophistic was an art, and called sophists in derision by orthodox Epicureans. But two objections arise to this interpretation; Zeno was probably head of the school; if so he was presumably orthodox. In the second place it is probable that this list in Diogenes comes from Philodemus' *σύνταξις τῶν φιλοσόφων*. If that is so the last clause *οὓς—ἀποκαλοῦσιν* cannot refer to Zeno, for Philodemus would not reproach his master with heterodoxy. Consequently the identity of those called sophists remains doubtful, and there is always the possibility that the word may have had two different applications in the Epicurean school, and that Metrodorus used one and Zeno the other.

¹⁹ Diog. Laert. X, 24.

But in the absence of definite proof it is perhaps safe to say that Zeno used the word in the same general sense as Metrodorus, but with greater precision.²⁰

This peculiar use of *σοφιστής* and the theory of the artistic nature of *σοφιστική* colors the whole of Philodemus' argument, and should be kept in mind in reading the following pages. It may not be amiss to discuss at this point some other words which are used in peculiar senses by Philodemus, and which require some comment if the translation is not to be misunderstood. *τέχνη* is (1) an art, craft or profession, or (2) the formal statement of the principles of the same, i. e., a manual or handbook. The English would undoubtedly be better if I had varied my translation between craft and profession, but where so much of the argument depends on the meaning of this one word I have thought it best to have a uniform translation at the cost of a certain artificiality of expression. It was almost imperative, also, to use a word which would permit of a derivative denoting agent, for *τεχνίτης* is used constantly of one who has mastered a *τέχνη*. "Art" and "Artist" give the necessary pair in English, and if it is borne in mind that in this work "art" means any activity or occupation which is reducible to rule, and "artist" anyone who pursues such an occupation, no confusion will result.²¹ The opposite of *τεχνίτης* is *ἄτεχνος* which I have rendered

²⁰ See the discussion in Körte, *Metrodori Epicurei Fragmenta*, Jahrb. f. cl. Phil. Suppl. XVII (1890), p. 552 ff.

²¹ The history of *τέχνη* and 'art' and their derivatives affords interesting parallels. 'Art' in its largest meaning in English has nearly as extensive a semantic area as *τέχνη* in Greek; "profession" which is included under *τέχνη* is not wholly included under art in English; e. g. medicine is either an art or a profession, but the ministry is not an art. Artist and *τεχνίτης*, theoretically equivalent, have both undergone a narrowing process; *τεχνίτης* came to mean an actor, while artist suggests primarily a painter. Both became terms of compliment, and both were extended to cover fields of activity which caused the more respectable artists to blush at the misuse of the word. A passage from R. G. White, *Words and their Uses*, forms an interesting parallel to some words of Philodemus, "Artist has been beaten out so thin that it covers almost the whole field of human endeavor . . . A cook is an artist; so is a barber; and Goldsmith soberly calls a cobbler an artist." Philodemus I, 59, 19 = Suppl. 30, 7 *Τὰ δ' ἐκ παρατηρήσεως καὶ τινος ἱστορίας συνησκημένα τέχνας ἢ συνήθεια τῶν Ἑλλήνων οὐ πάντι προσαγορεύει κατὰ τὸν κύριον τρόπον ἀλλ' ἔστιν ὅτε καταχρωμένη, καθάπερ ἐνίοτε καὶ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς θαύμασιν συντόνους τεχνίτας καλεῖ καὶ τὸ δεξιῶς ξύλα σχίσαι καὶ*

by "layman." As the opposition is almost always between the trained speaker or lawyer, and one not so trained, this use of the word will be natural enough to English readers. Ἐπιστήμη is used at times in the same sense as τέχνη. At other times there is the usual distinction between art and science, a distinction which is emphasized by the use of adjectives; τέχνη στοχαστική is opposed to ἐπιστήμη πάγιος or ἐστηκῆ. I do not recall seeing τέχνη πάγιος.

ῥήτωρ and its derivatives form another group that is puzzling to the translator. The start can be made with ῥητορικὴ for which the time-honored translation "rhetoric" must almost necessarily be used. But ῥήτωρ causes trouble. As used by Philodemus it shifts from orator to teacher of rhetoric, though for the latter he sometimes uses ῥητορικός, and one's first impulse is to vary the translation to suit the shift in meaning. But a twofold objection arises: the word "orator" does not cover the same semantic area as ῥήτωρ, even if we exclude from the latter word the meaning "professional teacher of speaking." With us "orator" means either a person chosen to speak on a definite occasion as in the phrase "orator of the day" in which case it is equivalent to speaker, or a person gifted in speech, as "he was a natural orator." There is nothing in either case to indicate that speaking is the man's habitual occupation. The Greek ῥήτορες, however, formed a distinct profession; it covered the field which to-day forms part of the fields of the lawyer, the preacher, the statesman and the public lecturer. Manifestly "orator" fails to cover the semantic area of ῥήτωρ. A second reason is that in Philodemus there is a constant play between ῥήτωρ and ῥητορικὴ²² which depends for its point entirely on etymology, and this is lost if we translate by "orator" and "rhetoric." I have therefore translated ῥήτωρ throughout as "rhetor," preferring the awkwardness of using a word hardly acclimated in English to the loss of the point of many of Philodemus' sentences. ῥητορικός I render by "rhetorician" in the sense of teacher of rhetoric.

συνθεῖναι καὶ ἐνεδρεῦσαι τινα ποιηρῶς τεχνικὸν λέγει καὶ τέχνας τὰς ἐν ταῖς κωμῳδαῖς καὶ πᾶν τὸ τοῦτοις παραπλήσιον. Καὶ μὴν τῷ καὶ παρατήρησιν καὶ ἀσκήσιν τέχνην προσαγορεύειν τὰ πλείστα τῶν ἐν τῷ βίῳ τέχνας προσαγορεύοντες οὐκ ἂν φθάνομεν.

²² See II, 215, col. XI for a case of the double meaning of ῥήτωρ which is easily lost in translation.

πολιτικὴ and πολιτικός should strictly speaking be rendered so as to keep the etymological connection, e. g. "politics" or "political science" and "politician." However as πολιτικός has none of the opprobrium which sometimes attaches to politician in English, I have rendered it by "statesman." There is not in the case of this pair the reason for keeping the etymological connection plain which we have noticed in the case of ῥήτωρ-ῥητορικός.

The date of the Rhetorica cannot be determined with exactness. It was written in the lifetime of Zeno, if we may be allowed to interpret strictly the present tenses of the paragraph referring to him; Suppl. p. 44 ff.; p. 45, l. 1: ὁ παρ' ἡμῶν ἐστὶν Ζήνων, p. 48, l. 13: τίς ὁ ἐκεῖν' ἀναγράφας ἐστίν; Οὐ Ζήνων γε. Zeno's dates cannot be determined exactly; he was born as early as 150, was teaching and apparently head of the school in Athens in 79/8, and was succeeded by Phaedrus shortly thereafter, if Phaedrus was succeeded by Patro in 70/69.²³ If we place Zeno's death at 75 we should have the inferior limit for the Rhetorica. One other point may be taken into consideration; the Περὶ ῥητορικῆς was addressed to a certain young Gaius (ὁ Γάϊε παῖ, I, 223, 5). This would suggest that Philodemus was at Rome, acting as tutor in some Roman family. The beginning of Philodemus' Roman sojourn may be approximated as follows: he met Piso when the latter was *adolescens*.²⁴ If we place the limit of *adolescens* at 30, the acquaintance must have begun before 71, as Piso was born at least as early as 101. That would make it possible for Philodemus to have been in Rome in the seventies, and so to have addressed the Rhetorica to his pupil Gaius before the death of Zeno in (circ.) 75.²⁵

It is almost paradoxical to pass judgment on the style of an author from whom we have scarcely a single sentence that has remained entire. Much of the obscurity is undoubtedly due to

²³ We really are not certain about the date of the succession of Patro. Phaedrus was contemporary with Zeno and probably did not long survive him. The only certainty is that Patro became head of the school before 51 B. C., v. Cic. Ad Fam. XIII, 1. For a fuller discussion of the dates v. Zeller III, 1 (3rd ed.), pp. 373-5, Susemihl II, p. 261 ff.

²⁴ Cic. In Pis. 28, 68.

²⁵ Comparetti on slightly different grounds arrives at a conclusion regarding the limits of Philodemus' literary activity which admits of the date given above for the publication of the Rhetorica. v. La Bibliothèque de Philodème, Mélanges Chatelain, p. 128.

unskillful emendation, and many of the half sentences would be plain enough if we only knew how the sentence began. Anyone who will take the pains to study the articles in which Sudhaus first published his reconstructions, and notice the steps by which the difficulties were cleared away year after year will appreciate the fact that it is dangerous to dogmatize about Philodemus' obscurity, for a single brilliant discovery may affect the interpretation of a whole book. For example, after Sudhaus had published his first volume, he discovered that Papyri 1015 and 832 were the upper and lower parts respectively of the same papyrus. The result was the complete reconstruction of the sixth book in his second volume, and a brilliant contribution to the history of rhetoric by von Arnim. But allowing for the difficulties arising from the fragmentary condition of the papyrus, many others still remain. Chief among these is the philosophic jargon of the Epicurean school, and the habit, also due to philosophy, of preferring abstract to concrete, and the impersonal to the personal. There is a dreary wordiness and prolixity which is so often characteristic of both philosopher and rhetorician in the period of decline. Characteristic, too, of the period is the hair-splitting, the page after page devoted to quibbles over the meaning of "art," "rhetoric," "sophistic," and the dozen other trifles with which the scholastic age of Greek literature amused itself. Philodemus' interest in expression did not carry him into the refinements of Atticism; his Greek is the typical literary Koine of the day, and he distinctly deprecates any attempt at imitation of the ancients and the cultivation of a special or artificial diction.²⁶ His theory of style is that there is no style except the ordinary language of every day intercourse.²⁷ A clear use of this provides a better means of expression than is offered by all the schools of rhetoric. Thus while renouncing all theories of style he commits himself to a very far-reaching theory. Freedom from the frills of rhetoric he certainly attained; one could wish that we might say as much of the clarity of his style. From the smooth, flowing style of the epigrams we might expect a similar ease and sharpness of definition in the *Rhetorica*. It is however wholly lacking even in the portions which are nearest

²⁶ I, 151, 6: "Ἐπειτα εἰ μὲν μὴδὲ εἰς ἡν φυσικῶς καλὸς λόγος, ὥσως ἂν ἦν ἀναγκαῖον ἀγαπᾶν τὸν κατὰ θέμα· νῦν δὲ ὑπάρχοντος, ἄθλιον τὸ παρίεντας αὐτὸν ἐπ' ἐκείνων καταγνᾶν."

²⁷ I, 153, col. X.

to a state of complete preservation. It is an interesting commentary on the artificiality of the epigram that a second-rate writer like Philodemus can attain comparative success in it while failing to write a readable prose style. Philodemus' mastery of the epigrammatic style is purely formal; nowhere does he show any great originality of thought; but his style is uniformly lucid and pleasing. In his prose, partly as a result of his theory of style, partly as a consequence of his rambling method of thought, he never attained such a degree of excellence. Even after making due allowance for the obscurity caused by imperfect restoration, it is hardly possible that he will ever be found to deserve the characterization of his master, *καὶ νοῆσαι καὶ ἐρμηνεύσαι σαφῆς*.

The translation follows closely the edition of Sudhaus in three volumes; Philodemi Volumina rhetorica edidit Dr. Siegfried Sudhaus, Leipzig, B. G. Teubner 1892, vol. II, 1896, Supplementum, 1895. As the fragments are presented in some confusion by Sudhaus, I have appended a schematic arrangement of the contents according to the divisions of Philodemus' work.

Philodemus	Sudhaus	Hubbell
Book I	I, 1-12 = Suppl. 3-8	265-267
Book II	I, 13-18 19-123 = Suppl. 11-61 123-136 136-137 = Suppl. 61-62 137-146 II, 65-130	267-293
Book III	v. Sudhaus' Intro. P. XXXVI	293
Book IV	I, 147-225	293-305
Book V	II, 131-167 I, 225-270	305-318
Book VI	I, 270-289 I, 289-325; revised in II, 1-64	318-332
Book VII	I, 325-385	332-341
Frag. Incerta	II, 168-195	341-346
Hypomnematicon	II, 196-303	346-364

Corresponding pages in the Sudhaus edition and in this translation.

Sudhaus	Hubbell
I, 1-146	265-286
147-225	293-305
225-385	311-341
(289-325 revised in II, 1-64)	

Sudhaus	Hubbell
II, 1-64	321-332
65-130	286-293
131-167	305-311
168-195	341-346
196-303	346-364

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BOOK I.

We have five fragments of the first book, one of seven columns, the others containing one column each. If we may make a rather large generalization from so small a section we might say that the first book contained an outline of the whole work. I have therefore reconstructed, partly from references, partly by inference the following outline of the book. The fragments which we possess come from the latter part of the book.

The first book contained:

1. The dedication to Gaius. Cf. I, 223, 5.
2. A statement of the purpose of the work: to criticize various views of rhetoric,
 - a. those of its supporters,
 - b. those of its opponents,
 - c. those of the extreme Epicureans who denied that sophistic rhetoric was an art, thus running counter to the doctrines of Epicurus, Hermarchus and Metrodorus. Cf. I, 12.
3. A discussion of the relation of the arts to one another, and of the nature of an art, with especial reference to the errors into which both supporters and opponents of rhetoric fall. Cf. I, 1, ff.

First a division of arts and sciences according to the relative necessity of natural ability and training (*φύσις* and *δασκαίσις*).

Sudhaus

Some sciences depend entirely on natural ability and need but little practice; some accomplish their purpose of and by themselves, granted that the workman has the natural endowment common to all the human race; no practice is necessary; some do not need natural ability but only practice.

In the case of some arts, their purpose can be accomplished partially and reasonably well by those who have not studied the principles of the art; in other cases only the person technically trained can succeed.

Some say that an art must have definite rules, e. g. grammaticé, others that an art is merely wisdom or skill (*σοφία*), others require that it have a definite purpose, e. g. Plato¹; others demand that it shall tend to improve life.²

¹ Gorgias 503E.

² Possibly Critolaus, cf. Sextus Empiricus Adv. Rhet. 10-12, 20.

I, 1, fr. IV
= Suppl. 3.

I, 2, fr. III
= Suppl.
4, 1.

I, 3, fr.
I = Suppl.
4, 8.

I, 4, Col.
I = Suppl.
4, 17.

Col. III.

Col. IV.

Those who define art fall into the error of expecting that one definition will cover all arts (*or rather* that all arts fulfil equally all the requirements of the definition), in order to obtain what they call the union of arts (*σύνδεσμος*). Then when they find an art which has some characteristic not shared by the others, as is frequently the case, they exclude it from the position of an art.

In the sciences there is frequently an interchange of function: two sciences produce the same result.³ But this does not prove that they are not arts.⁴ It is not unheard-of for the same result to be accomplished by two arts, and perhaps this is the best way of distinguishing the merely useful from the necessary art.

Objections can be made to most if not all of the arguments here mentioned (i. e. in the gap between fr. I and Col. I). The worst class of arguments are those which act as boomerangs and demolish the position of the disputant. As far as these arguments are concerned no one can object to the opponents' saying that there are perfect artists and imperfect ones as well. It is unfair to blame the perfect artist for the failures of his imperfect colleague. But that is what the present critics are doing. The end of rhetoric is to persuade in a speech; consequently it is idle to mention other means of persuasion, such as beauty. If laymen sometimes persuade by means of a speech it does not follow that they persuade better or more frequently than the trained rhetor.⁵

Apart from the aforementioned obscurities you will find that many of the arguments overstep the bounds of the facts under discussion and are built up on double meanings of words. Many of the arguments do not differ in validity, but by a variety of examples display the fertility of the inventors. Then, too, in these arguments there is a great deal of bare assertion, entirely unsupported by argument (*ἀκατάσκευον, κατασκευή*=constructive argument).

³ E. g. Sculpture and music both produce pleasure.

⁴ Philodemus seems to use *ἐπιστήμη* and *τέχνη* interchangeably.

⁵ If Philodemus here as elsewhere, notably in Book II, seems to champion the cause of Rhetoric it is because he is refuting the arguments against rhetoric in order to show that they are inadequate, and that the only true answer to the claims of rhetoric comes from the Epicurean school.

The following error is found in almost all the arguments: they Col. V.
assume from the lack of technical treatises at a given time or place that no art then existed. But it is hardly to be expected that we can find technical works in a period in which the art of writing had not been invented.

Most, if not all, the arguments do not prove what they claim to prove even if the premises be granted. For if the art of music does not produce the ability to read and write, it may still be the art of other things. Similarly if they assume that sophistic rhetoric does not produce political science or practical rhetorical ability, they are right, but that does not preclude the possibility that sophistic is an art.⁶

"Just as dialectic is an art, but accomplishes nothing unless Col. VI.
combined with ethics or physics, so rhetoric is an art, but accomplishes nothing unless combined with politics." There are many other errors in the arguments, but we do not intend to take them up in detail.

Those Epicureans are to be censured who assume that sophistic Col. VII.
is not an art, and thus run counter to the teachings of Epicurus, Metrodorus and Hermarchus, as we shall show later. Such Epicureans are almost guilty of parricide.⁷

BOOK II.

In the second book Philodemus discusses the question: Is rhetoric an art? The fragments fall into two classes. The first consists of one papyrus in ten short fragments and a continuous passage of very considerable proportions, contained in Volume One, pages 13-146, most of which has been incorporated by Sudhaus in the Supplementum pages 11-62. The second group consists of many fragments mostly unconnected, collected in Volume Two pages 65-130. The content of the first group may be expressed schematically as follows:

⁶ Here we get the first statement of Philodemus' favorite distinction between *σοφιστική ῥητορική* on the one hand, and *πολιτική* and *ἐμπρακτος ῥητορική* on the other.

⁷ This paragraph gives an interesting glimpse of the passion for orthodoxy which was characteristic of the Epicurean school. It also reveals the intensity of the feud between Zeno-Philodemus and the other branch of the sect.

- I. Arguments advanced by others.
 1. Arguments against rhetoric refuted.
 2. Arguments in favor of rhetoric refuted.
 3. Criticism of the views of Epicureans on rhetoric.
- II. Philodemus' constructive arguments.

The book is thus seen to be a critique of various works about rhetoric. The Epicurean triad, Epicurus, Hermarchus and Metrodorus provide most of the material for the last two sections. Among the opponents of rhetoric to whom prominence is given are Diogenes of Babylon and Critolaus. The work of Critolaus has been discussed by F. Olivier, *De Critolao Peripatetico*, Berlin 1895, and by Radermacher in the introduction to Sudhaus' *Supplementum*. In general I follow their conclusions, although I am not prepared to go as far as they do in crediting Critolaus with most of the ideas expressed in this book. In the notes I have indicated briefly my judgment on the sources of the principal ideas without entering into an extended discussion for which the reader is referred to the excursus at the end of this volume.

SECTION I-I.

*Refutation of arguments against rhetoric.*¹

I, 14, fr. V. The arguments are quoted in direct form without introduction, and are followed by a brief criticism. The first is fragmentary but may be reconstructed as follows:

(a) "The Spartans and Romans expelled rhetors." This does not prove that it is not an art, for states have expelled physicians, musicians and even philosophers.²

I, 19, Col. I = Suppl. 11. The argument which is criticized at the beginning of column I is missing, but must have run somewhat as follows: "An art always produces a beneficial result."³

But the captain sometimes loses his ship, the physician kills his patient. We must either deny that navigation and medicine are arts, or abandon the demand that all arts must always be beneficial.⁴

(c) "Different arts do not attain the same end, but gram-

¹ See note 5 on page 266.

² Cf. the similar discussion in Sext. Emp. Adv. Rhet. 20-25. It was one of the commonplaces of current educational argument; Sextus records that it was used by Critolaus, and by the Academics, Clitomachus and Charmadas; v. Excursus p. 379.

³ For a similar passage cf. Quint. II, 17, 23 ff.; v. Excursus p. 378.

⁴ Cf. Book I, fr. III.

marians and dialecticians attain the end of rhetoric." Others do persuade, but the end of rhetoric is not to persuade but to persuade in a rhetorical speech. The philosopher persuades by force of logic, Phryne⁵ by her beauty; neither persuades rhetorically.

(d) "An untrained person should not be able to excel one who has been trained in an art, but in rhetoric this sometimes occurs." The untrained man may excel the trained man at times in a conjectural art (*στοχαστική*), but never in an exact science. But if the layman without experience be compared with a man trained in the schools the comparison does not justify the conclusion that sophistic and politics are not arts.

(e) "In other arts the rules are true, in rhetoric they are false."⁶ (The reply is fragmentary but seems to mean): The same statement might be made about philosophy or medicine. In those some lay down principles which are not true, but the error of some individuals does not prove that the whole subject is not an art if properly treated.

(f) (a) "The artist does not deny that he is an artist, but the rhetor does." The major premise is false. Some artists do deny that they have an art.

(β) "And yet if the meanest artists do not deny that they have an art we should not expect the sophists to deny it."⁷ But as a matter of fact philosophers, geometricians, poets and physicians sometimes do deny it, thinking thereby to allay the suspicions of those who expect to be deceived.

⁵ For Phryne cf. Quint. II, 15, 6 and 9; Athen. XIII, 590, 591; Sext. Emp. Adv. Rhet. 4; Plut. Vit. Hyper. p. 849E. The story runs that Phryne was accused of impiety, a capital charge, by one Euthias, and defended by her lover Hyperides. When the latter saw that the jury was likely to bring in a verdict of guilty he rent Phryne's robes and exposed her breast, and thus won a verdict of acquittal. As we see from the employment of this illustration by Quintilian in a similar context, this was one of the stock arguments against rhetoric. Alciphron seems to be answering this argument in Ep. I, 31, Bacchis to Phryne, when he says: μηδὲ τοῖς λέγουσί σοι, ὅτι εἰ μὴ τὸν χιτωνισκὸν περιηξαμένη τὰ μαστάρια τοῖς δικασταῖς ἐπέδειξας, οὐδὲν ὁ ῥήτωρ ὠφέλει, πείθου. Καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἵνα ἐν καιρῷ γένηται σοι, ἢ ἐκείνου παρέσχε συνηγορία.

⁶ For illustrations of the false rules of rhetoric v. Sext. Emp. Adv. Rhet. 10-12; Quint. II, 17, 18 ff.; v. Excursus, p. 375.

⁷ This continues the thought of the quotation in the preceding paragraph.

(γ) "They deny that they possess the so-called sophistic rhetoric, and say that it is not a separate kind of rhetoric. However they do lay claim to the possession of experience in practical affairs reduced to a system, and ability to discuss these matters, and boast of it; a good example is Demosthenes." It is a disgrace for them to be ashamed of their art. However as sophistic offers no system for public speaking, how can it produce public speakers?

(δ) "Therefore it is plain that some criticize the art as having no characteristic which distinguishes it from other arts." In the case of other arts, too, which are really or apparently harmful, some criticize the teachers not for what they profess to know, but for what they do not even desire to accomplish.

I, 25, 32 ff.
= Suppl. 14,
16 ff. (g) "Every artist professes to accomplish a result, the rhetor does not profess to persuade." By no means all artists profess to accomplish the end of their art at all times. All who deal with conjectural arts, as, for example, physicians and pilots, sometimes fail in their purpose. The rhetor does profess to accomplish his purpose, which is not to persuade always, but to persuade better than one who has not been trained.

I, 26, 17 ff.
= Suppl. 15,
6 ff. (h) (Fragmentary and obscure.) "Every artist claims the province of the art as his own peculiar field (i. e. as belonging to the trained man and him alone); but the earliest speakers possessed the power of rhetoric before the art of rhetoric was formulated." On this principle we have to reject the art of medicine because men healed before Asclepius.

I, 27, 31 ff.
= Suppl. 15,
12 ff. (i) "A rhetor never charges others with lack of art, but with being in a state of mind which prevents them from seeing the connection of events." Therefore we must say that rhetoric is not a matter of practice or experience.⁸ For they would have claimed the results of practice for themselves.

I, 27, 6 ff. =
Suppl. 15,
17 ff. (j) "Men spoke better before manuals of rhetoric were written than they have since." The facts are granted, but inasmuch as rhetoric is not entirely subject to the rules of art, but demands much practice and natural ability, it is not surprising if there were once better rhetors than now, just as there were better

⁸ For *ιστορίαν* Sandys in *Class. Rev.* IX (1895), p. 359, proposes to read *ἐμπειρίαν*, as *τριβή* and *ἐμπειρία* are coupled in the *Gorgias* to which Philodemus refers several times.

philosophers. By this reasoning we should have to deny the position of an art to medicine and poetics. Then too, one might claim that there are good rhetors now. However sophists did not flourish before the technical treatises, but the arts were introduced by the statesmen, not by those who had made no study of the subject; and there are other arts about which nothing has been written as is the case in many parts of the barbarian world.

SECTION I-2.

Refutation of arguments in favor of rhetoric.

Having now discussed the arguments against rhetoric's being an art we shall now take up the arguments in its favor. I, 29, 14 ff. = Suppl. 16, 15 ff.

General criticism of these arguments.

(a) They assert that it is an art without establishing the preliminary principles on which their statement rests.

(b) They fail to see that not only is art required for some purposes, but practice is required for others, and think that the same training is adequate for sophistic and politics, whereas there is no art of the latter.

(c) If they apply the term "art" to the state of mind adapted for making rhetorical speeches, how can this be the property of only a few?

Let us take up the arguments one at a time.

"If the rhetors did not use a method we would not find many paying money for their courses." This argument rests on the supposition that rhetoric is an art of politics. This is contradicted by Epicurus in his treatise *Περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς* in which he says: "Those who study in the rhetorical schools are deceived. They are charmed by the tricks of style, and pay no attention to the thought, believing that if they can learn to speak in this style they will succeed in the assembly and court of law. But when they find that this style is wholly unfitted for practical speaking they realize that they have lost their money." In this respect rhetoric may fittingly be compared to the art of prophecy.

"Not a few who were unable to speak in public have gained ability by studying in the rhetorical schools." But some come out of the schools worse than when they went in. And if some improve, it may be from other causes which we shall discuss I, 35, 1 ff. = Suppl. 19, 13 ff.

elsewhere; and we shall also discuss elsewhere why they frequent the schools. This improvement does not demonstrate that rhetoric is an art for it is possible for speakers to improve by practice and experience.

I, 36, 24 ff.
= Suppl. 19,
24 ff.

[If it were not an art] "the majority of the students would not become good, but inefficient." Yet we see at times some without art producing more and better speakers than those who possess accurate knowledge; this proves that it is not an art. Some leave the study of sophistic to the child, and afterward give the youth the benefit of association with those who have had practical experience in the assembly and courts. Then if they succeed they are said to have studied with sophists, and the sophists get the credit for giving them the training which they have received from another source.

I, 38, 5 ff. =
Suppl. 20,
17 ff.

"Lawyers and statesmen send their sons to the sophists to pursue those studies which gave them their ability." In the first place some insist that they wasted the time which they spent in study with the sophists, and send their sons to their own teacher—the people. However if they do send them to the sophists it is because they do not want their sons to be deprived of any possible advantage to be obtained at the rhetorical schools, but they do not expect the school to produce a trained statesman. Some send their sons to the rhetoricians merely for a liberal education, putting rhetoric on a par with other studies.

I, 40, 18 ff.
= Suppl. 21,
7 ff.

"As in music and grammar so in rhetoric there is a transmission of knowledge from teacher to pupil, and the training is not without method." There may be a transmission of knowledge which is not connected with an art but acquired by experience and observation. The statement that "the training is not without method" is mere assertion without any argument to support it. If the statement means that sophistic is an art of practical speaking it is entirely wrong. (Lacuna.) In publishing technical works they are like the Chaldaeans and prophets who give out dreams to deceive the people, and are themselves deceived. If we grant anything we grant that sophistic is an art; but not even those who teach it believe that it is an art of politics.

I, 42, 17 ff.
= Suppl. 22,
8 ff.

[If there were no art of rhetoric] "none of those who speak powerfully and intelligently would speak artistically." We may turn the argument around and say that if some speak artistically before the court or the assembly the graduates of the schools

do not share any of their good qualities. However we may be accused of using language loosely and failing to distinguish between what comes with art and what without. For we use the word "artistic" in our everyday speech in a loose way, e. g. one plays games artistically.

"On seeing a beautiful statue you would say without argument that it was the product of art; you will pass the same judgment after investigating the acts of statesmen." One might acknowledge that the works of the panegyrists are the products of art. But inasmuch as the acts of a statesman deal with a subject which cannot be reduced to the rules of art how can they reveal that they are the products of art.

I, 44, 16 ff.
= Suppl. 23,
5 ff.

"If it were not an art those who have studied it would not practice proof (or demonstration)." Not only is one who has not studied an art unable to do the work of an art, but one who has not practiced and observed cannot reap the benefits. By studying what pleases the crowd and practicing, one can become skilled in politics. This is a strong proof that sophistic is not the art of politics.⁹ If it is, let him who has studied the technical treatises go before the people and speak!

I, 45, 13 ff.
= Suppl. 23,
20 ff.

SECTION I-3.

Criticism of the views of Epicureans on rhetoric.

The Epicureans who claim that *rhetoric* is an art of *writing* speeches and delivering epideictic orations make the error of

I, 47, 1 ff. =
Suppl. 24,
10 ff.

⁹ Here Philodemus seems to be attacking "sophistic" which he elsewhere admits as an art. The inconsistency is only apparent, however, as will be plain if we examine closely the meaning of "sophistic" as defined by Philodemus. The "sophists" are in his language the professional teachers of rhetoric, and sophistic is the subject taught in these schools. This subject matter is called "rhetoric" by those who teach it, and it is claimed that it trains for deliberative and forensic oratory, and therefore is an art. This Philodemus denies. The ability to persuade in a speech whether in law court or in public assembly, he says, is the result of natural endowment and facility acquired by practice; it must be acquired by each individual and cannot be set down in the form of rules and imparted from teacher to pupil; hence it cannot be called an art. In so far, then, as the professors of rhetoric attempt to teach the principles of public speaking and the laws of politics with a view to producing statesmen, they fail, for sophistic is not an art of politics. Later he sets the limits of sophistic—it is the art of epideixis and nothing more.

applying the term *rhetoric* to what should properly be called *sophistic*. Those who admit that *sophistic* is an art, but deny that there is an art of forensic and deliberative oratory because *sophistic* is not the art of these branches, have failed to prove that there is no art of forensic and deliberative oratory. There may be a method of these branches; but all they have shown is that some do succeed by means of natural ability and experience without the aid of rhetoric. Nor have they established beyond a doubt, as they should, that *sophistic* is the art of *epideictic*. The treatise on rhetoric ascribed to Polyaeus we have already shown to be spurious.

I, 49, 14 ff.
= Suppl. 25,
15 ff.

Those who say it is an art, but requires ability and practice, not to acquire it but to attain the end completely, have utterly failed. They have not made the division between the different parts of rhetoric (i. e. *sophistic* and practical rhetoric) which was made by Epicurus and his immediate successors. Epicurus demonstrated that *sophistic* is an art of writing speeches and delivering *epideictic* orations but is not the art of forensic or deliberative oratory; accordingly they say that *sophistic* is an art; his successors likewise have said that there is no art of politics. They certainly leave no place for any science of politics.

Moreover their statement that ability and practice are needed to learn the art of *sophistic* is false, or we must make the same statement about philosophy. Their illustration from the art of grammar turns against them. For natural ability is required for rhetoric just as much as it is as a foundation for grammar. In the case of grammar natural ability and practice are required in order to acquire the knowledge of the subject, not to attain the end. Consequently if rhetoric is similar to grammar we must admit that ability and practice are needed to acquire rhetoric. When they say that ability is required for delineation, for making suitable gestures, etc., and experience is needed to judge the proper occasion for speaking, what have they left for art? They ought to show what is needed to acquire the art if ability and practice are not needed.

I, 53, 3 ff. =
Suppl. 27,
6 ff.

Those are wrong who claim that rhetoric is not an art on the assumption that an art must have method and a transmission of definite knowledge, if on the other hand they allow medicine which is conjectural to be an art.

(a) Their expression *ἐκ τῆς προεῖληφε* assumes that one can define art as one chooses.¹⁰

(b) While criticizing those who do not make proper divisions, they fail to differentiate between the several parts of rhetoric.

(c) Politics is an art according to their grouping of the sciences and this is false. For it has no method, nor is it even a conjectural art. This can be proven by passages from Epicurus and Metrodorus. (Some of which are quoted.)

(d) It is stupid to say that the rhetors have *observed* the elements which generally persuade, and have reduced them to a system, and that we persuade by use of prooemium and narrative and the other parts of an oration.

A fourth class¹¹ present arguments which are a combination of the last two, and are open to the same objections. Their definition of art is "a state of training acquired as a result of observation, by which the proposed end is obtained generally and with reasonable probability." This removes the distinctive characteristic of an art which is its method and general principles applying to the individual cases. The practical skill acquired by observation is not called an art by the Greeks except that sometimes in a loose use of language people call a clever woodchopper an artist. If we call observation and practice art we should include under the term all human activity.

They say that politics is not an art, and yet they claim that rhetoric i. e. *πολιτικὴ ῥητορικὴ* is helpful in practical life. How can rhetoric be called an art when it does not help the artist but sometimes makes him inferior to the layman. Dialectic and eristic may be arts by their definition, but in differentiating between them and rhetoric they prove that rhetoric has no method. The other differences which they point out all go to show that rhetoric is not an art. These points of difference are (1) when it contributes anything it is something insignificant and accidental; (2) it is not necessary, a layman can do as well

¹⁰ Philodemus has in mind in this criticism his purpose to base his judgment of rhetoric on the definition of *τέχνη* accepted by usage. Cf. such passages as I, 69, 2 = Suppl. 35, 1: *ἔστιν τοίνυν καὶ λέγεται παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν*. I, 59, 19 = Suppl. 30, 7 ff. *ἡ συνήθεια τῶν Ἑλλήνων*. I, 68, 7 = Suppl. 34, 14; *κατὰ τὴν συνήθειαν*.

¹¹ Possibly these were followers of Diogenes of Tarsus, who derived their arguments from his *Ἐπιλεκτοὶ Σχολαί*.

as an artist; (3) its principles are easily acquired; (4) it depends largely on practice and memory. In short rhetoric has no method.

I, 64, 11 ff.
= Suppl. 32,
19 ff.

Bromius in his discussion of the arts passes over sophistic rhetoric on the ground that it is not regarded as an art either by people in general or by Epicurus. The only art that he will allow in this connection is politics. How can he do this when sophistic is an art and is so considered by the leaders of our school? If he considers sophistic to be no art why does he not prove his statement? How can he make the claim that the good statesman has calculated the means of arousing the emotions, and of persuasion, and uses these continually? Any success which the speakers attain they attain because of practice, but they do not succeed universally. Furthermore, his statement that the technical treatises of the rhetoricians are not entirely barren is in direct contradiction to the teachings of Epicurus who says that all such treatises are useless for producing the political faculty.

SECTION II.

Philodemus' theories about rhetoric.

I, 68, 1 ff.=
Suppl. 34,
12 ff.

We shall now present our own views under the following heads:

- (a) Definition of art according to usage.
- (b) Epicurean doctrine declares that sophistic rhetoric is an art.
- (c) Sophistic is an art of epideixis and writing of speeches, but not of forensic and deliberative oratory.
- (d) Politics depends on investigation and practice, but has none of the essentials of an art.

SECTION II-a.

Definition of 'art.'

An art, as the term is commonly used, is a state or condition resulting from the observation of certain common and elementary principles, which apply to the majority of cases, accomplishing such a result as cannot be attained by one who has not studied it, and doing this regularly and certainly and not by conjecture. For the moment we may leave out of the discussion whether or not a looser use of the word sanctions the inclusion under the heading 'art' of all occupations depending wholly on practice. This

definition applies both to the exact sciences like grammar and music which have certain definite rules, and to the conjectural which are in possession of certain common elements affecting¹² individual cases, although these common elements may not have been completely mastered, and the result may not be accomplished always but only more frequently than by those who do not possess the art.

(There follows a passage which cannot be restored.)

If rhetoric has no method it is not an art. We apply the terms 'experience,' 'observation,' 'practice' when one has failures as well as successes; but we never call this art, for the essence of art is to accomplish the result always.

[Another lacuna; apparently, A dancer] has observed the proper way of producing a beautiful effect, i. e. how to stand, how to walk, etc., but he has no method or elementary principles to impart as has the musician. The same statement applies to acrobats. If we class these occupations as arts we shall include practically everything. To sum up; these which we now say are arts we say have a certain character which is possessed by grammar and sculpture; and those which we deny are arts lack this character and are characterized by observation. On the basis of this definition we declare sophistic to be an art and politics not.

SECTION II-b.

Epicurean doctrine declares that sophistic is an art.

We now turn to the statement: *We* are not responsible for the statement that sophistic is an art and that politics is dependent on observation and practice, but this comes from the founders of our sect, not from us.¹³ I shall show where in the works of Epicurus Zeno found the expression of this doctrine. In the first place what would one make of the continual use by Epicurus

I, 77, 26 ff.
= Suppl. 38,
14 ff.

¹² There is a difference between the principles of the exact arts or sciences and those of the conjectural; of the former it is said that they accomplish the result *διὰ τινος παρατηρήσεως στοιχείων τινῶν διηκόντων διὰ πλειόνων τῶν κατὰ μέρος* of the latter that they possess *κοινῶν τινῶν διατεινόντων εἰς τὸ κατὰ μέρος*.

¹³ By *ἡμεῖς* Philodemus means himself and his master Zeno. They had been engaged in a controversy with another group of Epicureans who disputed the claim that Epicurus considered sophistic an art.

in his book on rhetoric of expressions like this: "schools of rhetoric," "the ability produced by the schools," "profession," "instruction about speeches and enthymemes" and the like?

I, 78, 19 ff.
= Suppl. 39,
5 ff.

Turning to Hermarchus, we find the same opinion in an epistle to Theophrastus. Alexinus in his work on education criticized the rhetorical sophists for wasting their time on investigation of useless subjects, such as diction, memory, and the interpretation of obscure passages in the poets. He added, "We can grant that they try to speak about useful subjects, by which it is possible to settle questions of philosophy; for if they do not possess *ἐπιστήμη* they do use conjecture which is the instrument of the rhetor." To this Hermarchus replied, "If by speaking about useful subjects he means speaking about such matters as will bring them pecuniary reward, he is insane."

I, 81, 3 ff.
= Suppl. 40,
23 ff.

Hermarchus then continues [Lacuna in which was shown the uselessness of these so-called useful subjects which the rhetoricians discuss:] "It is better to lose one's property than to keep it by lawsuits which disturb the calm of the soul."

I, 82, 24 ff.
= Suppl. 41,
10 ff.

Nor can we praise the rhetors for teaching their pupils to give advice on public questions. Hermarchus says: "If he says that the rhetors deserve admiration for being useful statesmen his statement will not stand the test. For cooks and carpenters give useful advice which need not be put in the form of a speech. Similarly any farmer without rhetorical training, even without elementary education can discover what is useful for the state.

I, 84, 31 =
Suppl. 42, 1.

Furthermore, what are we to make of Alexinus' statement that rhetorical speeches depend not on knowledge but on experience and conjecture? He cannot mean that they have no dialectical syllogisms. At any rate he rebukes Eubulides for despising speeches without syllogisms."

We have given these last quotations in case anyone desires to have them, realizing that they will seem to have been written about some other subject than the one under discussion.¹⁴

I, 85, 27 =
Suppl. 43,
14.

Metrodorus in the first book of his *Περὶ ποιημάτων* seems to indicate clearly that rhetoric is an art. Speaking with one who had written on poetics he says, "Until some proof is brought

¹⁴ In this remark of Philodemus we have a naïve admission of the weakness of his case. His attempt to find exact statements in Epicurean authorities to support his position is not particularly successful.

in regard to the art of the rhetoricians, it can hardly be said that it produces rhetors." Then he adds, "Callistratus and others spoke satisfactorily before the assembly about the public interests without having studied the *τέχνη* of Thrasymachus or of any one else." Elsewhere he says that those who teach the art of speaking do not speak themselves; it is ridiculous to suppose that one man possesses the theory, and another the power, of speaking.

(Lacuna)

A little later he says, "One who purposes to speak in public will not seek the teacher who after giving theoretical instruction is not able to see the next step; but with an eye solely to the task to be accomplished will fulfill by himself the purpose of the art, and will let no chance escape of becoming a better orator."

An outline of the history of the controversy which Philodemus discusses in the next section may enable the reader to understand some of the points to which he alludes in very obscure language. Philodemus was the pupil of Zeno, an eminent Epicurean who taught at Athens in the latter part of the second and early part of the first century B. C., and attained great eminence among his contemporaries, if he was not actually head of the school. Cicero attended his lectures at the advice of Philo, and admired his style; Non igitur ille, ut plerique, sed isto modo, ut tu, distincte, graviter, ornate. De Nat. Deor. I, 21, 59. His style is alluded to by Diogenes Laertius, VII, I, 35, *καὶ νοῆσαι καὶ ἐρμηνεύσαι σαφῆς*; he was evidently interested in style, and this interest served to distinguish him from the average Epicurean. Philodemus shared his master's interest in elegance of style as we may conclude from Cicero's remarks; (In Pis. 28, 68) Homo . . . humanus . . . Est autem hic, de quo loquor non philosophia solum, sed etiam ceteris studiis quae fere ceteros Epicureos negligere dicunt, perpolitus; poema porro facit ita festivum, ita concinnum, ita elegans nihil ut fieri possit argutius. It was this literary interest which led Zeno to make a collection of passages from Epicurus, Hermarchus and Metrodorus, which he thought proved that the leaders of the school considered sophistic rhetoric an art. He limited the province of the art, however, so as to include only the writing of a speech, particularly of an epideictic oration such, for example, as the orations of Isocrates, and excluded all power of rhetoric to persuade in the fields of forensic and deliberative oratory. The quotations, as far as they can be recovered from Philodemus, are not convincing; still it must be acknowledged that while Zeno might not have been able to quote chapter and verse from Epicurus in support of his view, he was in spirit true to Epicurean principles. For Epicurus, at least in his exoteric writings, paid attention to clearness if not, indeed, elegance of style.¹⁵

¹⁵ v. Usener, Epicurea, p. XLII.

Zeno had not published his views, but Philodemus had published anonymously a Hypomnematicon which was not intended for general circulation. A copy of this fell into the hands of an Epicurean of Rhodes who wrote a reply criticizing Philodemus' pamphlet as heretical, and also assuming that it had been written by Zeno. The next section is an answer to this attack.

I, 89, 11 =
Suppl. 44, 4.

Some Epicureans now resident at Rhodes write that when in the course of their teaching at Cos and again at Rhodes they were upholding the thesis, "Rhetoric is not an art," some students recently come from Athens asserted that this position was not agreeable to the teaching of Epicurus. Being asked to quote their authority, one said that a definite statement on this point was to be found in the Symposium or in the Lives; the other said he did not know where the statement was to be found, but knew that this view of sophistic was held by the Epicureans in Athens.¹⁶ The philosopher darkly hinted at in the latter phrase is Zeno; the fact that he had written nothing on the subject does not prevent the opponent from writing a reply to him. Frequently in this treatise he says that he found in Epicurus no trace of a statement that rhetoric is an art, but countless statements that no part of it is subject to the principles of art. Now we shall not hesitate to set forth in the future at greater length wherein we think this philosopher is wrong. For the present we shall give a brief outline of our criticism.

I, 92, 10 =
Suppl. 45,
16.

The opponent says that Epicurus and Metrodorus considered that the political and forensic branches of rhetoric needed practice and experience and a certain experimental knowledge, whereas the panegyric branch depended on practice and experience and a certain habit of expression without any knowledge of facts. Moreover the leaders of the school believed there was no art of persuading large bodies of men; that the aforementioned practice and experience do not suffice to persuade even in a majority of cases, and those trained in panegyric are less able to face the tumult of the assembly than those who have no rhetorical training; Epicurus and his followers knew that τέχνη

¹⁶ Philodemus is careful not to mention names, though describing the opposing parties by phrases which would be intelligible to his audience. The Rhodian school represents the author who had criticized Philodemus' work, thinking it to be Zeno's; the philosophers at Athens are Zeno and Philodemus.

had been written, and referred to these works by this name without granting that they accomplish their purpose; if any one possesses the power of persuasion, it is responsible for evil and not good. With these arguments he thinks that he proves that those who believe any part of rhetoric to be an art are inconsistent with Epicurus.

I wonder at the perplexity of the pupils of that "philosopher of Athens." If they cared to know where this doctrine was laid down they might have consulted the philosophers at one of the meetings of the school on the twentieth of the month, or any of the regular associates of Zeno, who lives in Athens, not in Persia. In order to satisfy their desire we have presented the passages which we claim prove that the so-called sophistic rhetoric is an art, and is not a part of rhetoric; for the divisions of rhetoric are not as he assumes throughout his work, panegyric, political and forensic any more than the genus dog is divided into the species sea-dog and land-dog.

We forgive the man for having written so much against our position; we should not have mentioned it except to show what strange things philosophers sometimes do. "But I desire to know," you will say, "who wrote that book"? Not Zeno.¹⁷

Our claim that the Isocratean orations and those of like character are not composed without method is especially attacked in the passage, "Epicurus believed that there was no art of persuading large bodies of men; that those who are not rhetoricians sometimes are more persuasive than the rhetoricians; that those trained in panegyric are less able to face the tumult of the assembly than those who have no rhetorical training; that Epicurus spoke of arts, and said that those acquainted with them were benefited, but did not mean that this enabled them to attain the end; if anyone possesses the power of persuasion it is responsible for evil and not for good."

But the arguments of Epicurus which prove that there is no art of politics do not prove that the sophists do not possess some other art. We shall select certain passages from the Symposium of Epicurus which support our view.

In order to represent the young man as being refuted when

I, 95, 18 =
Suppl. 46,
29.

I, 99, 5b =
Suppl. 48,
15.

I, 102, 21 =
Suppl. 49,
18.

¹⁷ Philodemus was the author of the book (his Hypomnematicon) which had been attacked on the supposition that its author was Zeno.

he claimed that his rhetorical study gave him power to deliver panegyrics and engage in politics, Epicurus makes Idomeneus beg pardon for his youthful presumption, and represents some one addressing him thus; I quote word for word, "It is strange that you are not prevented by your youth from surpassing older and famous men in the power of rhetoric"; by which he means. "It is strange that you are not prevented by your youth from excelling in rhetoric, which seems to require practice, while it is possible for you to be prevented by your youth from participating in philosophical discussions which depend more on knowledge than on practice."

I, 103, 13 =
Suppl. 50,
17.

"This," says the opponent, "is a clear statement from Epicurus; he makes a hard and fast distinction between *ἐπιστήμη* and *τρίβη*, and considers that all rhetoric, not merely the political and forensic divisions, depends entirely on experience. If rhetoric were wholly or in part an art, Epicurus' statement would become an absurdity meaning, 'If that which is produced by method can be attained by a youth, much more can that be obtained which is produced by method.'"

To assume that this statement of Epicurus refers to rhetoric as a whole, and not to the political part alone violates both the letter and the spirit of the Symposium. If sophistic rhetoric is an art, as it really is, requiring much practice (for the Epicureans acknowledge that some sciences need practice) how is Epicurus absurd? If the political form or division of rhetoric requires practice, and the sophistic, knowledge only, how is this absurd? The statement which our opponent thought to reduce to an absurdity, really means, "If that which is produced partly by method can be obtained by a young man, much more so, that which is produced by method alone."

I, 107, 15 =
Suppl. 53, 5.

Our opponent now proceeds to discuss the phrase *ὁ δοκεῖ τριβῆς εἶναι* (I, 103, 6 = Suppl. 50, 12). The passage is so fragmentary that the meaning can be restored only partially. Philodemus has been arguing that the phrase meant that a part of rhetoric employed method and art, and a part depended on practice and experience. The opponent insists that the phrase *δοκεῖ τριβῆς εἶναι* expresses Epicurus' view of rhetoric as a whole, and that *δοκεῖ εἶναι* is merely a milder expression for *ἐστίν*, a form of expression which Epicurus uses even when making a positive statement about philosophy. If *δοκεῖ τριβῆς εἶναι* applies to the political branch of rhetoric *δοκεῖ* must be equivalent to *ἐστίν* with the implication that *σοφιστικὴ ῥητορικὴ* also depends solely on *τρίβη* and so Philodemus' position is refuted. To this Philodemus replies:

This is foolish. For it is not like Epicurus to hesitate to speak the truth. However an obscure statement as to its being an art is characteristic of the leading Epicureans. One ought not to insist on the letter, but rather follow the spirit of the passage as revealed by comparison with other passages.

I, 109, 7 =
Suppl. 54,
11.

[Opponent.] "Do you not then admit that he agrees with those who declare that rhetoric is not an art, if you admit that he spoke without reservation?" No, for in other places he clearly says that it is an art.

[Opponent.] "But we claim that *δοκεῖ* applies also to *πολιτικὴ*." (The implication is that if the use of *δοκεῖ* instead of *ἐστίν* allows one part of rhetoric, viz., sophistic to be an art, it also allows us to consider politics an art, and this is acknowledged to be false.) We grant this, and even grant that *δοκεῖ* applies to sophistic; for Epicurus did not wish to settle the question by this one passage, and in many others he says that it is an art.

If anyone should ask Epicurus just what he considered an art and what not, he would say that the uncertainty of the premises makes the conclusion uncertain. He is in doubt whether *all* rhetoric depends on practice; he agrees that it requires *much* practice.

Again we say, "If he considered it to be only a matter of practice and experience, he would not have added *δοκεῖ*." They said that our interpretation did not give the right meaning, or that it did not give the only meaning. If the first is true we do not understand Greek; if the second, why do they, too, use obscure language in attacking us?

I, 112, 7 =
Suppl. 56, 6.

I shall show that Epicurus is obscure in the passage on *φρόνησις* when he says, *οὐ μᾶλλον ἂν δόξειεν ἐπιστήμη αἰτία εἶναι ἢ περὶ τριβῆς*; also that he shows that rhetoric is the result of knowledge and practice, but more of practice than of knowledge; that philosophical theorizing is the result of both, but more of knowledge than of practice; second, that he shows that philosophical theorizing is the result of both, but of one in a greater degree than the other, while rhetoric is the result of one alone; third, that philosophical theorizing is the result of knowledge and not of practice. The opponent chooses one of these interpretations at random. But suppose we substitute *ἐστίν* for *δοκεῖ εἶναι* so that the sentence reads, *Σὺ μὲν οὐκ ἐξείργου τῇ ῥητορικῇ δυνάμει προέχειν, ὁ τριβῆς ἐστίν καὶ συνηθείας πολλῆς*. How can this mean that rhetoric

I, 112, 24 =
Suppl. 56,
15.

is not the result of art, but of practice alone? We might say *πολλῆς φιλοπονίας ἐστὶ δλονότι τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ ἡ φιλοσοφία*, but no one would assume that philosophy is the result of labor alone. So by *πολλῆς ἐστὶν ἡ ῥητορικὴ τριβῆς καὶ συνηθείας* Epicurus means *δείτῃ πολλῆς τριβῆς καὶ συνηθείας*.

Furthermore, from the words that this man has used it is uncertain whether Epicurus assumed that rhetoric was the result of practice alone, or of art and practice, or largely but not entirely of practice. For in the sentence, *Θαυμαστὸν δὲ, εἰ σὺ μὲν οὐθὲν ἐξείργον διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν ἐν τῇ ῥητορικῇ δυνάμει προέχειν ὃ δοκεῖ τριβῆς εἶναι καὶ συνηθείας πολλῆς*, does *ὃ δοκεῖ* refer to *ῥητορικῇ δυνάμει* or *ὑπερέχειν*? It is possible to take this to mean that the power of rhetoric can be acquired by art, but to surpass all in it requires practice. This, however, I do not hold to be true. If you wish to consider how the author of the book understood this, he will say that *δοκεῖ* refers no more to *ὑπερέχειν* than to *ῥητορικῇ*, but you have rejected my plain statement, and use the tricks of the sycophant against me.

I, 119, 28 = [In a fragmentary passage Philodemus promises to discuss
Suppl. 59, later passages from Metrodorus.]
14.

I, 120, 10 = Epicurean authorities hold that sophistic rhetoric does not
Suppl. 60, 6. perform the task of practical and political rhetoric. This can be proved by passages from Epicurus, Hermarchus and Metrodorus. The ability to speak in assembly and court comes from practice and observation of political events.

SECTION II-c.

I, 122, 25 = Of the third section only the title can be determined with certainty.
Suppl. 61, 10.

Sophistic rhetoric is an art of epideixis, and of the arrangement of speeches, written and extemporaneous.

To which we may add the passage

I, 135, 40. Sophistic is not the knowledge of political rhetoric; this section we shall take up in the Hypomnematismus¹⁸ which is to follow. In that will be demonstrated that political ability cannot come from these sophistical schools any more than from the common schools or from the philosophical schools; that often-times the possession of it is responsible for no small mischief, and does not even bring success in actual law cases.

¹⁸ He refers to the third book, now lost.

SECTION II-d.

Politics depends on investigation and practice.

We now pass to the last section. No system of politics has ever been imagined except that offered by the rhetorical sophists. Now since sophistic contributes nothing to produce political ability, it follows that those who possess this ability have acquired it without the help of scientific principles.

After I, 122 the papyrus is so mutilated that no continuity between columns remains, and often the meaning of any one column is doubtful. I have given the only important passage in the last few columns. For the sake of completeness I append a synopsis of the other columns.

. . . it follows necessarily that the experience of the sophists is transmitted not without method. I. 24 . . . those emulated among many peoples, Euphranor, Nicias, Nicomachus and Hegesias¹⁹ and many others.

Prooemium, narration, demonstration, exception²⁰ and summary. I, 126, col. XXVI.

Unless he said that the Panegyric of Isocrates or the Panathenaic or the Busiris and the Helen and the Peace²¹ were without method. I, 127, col. XXVII, l. 20.

What is true of the most inconsequential arts is true of rhetoric. In these one with a suitable nature, who acquires the principles and adds to them practice is able to produce the result; one who does not learn the principles, either from others or from manuals, even if he aims at the desired goal always is incapable of producing any of the results. So in rhetoric. I, 128, col. XXVIII, l. 9.

A clever man without studying the technical works of the sophists can study some sophist's speech and so learn to imitate them. But how can he imitate it if it is a long way off? "How can he help imitating it if it is very near?" says Epicurus.²² I. 16. How can they expect that there will be differences in the written works when the art is the same? How will they persuade in medicine and many other sciences? But, as I said, the kinds I, 130, col. XXIX.

¹⁹ For Hegesias we should probably read with Wilamowitz, Hermes XXXIV (1899), p. 636, Pausias.

²⁰ Reading in l. 5 *ὑπεξαίρεσις* with Fuhr, Rhein. Mus. LVII (1902) p. 432.

²¹ Reading I. 24 *τὸν περὶ εἰρήνης* with Sandys, Class. Rev. IX (1895), p. 359. The thought is the same as I, 100, 10 (v. p. 20).

²² For a better understanding of this column compare II, 251.

of principles of such arts are very few, and differ from the sciences.

I. 132, col.
XXX, l. 7.

They say that the art applies to deliberative and forensic oratory. Therefore when it is demonstrated that they are capable of neither, it is made plain that they have no art.

I. 134, col.
XXXI

. . . to write imitations of forensic, deliberative and ambassadorial speeches. In addition to this, other imitations of speeches must be made to deceive people into thinking that this implants the political faculty, i. e. to demonstrate that it is an art. For not without system could one persuade the majority that he knows what he does not know.

I. 137, col.
XXXIII.
l. 21.

Certain arts have been transmitted to men in writing, e. g. architecture, ship-carpentry, navigation, painting. All these arts had methods in olden time.

I. 139, col.
XXXIV.

No man was able, whether induced by philanthropy or vain-glory, to impart to his contemporaries or to posterity [the principles of politics] unless he employed the political *τέχνη* of the philosophers.

I. 144, col.
XXXIX.

[One] oftentimes advises a man to be just and rich or poor and humble or magnificent or beautiful, matters in which it is madness to speak of art; and the statesmen probably are better guessers than others. Why not? They have more access to the people.²³

FRAGMENTS OF BOOK II.

The very considerable disconnected fragments of Book II are collected by Sudhaus in vol. II pp. 65-130. A certain grouping is possible, and has been worked out by Sudhaus in the introduction to vol. I pp. XXVII ff., which I have used as a basis for my own arrangement. In the case of most of the groups it will be apparent to what part of the book they belong, and what relation they bear to the larger continuous fragment. I have thought it wise to indicate in case of the obscurer passages my own conjecture as to their position. The meaning of most of the passages, however, will be clear to one who has read the preceding pages of the second book.²⁴

II, 67, col.
III.

If some say that the faculty of speech comes by practice, the majority say that practice alone produces poor speakers.

²³ Reading with von Arnim (Hermes XXVIII (1893) p. 153) in I. 16 *εἰσεν εἶναι* I. 20 *σπαιλὸς ἢ πρόσοδος*.

²⁴ The following fragments are so inconsiderable that I have not attempted to include them in this abstract:

"The technical element they [i. e. rhetoricians] borrow from other arts e. g. from dialectic, and adorn themselves with borrowed plumage." But [the philosopher] borrows from many sources, for according to Euripides one can get his proofs out of the air without toil.

It is absurd to agree with Diogenes that rhetoric is not an art, and unworthy of a freeman. On this principle he would have to exclude many arts.²⁵

. . . proves that politics and sophistic are the same. He may have proved that politics and sophistic do not produce statesmen, but he does not realize that sophistic is not practice, but that every artist has his theoretical principles.

II, 70, fr.
VII.

Some speak without having had the benefit of instruction, but this does not prove that rhetoric is not an art.

He²⁶ says clearly that Demades did not study rhetoric, and the same applies to Aeschines. All of Demosthenes' opponents claim that he was an artist and Critolaus does not deny it. In addition to this, our statement that they gained little from the art supports [the theory]. For hit-or-miss methods succeed only rarely; no one will say that the continued success of Aeschines and Demades is a proof that there is an art of rhetoric.

II, 93, fr.
XXII.

II, 97, fr.
VIII.

If he instances Aeschines and Demades as good orators, this does not prove that sophistic is not a science.

"Rhetoric is not an art, for every art aims at a correct (or successful) procedure; now hit-or-miss methods do not produce correct results, but we know that rhetors have been successful without instruction."²⁷

II, 69, fr. V.

II, 71, fr.
VIII.

II, 65, fr. I	II, 76, fr. I	II, 96, fr. VI	II, 117, fr. XIII
65, fr. III	76, fr. II	98, fr. IX	121, fr. II
66, fr. V	76, fr. III	99, fr. X	122, fr. III
66, fr. VI	84, fr. VIII	99, fr. XI	126, fr. X
67, fr. I	86, fr. XII	99, fr. I	128, fr. XIV
67, fr. II	87, fr. XIII	99, fr. II	128, fr. XV
72, fr. IX	91, fr. XIX ^b	104, fr. X	129, fr. XVI
73, fr. X ^a	93, fr. I	108, fr. XVII	
73, fr. X ^b	96, fr. V ^a	117, fr. XI	
73, fr. XI	96, fr. V ^b	117, fr. XII	

²⁵ Cf. II, 95, fr. IV.

²⁶ This is aimed at Critolaus or Charmadas; v. Excursus, p. 371.

²⁷ This argument is like that which proves that there is no art of

II, 77, fr. IV
= II, III,
fr. XXII

II, 119, fr.
XVI, 8 ff.

II, 115, fr.
VI.

II, 74, fr.
XII = II,
106, fr.
XIII, XIV.

II, 127, fr.
XII.

II, 127, fr.
XIII = II,
75, fr. XIII.

II, 83, fr.
VII.

II, 85, fr.
XI.

Probably all that Homer meant was that they surpassed the other heroes in charm of conversation.

Speaking of heroes who were able to speak, and kings able. . . .

This argument assumes that sciences are the same in different localities, but that rhetoric differs in different countries and cities.

The sense of the following passages runs somewhat as follows: Rhetoric has been criticized for being all things to all men, so that it could be compared to the polypus which adapts its color to the rock on which it rests.²⁸ Philodemus' answer is an analogy drawn from medicine; the rhetor must consider the needs and character of his audience, just as the physician must take into account differences of climate and constitution in regulating the diet of the patient. Fr. XIV, p. 106 views the same subject from a different angle. A rhetor cannot be expected to be equally successful in all countries. A great Italian physician if transferred to Egypt would "send many mighty souls to Hades," through failure to understand all the local conditions.

. . . art does not vary with locality, and does not adapt itself to different peoples, consequently he demands that rhetoric shall not change.

. . . demands that the perfect orator be also a good man and a good citizen.²⁹ But such a combination is not required in the case of any other art; a good musician may be a villain.

"Every art receives suitable pay; rhetoric does not." But dialectic does not receive large fees, nor does medicine; so by this reasoning these should not be considered arts.

Grant that the artist alone attains the end, or does so more than anyone else. If the rhetor is said to succeed alone or more than anyone else, that does not prove the sophist a rhetor. But this does not prove that politics is not an art, but the point would be proven if in law court and assembly no one of them succeeded more than those not rhetors. If it said that one skilled in trials attains the end, this remark is ridiculous. For in some arts, those untrained can attain the end.

rhetoric because the heroes were rhetors before any treatises on rhetoric were written. Cf. I, 27, 6 = Suppl. 15, 17. Also II, 76, fr. III. Philodemus seems to be arguing with a Stoic; cf. Sudhaus I, p. XXX.

²⁸ Cf. Theognis, 215 f.

²⁹ This is the Stoic position. Probably he is quoting Diogenes of Babylon; cf. Radermacher, Rhein. Mus. LIV (1899) p. 290.

They will say that the art is independent, but requires much natural superiority,³⁰ and practice in actual political life in which the art is deficient; and that those who are acquainted with the principles of the art are impotent if they do not have these external aids.

Having considered the arguments of this philosopher, we must next take up those of the Cyrenaic Theodorus and his followers.

"If the rhetors deceive, they are themselves deceived by their own instruments, just as in the case of sight and hearing. For if one deceives he can be deceived; therefore they deceive no more than they are themselves deceived." First, how does this prove that rhetoric is not an art? I do not see why he says that the rhetors are deceived, and that they do not merely deceive.³¹

When the rhetors deceive they deceive with a deception of others, not of themselves; as when a soldier strikes down his opponent, and says that he defeated him with defeat, he means his opponent's defeat, not his own.

When a man sees, he is not therefore seen; the same applies to hearing. Therefore rhetors are not deceived because they deceive.

One who deceives is also deceived himself; consequently capable rhetors are deceived in trials fully as much as they deceive. I wonder if Theodorus did not frequently deceive many; he had the power to deceive, and does not acknowledge that he was led astray.

The third syllogism is more endurable but no less absurd. For the physician can cure even if he uses barbarisms and solocisms, and does not speak in rhetorical style.

Persuasion is purely a matter of guesswork.

He says that the end of rhetoric is to persuade the hearer.

We shall say nothing to those who say that the end of rhetoric is to be able to find possible arguments on questions; or as some state it, to find the arguments for every question, and to refute the opposing arguments.³²

³⁰ προτερηματα means 'superiority' as in Polyb. III, 89, 9: ἦν δὲ τὰ προτερήματα Ῥωμαίων, ἀκατάκριπτα χορήγια καὶ χειρῶν πλῆθος.

³¹ Quintilian has a list of examples to prove that the deception practiced by the orators does not involve self-deception. II, 17, 18-21.

³² Cf. Aristotle's definition of rhetoric, I, 2: δύναμις περὶ ἕκαστον τοῦ θεωρησάι τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον πιθανόν.

II, 87, fr.
XIV.

II, 116, fr.
IX.

II, 90, fr.
XVIII = II,
121, fr. I.

II, 89, fr.
XVII

II, 88, fr.
XVI.

II, 113, fr.
IV.

II, 88, fr.
XVI, 7.

II, 91, fr.
XIX = II,
116, fr.
VIII.

II, 92, fr.
XXI = II,
124, fr. VII.
II, 103, fr.
IXa.

II, 94, fr. II
= II, 129,
fr. XVII.

(A refutation of an argument against rhetoric based on the mutual recrimination of orators.) If Aeschines charges Demosthenes with using *θαύματα* instead of *ρήματα*³³ of what use is that as an argument? Do not the philosophers revile one another?³⁴

II, 97, fr.
VII.

This fragment yields nothing of importance except the distinction between practical orators, Demosthenes and Lycurgus, and sophists, Isocrates and Matris. Cf. II, 233, 15.

II, 100, fr.
III.

This deals with the argument that rhetoric is not an art because it has been excluded from some cities.³⁵

II, 102, fr.
VI.

Phocion studied the political art with Plato or Aristotle, and became a statesman.

II, 102, fr.
VII.

Rivalry between Critolaus and the rhetors.

II, 105, fr.
XI.

The next argument is: "All practice and observation and training has some end to which all the parts ought to tend; rhetoric has no such end."

II, 105, fr.
XII.

[Rhetoricians] were not in good repute at the very beginning, in Egypt and Rhodes and Italy.

II, 107, fr.
XV.

We shall next consider the statement that every art is invented for some useful purpose, but rhetoric tends [to deceive].³⁶

II, 108, fr.
XVI.

[I think that he wishes to] say that they do not have theoretical acquaintance with all subjects, but only with some; that the speakers in actual debates discuss many political problems, and, therefore some are able to speak to the point, others not; and that those who have a theoretical acquaintance with all subjects are good speakers.³⁷

³³ Aesch. III, 167.

³⁴ For *θαυμασιουργίαν* l. 6 Fuhr, Rhein. Mus. LVII (1902) p. 431, proposes to read *θαυμαστοποιαν*.

³⁵ Cf. I, 16, fr. IX.

³⁶ Cf. I, 2, 6, ff. = Suppl. 4, 4, ff. Possibly this is the opinion of Critolaus; cf. Sext. Emp. Adv. Rhet. 10-12.

³⁷ It is impossible to determine the identity of the person from whom Philodemus quotes this opinion. It may be of interest to note, however, that a similar opinion of the need of universal knowledge in oratory was warmly supported by Cicero. The most striking passage for purposes of comparison with Philodemus is in the De Oratore, I, 5, 17: Est enim scientia comprehendenda rerum plurimarum; but the thought is elaborated in a large number of passages which I have collected in my dissertation—The Influence of Isocrates on Cicero, Dionysius and Aristides, pp. 20 ff. It would be rash to make the claim that Philodemus was aiming at Cicero, for Philodemus in spite of his long residence at Rome, and his close connection with a prominent Roman family is entirely Greek in his literary

They do not show that rhetoricians were contemporary with the physicists. The fact that there were political rhetors before the technical treatises of the sophists were written, does not prove that political rhetoric is not an art.

The same form of argument could be used with damaging effect against its author; there were certainly statesmen before Plato and Aristotle wrote on politics, and it can be proven that philosophy is not an episteme, for there were good men before Zeno, Cleanthes, Socrates and Aristotle.

If we consider that he (i. e. Homer) was the founder (*εὐρέτης*) of philosophy, as he is held to be not by the Critics alone but by the philosophers of all sects, it is just as reasonable to hold that he was the founder of rhetoric.³⁸

Does rhetoric help body or soul?

Let us now take up the statement of these same people that political rhetoric is an art, but less so than others; for they agreed that a few who had reached the top would be capable speakers.

He who says that the end of rhetoric is to persuade, does not persuade himself but his neighbor.

He holds the art to blame for the mistakes of those who are only partially acquainted with it.

If many are able to attain an easy end, oftentimes better than the artist, still artists are to be admired, and are able to attain difficult end. For a physician who can cure ten out of a hundred difficult cases cannot be said to succeed in the majority of cases, yet we might call him a good artist.

There is no method by which one can persuade the multitude, either always or in the majority of cases.

... and they say that Isocrates and Gorgias and Lysias acknowledged that they did not possess science. This is incredible and impossible, since they professed to be artists, and to

references. Cicero's opinions, however, were not unique but merely representative of the revival of the 'philosophic rhetoric' of Isocrates, which is represented on the Greek side by Dionysius, and, as we know from the introduction to his Attic Orators, by many others, some of whom may have been in the mind of Philodemus. Furthermore, any reference to Cicero is excluded by the probability that the Rhetorica of Philodemus antedates the De Oratore.

³⁸ Wilamowitz, Hermes XXXIV (1899) p. 636, reads l. 10 *οὐχ ὑπὸ* l. 13 *αἰρέσεως* and explains *κριτικῶν* as the school of Crates.

teach others. Isocrates left technical treatises, and so did many other sophists, and declare it to be a wonderful art.

II, 123,
fr. V.

But [the rhetoricians] do not know how to make laws, or govern according to their manuals.

II, 123, fr.
VI.

Inasmuch as rhetors persuade some people by kisses, let us not say that others are artists who do not possess the rhetor's faculty. He demands that every science have its own subject matter with which it is concerned, and tries to show that rhetoric has no such subject matter.³⁹

II, 66, fr.
IV.

. . . we use the principles of grammar; and using the same line of argument, if we are to heal we shall use the principles of medicine, and so in the case of the other arts.

II, 125, fr.
IX.

We take up next the argument that every art attains the end either always or generally, but rhetoric falls into neither of these classes, but succeeds rarely, and then by the use of elements common to all men.⁴⁰

II, 126, fr.
XI.

(Summary of the arguments against the Stoics.) They use a poor definition which excludes all the conjectural arts; they make false accusations against rhetoric, which really accomplishes much by definite principles; many other criticisms might be made against them. We now pass to the next group, Ptolemaeus. . . .

II, 109, fr.
XVIII.

How can one teach vocal culture unless one has a trained voice, or medicine unless one is a physician?

II, 95, fr.
IV, l. 5.

Gladly would I learn why only occupations fit for a free man can be considered arts. How could rhetoric be called unsuitable, if . . . I pass by for the moment the statement that [the rhetors themselves] do not wish to have it considered an art; for Demosthenes and Pericles claimed [to possess] rhetoric, and usage [accepts it as an art].

II, 94, fr.
III.

No less in error is the next argument which runs as follows; if the theorems of the art ought to be of such a nature, one must not do this. However one must not draw the conclusion which they direct. (What follows refers to periods.)

II, 91, fr.
XX.

Epicurus has stated explicitly in his *Περὶ ῥητορικῆς* that their knowledge of sophistic does not give them theoretical knowledge [of politics].

³⁹ Cf. Sext. Emp. Adv. Rhet. 48 ff., Quint. II, 21; v. Excursus p. 374.

⁴⁰ Cf. Sext. Emp. Adv. Rhet. 13-15.

One who spells Dionysus is not more grammatical than one who spells Theodorus.⁴¹ . . . The physician and grammarian attempt to impart certain things to others, and to instruct students of grammar and medicine; similarly, the rhetor . . .

II, 88, fr.
XV.

Let us say that music and medicine and Epicurean philosophy are not arts. Consequently they will say that there is no characteristic exercise in the arts, and judge that the assistance that comes from the arts . . .

II, 82, fr.
VI.

It is quite incredible that Isocrates accomplished any such result with this faculty.⁴²

II, 70, fr.
VI, 31-44.

If the Spartans and Romans manage their governments without the aid of rhetoric . . .⁴³

II, 65, fr. II.

BOOK III.

At the close of the second book Philodemus remarks: "Sophistic is not the knowledge of political rhetoric; this section we shall take up in the Hypomnematismus which is to follow. In that it will be demonstrated that political ability cannot come from these sophistical schools any more than from the common schools or the philosophical schools; that oftentimes the possession of it is responsible for no small mischief, and does not bring success in actual law cases."

This is the only certain indication that we have of the contents of the third book. Sudhaus thinks that some of the fragments of the Hypomnematismus may belong to this book, but the two works overlap so much that the question cannot be settled with certainty.

BOOK IV.

The contents of this book may be deduced from the closing paragraph, I, 222, col. XLIIa, 4. 'Αποτεωρημένων τοιγαροῦν, ὃ Γάίε παῖ, πάντων ἃ μέρη φασὶ τινες καὶ διδάγματα τῆς ῥητορικῆς ὑπάρχειν, ὅτι τὰ μὲν κατέψευσται, τὰ δ' οὐδὲν χρησιμεύει τοῖς μὴ τὰ ῥητορικὰ σοφιστεύουσιν, ὅλον δὲ πομπέεται παρ' αὐτοῖς τὸ μητέρα τῶν μαθημάτων καὶ τῶν τεχνῶν εἶναι καὶ τιν' ἐνθήκην καὶ ἀφετήριον τὴν ῥητορικὴν καὶ μᾶλλον ἔτι μετὰ τῆς πειθοῦς λαμβανόμενῃ. It was a criticism of rhetoric, following the divisions of the ordinary rhetorical technē. All that remains is the treatment of λέξις or φράσις, and ὑπόκρισις, with a short digression on the province of the orator. The study of the book

⁴¹ I. e. different words have different spellings, and different arts have different principles, but one is an art just as much as the other.

⁴² Isocrates is representative of sophistic. The sentence means: It is incredible that sophistic trains for practical rhetoric.

⁴³ Cf. the use of the same argument in the larger fragment, I, 14, fr. V.

may be facilitated by prefixing a short outline of its present contents to the detailed treatment of the fragments.

The main body of the book is devoted to λέξις. The first two columns however, do not have any connection with this subject. Column I, vol. I, p. 147 deals with φύσις, column II with the meaning of φιλοσοφία. The connected fragment begins with column III. III-X discuss the meaning of καλή as applied to λέξις. XI-XIX treat of faults of style, soloecism, barbarism and obscurity. The second group of fragments (I, p. 162 ff.) begins with a discussion of homoioteleuton (col. I) and collision of vowels (col. II). Col. III outlines the following discussion of φράσις dividing it into τρόπος, σχῆμα and πλάσμα. The first part of the discussion of τρόπος is too fragmentary to permit of any restoration. X-XXII criticizes the rhetorical treatment of metaphors, XXIII introduces the subject of allegory, and there the fragment ends; the sections on σχῆμα and πλάσμα are entirely lost. The next group of fragments, continuing the criticism of text books of rhetoric, denies that rhetoric can claim the credit for teaching men to avoid faults of speech (col. I^a-XI^a). XI^a-XIX^a makes a similar criticism of the rhetorical claims to teach ὑπόκρισις. XX^a-XXX^a attacks the rhetorician's claim of ability to speak on all subjects. XXX^a-XL^a criticizes the sophistical use of epideictic, denying that the sophistical encomia possess moral value. XLI has a brief remark on Demetrius' peculiar fourfold division of oratory. The book concludes with a summary (XLII-XLIV).

I, p. 147,
col. I.

They agree with us regarding what is naturally and truly advantageous. Therefore he who has learned what is naturally good and bad, and intermediate and indifferent, and has acquired the practical and theoretical means of producing this . . .

I, 147, col.
II.

The restoration of this column is very uncertain. I cannot understand the use of εἶπον (I. 7) with ἐκάλουν following in I. 11 without a connective. The meaning seems to be that the rhetoricians, claiming that their profession was a philosophy and an art, meant that it was a philosophy in the sense in which Isocrates used the term, i. e. the study of the whole of human activity from the standpoint of the orator, and not with the intention of paralleling the Peripatetics and Stoics by propounding a peculiar system of thought. This claim that rhetoric is the most comprehensive of studies is noticed again at the end of the book, I, 223, 11 quoted above, p. 37.

I, 148, col.
III.

This fragment is part of a discussion of the meaning of καλή as applied to λέξις or φράσις. One possible definition is that καλή λέξις is one which can present proposals which shall seem advantageous¹ in such a way as to win the audience. This definition is mentioned only to be rejected.

¹ For the thought cf. Sext. Emp. Adv. Rhet. 56: διόπερ ὅταν λέγεται ὁ ρήτωρ καλῆς λέξεως εἶναι κατασκευαστικός, ἦτοι κατὰ τοῦτο λέγεται καθὸ τὴν τὰ συμφέροντα πράγματα δηλοῦσαν λέξιν κατασκευάζει. . . . οὔτε δὲ καθὸ τὴν τὰ συμφέροντα πράγματα μνηνύσαν· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἴσασι περὶ τούτων τῶν πραγμάτων οἱ ρήτορες.

καλή φράσις belongs to the Epicurean philosophers, but is not even remotely connected with the rhetoricians or sophists. For if by καλή one means the use of words in their proper meaning, why should the philosophers take second place?

I, 149, col.
IV.

Any "imitation" of things by words is impossible. In the beautiful style of Isocrates, or the grand style of Demosthenes we do not find this attempt to fit sound to sense.

I, 149,
col. V.
I, 150, col.
VI.

If there were no naturally beautiful style, it might be necessary to be content with one established by arbitrary authority. But as there is a naturally beautiful style it is a shame to seek for another. For the arbitrary style is not accepted by all, nor is it always the same in the same author; some imitate the style of Isocrates, others that of Thucydides.²

I, 151, col.
VII.

Whom then shall we imitate, especially since it is so formidable a task? Perchance we might imitate all who have been successful at any time or place. One cannot even say that all rhetors adopt one style.

I, 152, col.
VIII.

Only two or three at the most imitate Isocrates, and some say that the style of Isocrates is not uniform in all his works.

I, 152, col.
IX.

Therefore the grammarians and philosophers who refuse to follow these rules, but write in simple style and not in the ridiculous style prescribed by the manuals [write better than the sophists]. We have now discussed every possible phase of the subject.

I, 153,
col. X.

Now in regard to a correct use of the Greek language which some say consists in observing the local peculiarities of speech (dialectical peculiarities), and in the avoidance of soloecism and barbarism³—some call the failure to observe the local peculiarities soloecism, still others make a distinction between barbarism and incorrect pronunciation, e. g. a mistake in aspiration or accent—it is not convenient to speak at present.⁴

I, 154, col.
XI.

² Radermacher, Rhein. Mus. LIV (1899) p. 365, quotes Maximus Planudes, Schol. Hermog. vol. V, p. 440, 25W; ὁ δὲ γε Ἐπίκουρος ἐν τῷ περὶ ρητορικῆς ἀθθαδέστερον οἶμαι λέγων φησὶν αὐτὸς μόνος εὐρηκέναι τέχνην πολιτικῶν λόγων· τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἀποσκορακίζων ρήτορας ἐαντὶ πως μαχόμενα λέγει· φύσις γὰρ ἐστὶν ἡ κατορθοῦσα λόγους, τέχνη οὐδεμία. Apparently he thought that Epicurus was a rhetorician!

³ Reading in I. 11 μηδὲ for οἱ δὲ as suggested by von Arnim, Hermes XXVIII (1893) p. 153.

⁴ The distinction between barbarism and soloecism which is given by the later grammarians when the theory had become crystallized was that

I, 155, col. XII.

The sophists commit more soloecisms than anyone else. There is no art of style, such as they desire, and as is found in other lines of study. To sum up the question of style—one style is common to all. (I. e. the natural.)

I, 156, col. XIII.

Obscurity is of two kinds, intentional and unintentional. It is intentional when one has nothing to say, and conceals the poverty of his thought by obscure language that he may seem to say something useful. [Connected with this] is the use of many digressions, poetic images, recondite allusions and archaic language. Soloecisms prevent the hearer from understanding many things. Only the true philosopher is free from these faults.

I, 157, col. XIV.

Unintentional obscurity arises from not mastering the subject, or not observing the proper formation of periods either in writing or speaking, and in general from failure to use pure Greek, and from believing that words are in harmony with things.⁵

I, 157, col. XV.

I, 158, col. XVI.

barbarism was a mistake in a single word e. g. in the use of a wrong ending, while soloecism was a mistake in syntax. The two overlapped somewhat, and it remained a question whether to use *hanc* meaning a man, was a soloecism or barbarism. (Cf. Quint. I, 5, 34 ff., Diomed. 455K.) Quintilian with his usual good sense decides that this is a soloecism.

Quintilian and later authorities include under barbarism mistakes in the use of the aspirate and in accent, which some *teste Philodemus* preferred to make a separate class. (Quint. I, 5, 19; I, 5, 22; Donat. p. 392K.) The definition of *ἑλληνισμός* here given is paralleled in Herodian, De Soloecismo et Barbarismo, Nauck, Lex. Vindob. p. 311, 9; 'Ἐρωτηθεὶς τις τί ἐστὶν ἑλληνισμός, ἔφη, 'τὸ πάσαις ταῖς διαλεκταῖς ὁρθῶς χρῆσθαι.' In their origin there seems to have been no distinction between soloecism and barbarism. Aristotle uses the terms interchangeably (Soph. El. III); Hegesias has the same confusion (ap. Dion. Hal., De Comp. Verb. 18, p. 82, 5 U. et R.). The first clear statement of the distinction which afterwards became fixed is in Diogenes of Babylon ap. Diog. Laert. VII, 1, 59. But the question was far from being settled by his dictum, as this passage from Philodemus shows.

⁵Reading *σύνφ[ωνα]* for *συμφ[ωνή]* lines 24, 25. Does he refer to the doctrine, elaborated by the Stoics though not originated by them, of the onomatopoeic origin of language? Cf. Arist. Rhet. III, 1, 8; Plato Crat. 423A; August. Princ. Dialect., VI (I, 1412M). Of the Stoic position the latter says: Stoici autumant, quos Cicero in hac re irridet, nullum esse verbum, cuius non certa ratio explicari possit. Et quia hoc modo suggerere facile fuit, si diceret hoc infinitum esse; quibus verbis alterius verbi originem interpretaveris, eorum rursus a te originem quaerendam esse

[Obscurity also arises] from ignorance of the proper meanings of words, their connotation, and the principles on which one word is to be preferred to another. I, 159, col. XVII.

In addition to these there is a fault treated separately by the theorists, namely the too frequent use of hyperbata, and failure to make the gap between the separated words short enough when it is necessary to use this figure; and the separation of correlated conjunctions by too large an interval.⁶ I, 160, col. XVIII.

One should use ordinary expressions appropriately, and not express oneself inaccurately, nor vaguely, nor use expressions with double meaning.⁷ I, 161, col. XIX.

They (the sophists) have not explained the intricacies of subject matter. [This belongs to the philosophers.]

(A discussion on the choice of words has preceded.) The most important of the rhetorical sophists err in their too great devotion to homoioteleuton and similar figures, and pay little heed to the use of words. I, 162, col. I.

Collision of vowels is rather frigid, but sometimes not inopportune. However they (the sophists) do not define each case (i. e. when it is to be avoided and when permitted), but they depend entirely on subjective tests. . . . If, then, the observation of the principles laid down by them involves anything extraordinary, and there are present *πάθη* and *ῥήθη* and the other characteristics of artificial speech, I wonder if a satisfactory form of expression has not been moulded from the vulgar speech. This artificial speech they divide into three parts: *τρόπος*, *σχῆμα*, *πλάσμα*. *τρόπος* includes metaphor, allegory, etc.; *σχῆμα*, periods, cola, commata and the combinations of these; *πλάσμα* refers to I, 163, col. II.

donec perveniatur eo ut res cum sono verbi aliqua similitudine concinat, ut, cum dicimus, aeris tinnitum etc. . . . Sed quia sunt res, quae non sonant, in his similitudinem tactus valere, ut si leniter vel asperere sensum tangunt, lenitas vel asperitas litterarum ut tangit auditum, sic eis nomina peperit. . . . Lene est auribus, cum dicimus, voluptas, asperum est, cum dicimus, crux. . . . Haec quasi cunabula verborum esse crediderunt, ut sensus rerum cum sonorum sensu concordarent. Hinc ad . . . similitudinem . . . processisse licentiam nominandi. . . . Inde ad abusionem ventum est. . . . Innumerabilia enim sunt verba, quorum ratio reddi non possit; aut non est, ut ego arbitrator, aut latet, ut Stoici contendunt.

⁶ Cf. Arist. Rhet. III, 5, 2.

⁷ Cf. Arist. Rhet. II, 22, 12.

the distinction between grand and plain and middle or smooth style.⁸ It is foolish to apply the term *πλάσμα* to everything which transgresses the bounds of plain speech.

I, 166-169. Cols. V-IX are too fragmentary to permit a restoration of a complete sentence. It is evident from such phrases as *μεταφέρειν τὰς ὀνομασίας* (167, col. VII, 6), *πλείστας ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν ὁμοιότητας ἐννοεῖν καὶ διαφορὰς* (168, 24), *μεταφοραῖς* (169, 16), that they are devoted to a discussion of *τρόπος* (cf. col. III). Apparently in col. VIII there was some discussion of the propriety of metaphors in deliberative oratory. Col. X sub fin. and col. XI discuss some plan for a scientific classification of metaphors, the details of which are not clear. He continues (col. XII, XIII) with a criticism of the common rhetorical doctrine of metaphors.

I, 171, 2, col. XII. The rhetoricians are content to classify and describe metaphors, e. g. animate objects are compared to animate, or animate to inanimate, inanimate to animate etc., but they give no practical working instructions.

I, 173, col. XIV. They will ridicule a metaphor without explaining why it is faulty or how a good metaphor is to be invented. While they divert the attention of young men from philosophy they do not give specific instructions when to use metaphors and allegories, for they consider that the use of metaphors is of advantage only to teachers, but to one engaged in the intercourse of active life they are superfluous baggage. If the use of literal expressions is extended over so wide a field, every art will be silent because deprived of the helpful assistance of metaphors. Some even apply opprobrious epithets to those who call in the aid of figurative language.

I, 175, col. XVI, I, 176, col. XVII. The language again becomes fragmentary. Apparently the charge is made that the sophists use metaphors even more freely than the poets, not to mention the other writers of prose. Other fragments of these two columns are almost too small to notice.

I, 177, col. XVIII. Some say that they use metaphors for the sake of the comparison or resemblance; not however resemblance *per se*, but . . .

I, 179, col. XX. This column deals with the far-fetched metaphors of which two examples are given. These were criticized by persons whose own use of metaphors was not above reproach on this score.

I, 180, col. XXI. Many who have received an education, and who are acquainted with the sciences, use metaphors nearly as much as the sophists.

⁸ For *μέγεθος* I. 4 read *μεσότης* with Radermacher, Rhein. Mus. LIV (1899) p. 361, n. 1.

It is strange then if we are to avoid metaphors, wholly, or in part, while the sophists use them constantly. I, 180, col. XXII.

Col. XXIII is the beginning of a discussion of allegory, dividing it into three parts, *ἀνύγμα*, *παροιμία*, *εἰρωνεία*, disregarding for the present such subdivisions as *γρήφος* and *ἀστεισμός*. I, 181, col. XXIII.

The first five columns of this section are disconnected fragments. The subject is the avoidance of faults of style. In column IV^a the thought is, "But the avoidance of these faults is not the result of technical training in rhetoric." Various faults to be avoided are mentioned in column III^a; viz. the use of rhythm in prose, obscure use of metonymy, and omission of the second of two correlating particles. The continuous section begins with column IV^a l. 5a. I, 182, col. I^a-I, 186, col. V^a.

The sophistical training does not prevent faulty speech. Those who compose these technical treatises would have us believe that nobody observed these errors in speech before they wrote, and that they speak more correctly than other people.

How can he (i. e. some rhetorician whose statement of the above tenor has just been quoted) say that these faults were not observed by the famous statesmen and philosophers who preceded Zopyrus and Antiphon, who avoided most if not all of them? He did not allow himself any loophole for escape, such as allowing "rhetoric" in his statement to be interpreted as meaning such instruction as Phoenix is reputed to have given Achilles, for he will not allow natural ability in speaking to be called rhetoric. And he made his statement more emphatic by saying, "before the study of rhetoric became firmly established." Consequently both Thucydides the son of Stephanus¹⁰ and Thucydides the son of Olorus were guilty of these faults of style. For the systematic study of rhetoric began in their day, but can hardly be said to have been firmly established. And yet the introduction of these studies has made no difference in the way people speak. I hesitate to say that no one except a ditch digger and Maison talks in the way which he criticizes, but I think that such language as he condemns is characteristic not of an uneducated man, but of one lacking in common sense. Therefore let us not wonder at his statement that the technical I, 186, col. V^a, l. 8. I, 188, col. VII^a. I, 189, col. VIII^a.

⁹ It is probable that col. IV^a should precede col. III^a. Then col. III^a and col. V^a are continuous reading; *ἐγὼ μὲν τούτων πολλὰ κάγαθὰ πεποίηκ', αὐτοῖς μοι χάριν οὐκ ἀποδέδωκεν*, thus illustrating the omission of *δέ* after *μὲν*. This is the suggestion of Sandys, Class. Rev. IX, p. 359.

¹⁰ Apparently a slip for Melesias.

I, 190, col.
IX^a, I, 191,
col. X^a.

treatises on rhetoric are the sole standard of correct speech. If he called rhetorical speech the only correct speech, his statement would be consistent. And that is what he actually appears to mean when he says that at the time poets and educated men flourished in Greece all were inferior to the sophists in correctness of speech. He does not permit us to understand him to be speaking of ordinary conversation, because he cites examples of faults in diction, and corrects them. If he said that the rhetors were successful in rhetoric he was speaking either with reference to the dialectician (a position which we refute) or with reference to other educated persons or artists, each of whom understands the principles of his profession better than a layman, as for example he himself has represented Philo the architect addressing the people about the arsenal.¹¹ But study of technical rhetoric has never advanced anyone.

I, 192, col.
XI^a.

SECTION II.

Delivery.

I, 193, col.
XI^a, I. 12.

Of the six, or as some say seven, parts of rhetoric, Athenaeus says that the most important is delivery,¹² and we agree that a good delivery lends dignity to the speaker, secures the attention of the audience and sways their emotions. But if¹³ it is more the task of rhetoric to teach this than it is the task of dialectic or grammar one would desire to learn it. One teaches how to argue, the other how to read. If they claim that delivery in drama comes under the head of rhetoric, we congratulate them on their sense. But if actors do not need assistance from the rhetorician why do they not allow us, too, to decide on the delivery proper to our own sphere? The fact that, uncertain in the

I, 194, col.
XIII^a.

¹¹ On Philo the architect cf. Cic. De Orat. I, 14, 62. The use which the rhetorician made of Philo may be estimated from the words of Cicero, Neque enim, si Philonem illum architectum, qui Atheniensibus armamentarium fecit, constat perdiserte populo rationem operis sui reddidisse, existimandum est architecti potius artificio disertum quam oratoris fuisse. Is οὗτος αὐτός Demetrius of Phalerum? See the discussion by Fuhr in Rhein. Mus. LVII (1902) p. 434.

¹² I adopt the emendation of Gomperz, Sitzungsab. d. k. Ak. in Wien, vol. CXXIII, p. 33, quoted in Sudhaus' apparatus.

¹³ Reading in I. 25 *ei* for *οὐ* with von Arnim, Hermes XXVIII (1893) p. 153.

beginning, they take refuge in this, that the actors try to rival the delivery taught by the rhetoricians, is not consistent with their magnifying the art of rhetoric because of delivery, and claiming that for this reason it is better than philosophy. If they say that they are the only ones who have formulated an art of delivery, they do violence to the plain fact that the poets and writers of prose have a theory of delivery even though they have not committed it to writing.

Much of delivery is the natural and unconscious bodily expression of the emotions. Delivery depends, too, on natural endowment, beauty of voice, grace of body, selfpossession, qualities the lack of which caused Isocrates to refrain from public appearances. But Demosthenes said that delivery was the first thing in oratory, and the second and the third, and actors say that it is everything in their art. However it was ridiculous to say that this element which is of assistance to all is of more account in rhetoric than in other forms of prose. Although Demosthenes was in the first rank of rhetors, still he is criticized by Aeschines for his shrill voice, and again for loudness,¹⁴ and by Demetrius of Phalerum for being too theatrical, and not simple and noble in his delivery. Moreover most of the sophists, judged by their writings, seem to have had a poor delivery. Their long periods are hard to pronounce, *teste Demetrio*.¹⁵ Hieronymus also criticizes Isocrates. His orations he says are easy to read, but hard to deliver in public; there is no fire in them; everything is monotonously smooth. He sounds like a boy speaking through a heroic mask. Sophists of the present day have somewhat improved in delivery.

I, 195, col.
XIV^a, 8.

Col. XV^a.

I, 198, col.
XVII^a, 23.

I, 200,
XVIII^a, 18.

The formal instruction in delivery is a product of recent foolishness; however many of the heroes had an excellent delivery. What the technographers have done is to make plain what had been kept secret before by the statesmen, viz. that they have a system for making themselves appear dignified and noble, and for misleading their audiences. This system is not needed by any other artist, certainly not by the philosopher. The fact is, each profession has its own peculiar delivery.

¹⁴ Aesch. 2, 157: ἐντενόμενος τὴν ὀξείαν καὶ ἀνόσιον φωνήν. 106, ἀναβοᾷ παμμεγέθες Δημοσθένης. Cf. 86; In Ctes. 218.

¹⁵ For Isocrates' own opinion on the way people delivered his orations v. Panath. 17, Phil. 25-29.

I. 201, col.
XX^a, 12.

Sophists with common sense confine themselves to a discussion of political questions, and do not claim to discuss the form of introduction, narration etc. suitable to every question.¹⁶ The latter is reserved for the thick-witted crew who fail to distinguish whether 1) only political questions can be treated in these divisions, or 2) all questions can be so treated, and that they are the only ones who outline methods adapted to all questions, or 3) they are the only ones who have published such treatises. All three positions are unsound, for 1) almost all questions are treated according to this division, 2) the technographers have given us no treatises on philosophy or music, 3) other professions have laid down rules for presenting their subject matter.

I. 202, col.
XXI^a.I. 204, col.
XXII^a, 16.I. 204, col.
XXIII^a.

The same confusion of thought is found in the claim that the end of rhetoric is to find the possible arguments on any subject, and that rhetoric is alone or almost alone in doing this.¹⁷ In the first place this is nothing more or less than "invention." In the second place if rhetoric can discover the possible arguments in questions relating to medicine, music, etc. the rhetoricians are immediately put into rivalry with the experts in each of these professions. As it is impossible for a philosopher to discover the best possible arguments for some other sect, how can one in a totally different line of activity discover these arguments?

I. 206, col.
XXV^a.

Each profession has its own facts and principles, and is alone competent to argue about them. But grant that the end of rhetoric is to find the possible arguments on every rhetorical subject; the phrase "on every" needs restriction.

I. 207, col.
XXVI^a.

Besides let us say that no good can result from being able to discover arguments, even if it is valuable to have the state of mind which could discover them. For it is clear that he who

¹⁶ This paragraph is an attack on followers of Isocrates such as Cicero, who claimed for the orator the right to speak on all subjects. Cf. *De Oratore*, III, 20, 76, as an illustration of the principle, although Philodemus probably wrote before Cicero: *Illa vis autem eloquentiae tanta est ut omnium rerum virtutum officiorum omnisque naturae, quae mores hominum quae animos, quae vitam continet, originem vim mutationesque teneat, eadem mores leges iura describat, rem publicam regat, omnia quae ad quamcumque rem pertineant ornate copioseque dicat.*

¹⁷ This is substantially Aristotle's definition, *Rhet.* I, 2, 1: *ἔστω δὴ ῥητορικὴ δύναμις περὶ ἕκαστον τοῦ θεωρησαὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον πιθανόν.*

discovers the inherent arguments must know those which are cogent, and those which are only plausible; but they are far from knowing what is plausible and what is necessary. Nor do they know what is possible and impossible; their natural philosophy is of no help to them. Then they need a criterion of truth, and it is folly to think they possess this. If they say that what appears true to the crowd is true, they say nothing more than that the statesman can discover the inherent political arguments; secondly, the majority does not always abide by the same standard of judgment. Perhaps some one will say that a happy life has no need of politics and rhetorical sophistic. I assert that the sophists can, at least as far as their technical treatises are concerned, discover not the slightest argument pertaining to politics.

I. 208, col.
XXVII^a.I. 209, col.
XXVIII^a.I. 210, col.
XXIX^a.

Again another will object that the great sophists have no ability in sophistic, as is shown by the published treatises. I say that the arguments of the sophists and statesmen are mostly false. To discover all the arguments requires a deeper and more philosophic understanding.

Rhetoricians divide their subjects into three parts: forensic, (*δικανικά*), deliberative (*συμβουλευτικά*), and encomiastic (*τὰ περὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνοους καὶ ψόγους*). We will omit for the present, discussion of the first two, except to say that some use the term *δικαστηριακόν* instead of *δικανικόν*, and that deliberative oratory gives advice only on matters affecting the common welfare, and that this advice is not the product of the sophistic art, but of quite a different art.

I. 211, col.
XXX^a, 19.

In regard to the encomiastic branch of oratory, let us say that political orators frequently employ passages of praise and censure but they do not use them after the fashion of the sophists, nor do they claim to be the only ones able to praise or censure. That is the pretension of the sophists whom we now proceed to answer referring directly to their published works. If they mean that they alone have the power to praise or censure all things, it is right to inquire whether they praise or censure the same object indifferently, or only praise what is praiseworthy, and censure what is blameworthy. If the former, aside from the impossibility of praising that which is blameworthy, there are some things which do not admit of either praise or censure;

I. 213, col.
XXXII^a, 6.

I, 215, col.
XXXIV^a.

I, 216, col.
XXXV^a, 14.

if to the second, they arrogate to themselves the knowledge of what is useful or harmful. If they profess to write encomia of gods and heroes, and to praise some men and censure others, we say that the gods do not need any praise of men, especially not the unseemly praise of the sophists. Their praise of brute beasts does no good, for one can not change the nature of animals by this process.

They say that men are turned to virtue by their encomia, and dissuaded from vice by their denunciations. But the sophists by their praise of Busiris and similar characters, persuade men to become villains. And when they do praise a good man they praise him for qualities considered good by the crowd, and not for truly good qualities. If they had real philosophic insight into the nature of virtue and vice, they would seek virtue and avoid vice themselves.

I, 218, col.
XXXVII^a,
19.

Not only do they fail at times to praise anything useful, but they frequently praise bad things, and by lavishing praise on matters of small account they incline us to treat all subjects lightly, and by their praise of men to their faces lead to great confusion. They are ignorant, too, of the proper time to praise, which we discuss in our work *Περὶ ἐπαιῶν*.

I, 220, col.
XXXIX^a, 4.

Furthermore, no one can believe the encomiasts, because they praise bad men, and often praise and censure the same person.

I, 220, col.
XL^a.

The sophists do not excel the poets in their ability to praise, nor even some of the philosophers. In fact any one can do what they claim as their sole possession. We grant that they may have a monopoly of such encomia as are in common circulation. That they do any good thereby, we deny.

I, 222, 6.

Demetrius adds a fourth class to those mentioned. This he calls *ἐντευκτικὸν ἄπασιν* (obtaining favor with all).¹⁸ If he means that which obtains favor with the multitude, and with potentates, let him have his point for the present; later we shall see what comes of it. But he errs in assigning this and the sophistical branch of rhetoric to the same individual. If he takes the search for truth from the philosophers and gives it to the rhetoricians

¹⁸ Crönert, *Kolotes und Menedemos*, p. 69, refers this to Demetrius of Phalerum. Diogenes Laertius gives among the works of Demetrius (V, 5, 80, 81) *δημηγοριῶν τε καὶ πρεσβειῶν . . . συναγωγαί*, and *Πρεσβευτικός*, and his fourth class may be speeches of ambassadors.

he is transferring the power he once had in political affairs to investigations which require proof.

After considering all the divisions of rhetoric and its claims, I, 222, col. XLII. Gaius, and recognizing that some are false, and others are of no use to one who does not make a profession of rhetoric, it is plain that their claim that rhetoric is the mother of the arts and sciences is a vain pretense. In another place we shall discuss the charge that it is based on deceit, and therefore harmful. We differ from them when they say that the students of rhetoric become better than their contemporaries. If they mean that they become better in their private lives they are utterly wrong.¹⁹ If they claim that it gives them more practical power than other arts, we retort that all do not obtain power, but some are banished and hated. Gorgias' statement ²⁰ that the rhetorician is more artistic than any other artist we shall consider later.

I, 223, col.
XLIII^a.

BOOK V.

This book consists of three groups of fragments. The first group is contained in vol. II pp. 131-143, and is designated as A by Sudhaus in his introduction; the second group is in vol. II pp. 143-167, designated as B by Sudhaus; the third group, vol. I pp. 225-270, comprises eight unconnected fragments, and a more or less continuous series designated as C. The contents of this book are foreshadowed at the close of the fourth book by the statement, "We postpone to another time the discussion of the claim that rhetoric is harmful because based on deceit." A large portion of the fifth book is occupied with a presentation of the disadvantages of rhetoric. This is, however, only a foil to the praises of Epicurean philosophy which are given in the form of a comparison of rhetoric and philosophy. In a portion of the book, at least, Philodemus discusses a treatise in praise of rhetoric, the statements of which are taken up and refuted one by one.

Briefly stated the contents of the book are:—Rhetoric is harmful, and useless in actual practice in public life; it is no protection against sycophants, but a trained speaker is even at a disadvantage before a jury because they expect to be deceived by his specious arguments. If a man expects to use it as a means to public preferment he should remember that

¹⁹ The claims of rhetoric here refuted are perhaps the common claims of Philodemus' own day. However they are at least as old as Isocrates, whose statement of them is perhaps the best; v. the chapter on Isocrates in the author's, *The Influence of Isocrates on Cicero*, etc.

²⁰ Cf. Plato, *Gorgias*, 456C. I. e. better able to discuss medicine than the physician.

statesman suffer death, exile and dishonor from the people they try to lead, and that if they succeed in avoiding popular displeasure, very few attain eminence; the toils of rhetoric more than counterbalance its advantages. The rhetorician's claim that the promises of rhetoric are possible of fulfillment, and those of philosophy, impossible, can hardly be meant seriously; if rhetoric promises to satisfy all one's desires, the philosopher replies that most of these desires are unnatural and impossible of satisfaction; the true way is to apply the teachings of philosophy and so limit one's desires. If it be asked what benefit philosophy confers on a state, we reply, it makes men good citizens, content with their lot; philosophy is the only true benefactor.

Rhetoric claims to be able to "sail the deep seas" i. e. to speak at length on any subject, while the philosophers use the dialectic method. But the philosophers can use both methods when they desire; the real difference between the two is that the philosophers use strict logic, while the rhetoricians use only probabilities and guesswork. But moral questions cannot be settled by guesswork.

The rhetoricians say that there is no morality except that established by popular opinion, and that the philosophers try to establish a new morality, like a new coinage. This is not true of the Epicureans. They agree with the people that the end of all conduct is pleasure, but they differ on the means to be employed to attain the end. It is really the statesman who differs from the popular conceptions.

The rhetoricians say that a virtuous man unable to defend himself from malicious attacks is a miserable sight; rhetoric defends a man, virtue does not. But the disgrace falls on the attackers not on the virtuous man. Philosophy provides everything necessary for a happy life.

II, 131, fr. I. (Quoting from some Epicurean? author)—he adds that the training given by the sophists does not prepare for forensic or deliberative oratory.

(Frgs. II and III are hopeless.)

II, 133, fr. IV. To tell the truth the rhetors do a great deal of harm to many people, and incur the enmity of powerful rulers, whereas philosophers gain the friendship of public men by helping them out of their troubles. Ought we not to consider that men who incur the enmity of those in authority are villains, and hated by both gods and men.

II, 134, fr. V. [Those trained in other arts, without training in rhetoric] can speak, not, to be sure rhetorically, but as laymen or dialecticians or philosophers. What is the loss incurred by inability to speak rhetorically? I do not mean to say that one trained to be a soldier, a gymnast or a dialectician could not possess a

knowledge of rhetoric, but that many would not. If they did not abandon the deceit involved in practical rhetoric they would not be able to acquire such rhetorical ability as even philosophy provides. . . . Sophistic style is suited to epideictic oratory and written works, but not to actual practice in forum and ecclesia.

More men are acquitted because of the lack of rhetoric than by means of it; nay even stammering is more persuasive than any other form of speech. For it is well said that the jurymen are not affected by any form of speech as much as by the just and prudent actions of the uneducated, and in trials they fear being misled by the rhetor. In speaking one should not resort to ignoble rhetorical tricks; these have less effect than a straightforward character. . . .

Speeches of this sort are no disgrace, if the object of forensic oratory be to set forth the facts, and not to show one's power.¹ II, 137, fr. VII. It is certainly not true that rhetoric is a weapon to be used against sycophants. . . .

Suppose one to have an abundance of delicate food and drink, but to be suffering great physical or mental torment, could one enjoy them? The implied comparison is: one cannot enjoy the power and wealth which are the prizes of rhetoric, if one has to endure its toils. It is this thought, apparently which is worked out in fr. X.

If they spend all their time about the courts, and start many lawsuits because of their knowledge of that sort of life, when they are brought to trial themselves they are ruined (because of the prejudice against professional speakers); if they make a sparing use of their professional knowledge in order to appear modest, they lose some of their power, and at the same time forfeit that peace of life and solidity of character which contribute most to success.

Every good and honest man who confines his interest to philosophy alone, and disregards the nonsense of lawyers, can face boldly all such troubles, yea all powers and the whole world. II, 140, fr. XII.

We do not claim that rhetoric is bad in itself, even if it furnishes weapons for wicked men, but it does not indicate what use is to be made of the power it gives, so as to fit in with our II, 142, fr. XIII.

¹ Cf. Arist. Rhet. III, 1, 5; I, 7, 36-37.

principles of justice and honor. Rhetoricians are like pilots, who have a good training but may be bad men.

II, 142, fr.
XIV.

Those who are troubled with the itch make it worse by scratching. If they would only endure the annoyance of the itch, and think less about it they would get better. So with those who suffer from sycophants.²

II, 143, fr. I.

[Giving everyone rhetorical ability with the idea that he will use it only in self-defence] is like giving a brigand or slave a sword, and bidding him strike only those who attack him.

II, 144, fr.
II.

But this does not apply any more to philosophy and the Epicureans who refrain from such things, than the remarks of those who combine contradictory principles in their instruction affect medicine.

II, 145, fr.
III.

[Men are lured away from their home towns; the small towns have to sacrifice their best to the large cities.] Many are attracted by Athens with its enthusiasm for philosophy, and the opportunity to enjoy the siren song of the philosophical schools; some are detained by great capitals, Alexandria and Rome, either by necessity (as hostages?) or by the fact that they can derive therefrom some great advantage for themselves or their country. This I say in excusing philosophers [for going to live in great cities]. But perchance, some one else might be rude enough to pray that many of the rhetors be compelled to reside the rest of their lives in a foreign land, because the cities they leave will be better off than those to which they go.

Let us now take up the comparison of rhetoric and philosophy in another fashion. One statement—that the promises of rhetoric are possible of fulfillment, whereas the promises of philosophy seem to be made only in jest, and are so far from actuality that few have ever followed them.

II, 147, fr.
IV.

Many rhetors have been banished or executed for many strange reasons, even for insignificant reasons. All this risk they run, and yet only two or three of them can speak brilliantly, the majority disgracefully. There follow examples of rhetors who met with disaster, Themistocles, Alcibiades and Callistratus.

II, 148,
fr. V.

This remark praises rhetoric because it strengthens the wicked,

² I should read in l. 14 *συκοφαντας*. The thought then parallels that of fr. VII. Sycophants are not to be fought by their own weapons, but by paying no attention to them.

on the assumption that it would not deserve praise if it merely tried to hinder them and punished them if they did not obey.

Fragment VI is not substantial enough to enable us to form an opinion of its meaning. Fr. VII and VIII answer the argument that rhetoric gives men higher pleasures and greater power than ordinary people possess.

It is not necessary or even possible to satisfy unnatural and cultivated appetites. But the natural desires can easily be satisfied in all pure men—not merely in great rhetors like Pericles; consequently philosophy which teaches us how to limit our desires is better than rhetoric which helps us to satisfy them.

I do not believe that even the greatest rhetors can accomplish all they wish even in their own cities, for then they would be tyrants. Rather it is true that men held in great honor by the people, when they try to restrain them from following their own pleasures are humiliated, fined and killed.³

From the mention of players on the cithara, and physicians and painters I judge that this is part of a comparison of the value of these professions and sophistic to a city. The passage, however, is sadly mutilated. Fragments X and XI are hopeless.

Rhetors find their public friendly until they have received civil honors at their hands, and then find it hostile. For the mob is envious of those whom it has honored, and always thinks that its heroes make an inadequate return for the honors they have received. Consequently it is better not to receive public preferment.

It is objected (by the rhetoricians) that philosophers do not help their country. That is the reason why Critolaus' advice to a philosopher not to join a colony was not regarded as ridiculous. But if philosophers do not enter politics, yet they help their native land by teaching the young to obey the laws; nay more, by teaching them to act justly even if there are no laws, and to shun injustice as they would fire.

[They say] that not only Lycurgus and Pittacus, but also those who established constitutions were of this nature (i. e. rhetors?). But not even those who had rhetorical ability were like these,

³ Fuhr, Rhein. Mus. LVII (1902) p. 431, proposes these emendations in fr. VIII: l. 21 *κακώσεων* or *ἀτιμώσεων*, *δημέβσεων* or *φυγαδεῶν*.

but with different intent, and with varying experience they turned to managing the public revenues and other matters of administration, and were quite inferior to Callistratus and Demosthenes.⁴

(Fragments XV and XVI are hopeless.)

II, 157, fr.
XVII.

It is better to learn (from philosophy) to care for oneself, than (from rhetoric) to care for the multitude of common people in all sorts of conditions. A rhetor is like a magician; able to bring down the moon, but what good does he get from it?

II, 157, fr.
XVIII.

[An opponent says] "No philosopher *qua* philosopher could benefit anyone." If he had added that the philosophers refrain from speaking their mind freely whether at home or in exile, he would have brought his impudence to the proper conclusion. For by their lives, their conversation (they benefit their followers).

II, 158, fr.
XIX.

A complete investigation of the causes destructive of friendship would reveal that politics is the worst foe of friendship; for it generates envy, ambition and discord.

II, 159, fr.
XX.

If we throw them (the philosophers) some small change we find them satisfied, not affecting a proud and haughty attitude like the rhetors. If we are right in considering externals of little importance, and the soul more important than anything else, then philosophy is the only true benefactor. Moreover the rhetors charge for the help they give, and so cannot be considered benefactors; the philosophers give their instruction without cost.

II, 160,
XXI-XXV.
II, 162, fr.
XXVII.

(Fragments XXI-XXV are hopeless.)

Furthermore we must add that philosophers are not really hated by all men, for they live in peace and justice and tried friendship; those whom they find opposed to them they quickly soften.

II, 163, fr.
XXIX.

They acquired the inability to speak rhetorically from the ability. You can not rightly say that anyone acquired inability in war from rhetorical ability. That one derives the inability to speak rhetorically from the ability is not correct, nor merely that he acquired that as being able to accomplish something in

⁴The meaning would be plainer if we had the beginning of the first sentence. Apparently Philodemus is combating the claim that rhetoric produces *great* statesmen. Many, he says, have to content themselves with menial tasks.

contests of speaking, but that he acquired the inability to speak rhetorically.

(First part obscure.) It is impossible to check up the relative success of speakers rhetorically trained and those not so trained. No one has ever counted all the cases, not even those in his own lifetime, or in a single year; and yet you have the confidence to say that more persuade by rhetorical means than by the simple processes of nature. II, 164, fr. XXX.

There remains the subject of "proof," of which Anaximenes says . . . "Speech is the best means to persuade the soul." In the first place this is false, for money and a thousand other things persuade more powerfully than speech.

In a picture all is light and shadow; painting cannot produce a living being. II, 165, fr. XXXI.

Epicurus has this in dialogue form; "First let us agree on the end for which we do everything, in order that we may know. . . ."

It is worth our while to consider what sort of a life those have lived who have spent it all in prosecution and defence. Even when priding themselves on their profession they admit that it is well not to pass one's whole life in such occupation; but just as it is possible not to have any experience in law courts, so it is desirable not to be idle, or to see children or friends suffer, or suffer misfortune in marriage, or lose money, or suffer similar misfortune. II, 166, fr. XXXII.

Philosophy is more profitable than epideictic rhetoric, especially if one practice rhetoric in the fashion of the sophists. . . . I, 225, fr. I.

The philosopher has many *τόποι* concerning practical justice and other virtues about which he is confident; the busybody (i. e. the rhetorician) is quite the opposite. Nor is one who does not appear before kings and popular assemblies forced to play second part to the rich, as do rhetors who are compelled to employ flattery all their lives. I, 226, fr. II.

The instruction given by the sophists is not only stupid but shameless, and lacking in refinement and reason. I, 223, fr. III.

(Fragments IV-VIII and col. II are hopeless.)

He makes an incredible statement when he claims that one skilled in such subjects (viz. philosophy) could not be of noble III

character, and that such studies bring no one happiness, and that no one except a madman would be interested in them. For apart from the knowledge an educated man ought to have, he should obey the laws, realizing that they apply to him. . . .

I, 234, col.
IV.

If the goodwill of one's country is esteemed the fairest crown of victory, the defeated also ought to fare well. A common country should bestow benefits in common. But as we see in one country a rhetor neglected rather than crowned, and in another country one is banished, tortured and insulted, let us without claiming a share in the ability to manage a city by persuasion, be content [to live the quiet life of a philosopher].

I, 234,
col. V.

Very few if any of the [tyrants] have been overthrown by their mercenaries, whereas many statesmen have been rejected by their fellow citizens, and slaughtered like cattle, nay they are worse off than cattle, for the butcher does not hate the cattle, but the tortures of the dying statesmen are made more poignant by hatred.

I, 235, col.
VI.

It is claimed for rhetoric that it protects property like a strong tower. First if we are not rich we do not need rhetoric. Secondly it is much better to lose one's wealth if one can not keep it otherwise, than to spend one's life in rhetoric.

But Cephenides (Drone) the rich man is a prey to slaves and prophets as well as to sycophants.

I, 236, col.
VII.

. . . they are unable to make the multitude friendly to them, as the crowd of politicians can.

I, 237, col.
VIII.

The philosophers are not vexed if people, like foolish sheep or cattle, attend to an inferior, but are satisfied that what they say, particularly about the attitude of the common people, shall please the few; and in action they are most blameless, nor do they as slaves of all, try to rule everything for themselves. For they do not expect to satisfy their wants at the expense of the public. But those philosophers who envy other's property while they pretend to need nothing, and are detected being coy, these men the people despise, but consider them less wretched than the rhetors, because so many obtain the same result that the rhetors obtain.

I, 239, col.
IX.

It is numbered among the glories of rhetoric that it can "sail the deep seas"⁵ while those who speak briefly are rejected like

⁵ πηλαγίζειν = μακρολογεῖν. Cf. the discussion of μακρολογία in Plato, Gorgias 449B; Prot. 334C—338B; Cic. De Orat. III 36, 145; Quint. XII proem.

small boats unable to sail far from shore, because they accomplish nothing brilliant. If by "sail the deep seas" they mean "make long speeches," then rhetoric is a crazy profession.⁶ If by "sail deep seas" they mean treat at length a subject needing detailed treatment, and arrogate to themselves alone this power, not even then are they in their right minds; for the philosophers, or any one else with sense can treat a subject in this manner. However if they examine a subject minutely by their "deep sea" method, then the rhetors are mistaken in thinking they speak only about large subjects. . . . I. 26. They borrow the dialectic method from the philosophers, and pride themselves on something which they reject as a principle.

I, 240,
col. X.

For the method of question and answer is necessary not only in philosophy and education, but often in the ordinary intercourse of life. The method of joint inquiry frequently demands this style. Moreover this method is adopted by the rhetor in the assembly as well as in the court of justice. "Rhetoric enables a man to be a guard of metics, a friend of citizens and a protector of those of lesser rank."⁷ Therefore one could not say that a rich man does not possess happiness unless he knows rhetoric, but that he is much better off without it. For he ought not to fortify himself, but to free himself from paying ransom to speechwriters.

I, 241, col.
XI.

Consequently though both methods are useful, they neglect one of them. Those who say that the rhetors use the method of question and answer in its highest degree cannot prove that this method is peculiar to them, nor that they rather than the philosophers wrote technical works about it. Neither the modern sophists in their teaching, nor the ancients in their published works attained such distinction in dialectic as have the philosophers.

I, 242, col.
XII.

They say that the rhetor does not seek pleasure from such foolish subjects as geometry, but producing arts and sciences of daily life, he directs men to that path which leads to the city and place of assembly, which they themselves follow. It is ridiculous for them to say that geometry produces pleasure and glory. Certainly we do not claim to devote our whole life to

I, 244, col.
XIII.

⁶ Col. IX 21-34 is a dittography of col. X, 1-14.

⁷ Cf. Schneidewin, *Studia Philodemea*, p. 10, n. 26.

it. . . . The philosopher⁸ is versed in the characters and methods of living which result in faction and exile, through a knowledge of which it is possible most correctly to govern the city and the assembly. The sophists have unawares, made a simile which applies to themselves; for it is their profession which does not enter into the civil life and the assembly, and is of no help to human life. So it is reasonable that some do not care at all for what they say, but refuse to accept rhetoric and sophistic and politics even cursorily, considering one foolish, the other most inimical to peace of mind.

I, 245, col.
XIV, l. 13.

If the remarks following directly after these were intended to apply to the dialecticians—they are no concern of ours; if they apply to us they are mere chatter, because when we claim to speak accurately as the rhetors cannot because their speeches are composed of probabilities, they proceed to say that spider webs are finer than cloth but less useful; similarly the finespun subtleties of the philosophers are useless for practical purposes because no one in deliberating uses syllogisms, but probabilities. So that if we use syllogisms, what appeared advantageous at one time would not remain so; whence there is no one possibility which will be advantageous if brought to pass, but the only thing left is to guess on a basis of probability. . . . After assuming that speeches can be made according to strict logic, they proceed to use in both deliberative and forensic oratory, nothing but probabilities, and often the less probable rather than the more; besides they seek broad effect rather than accuracy and systematic treatment, as is natural since they have no *method*, but depend entirely on observation, and quickly discard their observations because of the changes of the populace which are quicker than those of the Euripus.⁹ But the philosophers do not restrict themselves to rigidly logical argument. . . .

I, 249, col.
XVII.

The nature of justice and injustice—that one is always advantageous and the other never, can be settled entirely by strict logic. Anyone who applies guesswork to such subjects is simply

⁸ For the emendation v. Schneidewin p. 12 f.

⁹ On the Euripus as a type of fickleness cf. Plato, *Phaedo*, 90C; *Rhet. Gr.W.* I, p. 591, 21.

foolish. Then their talk about spider webs, bits and saws for cutting millet seeds is nonsense.¹⁰ . . . It is clearly proven that the art of the rhetor is of no assistance for a life of happiness.

[The sophist says] it is better to estimate roughly on large subjects than to treat accurately of some small subject of no importance. Perhaps we can add to the accomplishments of rhetoric that it can talk in a general way about subjects of no importance. The comparison of great and small subjects is kept up at the end of the column in the reference to fishing for tunnies and sprats.

I, 250, col.
XVIII.

. . . to one who wonders why they can see clearly into a dark and difficult subject, and are unable to see what is in plain sight of all, they apply the figure of the owl. Such remarks as they made about oaths and counsels, not only no philosopher but not even a man of ordinary taste would. . . . The doctrines of the philosophers are not too finespun for practical life, and the doctrines of the rhetors are not suitable, so that having demonstrated that the doctrines of the politicians are like one or the other—they compare us to owls.

I, 252, col.
XIX.

Their next statement is that there is no distinction between justice and injustice except that commonly accepted by the people, and that those who assume a different standard are like those who seek to substitute a coinage of their own for that established by the state; the new coinage is useless, for it will not pass current and the maker's life would not be safe.

I, 253, col.
XIX, l. 35.

By rhetoric neither [is accomplished] as it seems, but political science is not investigated or taught by the rhetoricians, either exclusively or to a higher degree than by others.

The philosophers of our school agree with οἱ πολλοί on a question of what is just and good, differing from them only in this that they arrive at their conclusions by logic as well as by feeling, and never forget these conclusions, but always compare the chief good with things indifferent. They do differ from οἱ πολλοί about the means to attain happiness, and do not think that offices, power, conquests and the like are proper means

I, 254, col.
XXI.

¹⁰ Following the restoration of Schneidewin, p. 14; . . . *τρυνάων καὶ πρύων ὁστισιν κέγχρους καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τρυνῶσι καὶ διαπρίουσι.*

to the end. Similarly the principles derived by them from "notions" we judge to be just and noble; but we differ from the common opinion as to what corresponds to the "notion." (I. e. what produces the end—pleasure—which is perceived by all.)

I, 256, col.
XXII.

Not only *some* philosophers differ from the popular ideas of right and wrong, but *all* statesmen do. For in their period of office they are wholly concerned to change popular opinion on questions of right and justice and advantage. If this is so, how do we resemble those who scorn current coinage, and seek for substitutes? Apart from the fact that we do not despise theories based on "notions," how could we be said to be acting in this way if we assume the true principles of right and wrong? For some of these are helpful to them as well as to us whether they grant it or not; others are really established customs, and will not allow themselves to be used unless we assume them in keeping with the former principles. For if they do not have the true idea of hot and cold, it is not our authority which they oppose. It is possible for a fate to befall them like that of those who differ (with their states) about coinage—and how can their search be called useless if there is really anything better—if the cities will not accept the innovations, and the inventor's life is not safe. For it makes no difference to those truly well if others will not adopt hygienic measures, nor to those who avoid fire or snow, if others refuse to acknowledge the natural qualities residing in them. It is astounding for them to say that the natural means of safety will not protect them.

I, 257, col.
XXIII.

I, 258, col.
XXIV.

I, 258, col.
XXIV, l. 26.

I, 259, col.
XXV.

Some things are just or unjust by nature and never change, others vary according to locality and condition. Laws which are not of this nature, but are established for various reasons ought to be obeyed, or if the philosophers do not think that they can live well under these laws they ought to leave the country. They can be social to a high degree by observing those principles which make for likeness and not for difference; we can do this without being observed as well as with publicity; with pleasure and not under compulsion; steadily and not in an uncertain fashion.

If rhetoric imparts an experience of these things, so that it is the only road to the happy life, yet it does not lead to courts

and assemblies, where there are more wrecks than ever at Cape Caphereus.¹¹

[Rhetoricians say that this art makes men good] for one will wish to seem prudent and just in order to obtain favors from the people.¹²

[It is strange that one would not endure to be taught virtue] whereas if he were sick he would endure being forced to undergo treatment. But their interjection of the argument that virtue cannot be taught is untimely. For Socrates showed that political virtue cannot be taught, proving his case by the inability of Themistocles, Aristides and Pericles to train their sons to be their equals. By the same means one could prove that sophistic rhetoric cannot be taught. l. 30 But "rhetoric would be able to benefit a man who by its help can persuade the people that he is of high character." Quite the contrary; even if a man be virtuous otherwise, he is considered a scoundrel because he is a rhetor. They say that we ought to believe that there is something better than truth which does not persuade, on the testimony of Euripides who says; "Mortals' coin is not only shining silver but virtue" (i. e. virtue in the commonly accepted sense). At any rate they purchase many things by character, as well as by money. But why should a philosopher pay attention to Euripides, especially since he has no proof . . . ? Some say they pursue virtue not expecting to receive anything from it; others desire safety for the sake of happiness.

I, 261, col.
XXVI.

"Suppose a virtuous man made the object of a slanderous attack, and unable to persuade the jury of his innocence; he would be punished, not pitied and honored." Certainly. But worst of all is not to recognize exalted virtue, but to consider it wickedness. According to the argument of the rhetors one ought to study the reputable rather than the monstrous—and that when the greatest statesmen bring to the bema things which should be associated only with the vilest of men. The so-called virtuous men when they are called to account before the people refuse to stand trial. They think they are to suffer a treatment

I, 264, col.
XXVIII.

¹¹ Cape on Euboea where a fleet returning from Troy was wrecked. Cf. Vergil, Aen. XI, 256-260: Propert. III, VII, 39-40. (Quoted by Gros.)

¹² Cf. Isoc. Ant. 278: ὅσῳ περ ἂν τις ἐρρωμενέστερως ἐπιθυμῇ πείθειν τοὺς ἀκούοντας, τοσοῦτον μᾶλλον ἀσκήσει καλὸς ἀγαθὸς εἶναι καὶ παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς εὐδοκίμειν.

much worse than that accorded to the sick, much less acquire virtue, just as if virtue were not a real good, or there were no real cure which the people apply when they judge a man in the wrong.

I, 265, col.
XXIX.

"Furthermore it has been said that we (i. e. the rhetoricians) fight not against external enemies at whose hand it is honorable to die, but against internal enemies at whose hands it is disgraceful to die; that we have nothing to do with virtue—for that did not save Socrates;—nor with medicine—that saves men from disease, not from prison; nor with any other profession than rhetoric which helps those who strive not only for their lives but to obtain money, and to prevent disfranchisement and exile."

I, 266, col.
XXX.

However we shall repel our enemies with their own weapons. Virtue did not help Socrates because when he was led to court it was lacking in some people. Medicine and other professions help even in prison. If a philosopher falls a victim to such a death, it is not a disgrace to him but to those who kill him. However he does not live in fear of meeting such a fate. For the superstitions of the common people do not disturb one who is persuaded that he shall have no existence after death.

I, 268, col.
XXXI.

I, 269, col.
XXXII.

If for these reasons persuasion was reasonably considered a good by them, she would have been deified by philosophy. The fact that through it no little harm is done is not true of philosophical persuasion, but of rhetorical which Pisistratus used; wherefore it does not belong to the category of the greatest goods as they perversely say,¹³ nor to the special categories of power and wealth. If one does not use these well, he would receive much harm. Philosophy shows us how to find and use everything necessary for a happy life.

BOOK VI.

In the sixth book Philodemus attacks the philosophical schools which advocated the study of rhetoric. The extant portion discusses Nausiphanes and Aristotle. The attack was extended to others as we can see from II, 64, col. LVIII, but the identity of the persons attacked cannot be determined. In this book as in many others, Philodemus is merely para-

¹³ Reading for *καὶ ὡς* I. 15 *κακῶς* with von Arnim, *Hermes* XXVIII (1893) p. 154.

phrasing the works of earlier Epicureans; the criticism of Nausiphanes seems quite clearly to be based on Metrodorus' *Πρὸς τοὺς ἀπὸ φυσιολογίας λέγοντας ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι ῥήτορας*. The fragments are of very uneven value; there are large sections of connected argument, in which the relation of the pages can be clearly demonstrated; but many of the pages stand by themselves, and the trend of the thought is not always clear. However by a judicious piecing together of the several parts we can at least gain an idea of the tenets of Nausiphanes. As the present arrangement of the fragments in Sudhaus separates ideas which belong together, it may assist the reader if a résumé of Nausiphanes' doctrine is given here with a brief statement of his position in the controversy over rhetoric.

Nausiphanes was a natural philosopher (*φυσικός*) of the latter part of the fourth century, a pupil of Democritus and teacher of Epicurus. Although Epicurus must have owed much of the foundation of his own system to Nausiphanes, he took pains to deny any connection with him, and even abused his master in no uncertain language. The feud thus instituted by Epicurus was continued by Metrodorus and is echoed in Philodemus. The chief tenet of Nausiphanes, that a study of natural philosophy (*φυσιολογία*) is the best training for an orator, sounds like an absurd freak. Absurd it may have been in the effort to connect natural philosophy and oratory, but it was a natural product of the educational tendencies of the time. The educators of his period were afraid of a divided authority. Some way must be found to enable *one* teacher to guide the higher studies of the youth. As the ideal of education was for the most part preparation for public life, and as oratorical ability was indispensable for the aspiring politician in the Greek state, Nausiphanes was compelled in self defence to show how a study of natural philosophy could train an orator. As presented in Philodemus he appears ridiculous; we may perhaps be justified in believing that here as elsewhere, Philodemus has not been too scrupulous in presenting the views of his opponents. Disentangled from the maze of Philodemus' polemic the principles of Nausiphanes may be stated as follows: the study of natural philosophy produces orators; the natural philosopher derives from his study of nature the knowledge of the causes of pleasure, and so is able to guide his audience toward the true end of all action. Contrary to the Epicurean view he holds that the philosopher should enter politics. The style of the natural philosopher is plain like that of the average man, and so is better adapted to explain a difficult case than the elaborate style of the rhetoricians. The orators use of logic is the same as that of the dialectician and the philosopher; *παράδειγμα* = *ἐπαγωγή*, *ἐνθιμημα* = *συλλογισμός*, the only difference is in the manner of presentation. Finally a study of science produces in the student a political state of mind, so that every natural philosopher is potentially an orator.¹

The discussion of Aristotle begins with the well known parody of the

¹ For a full discussion of Nausiphanes and this portion of Philodemus v. von Arnim, *Leben und Werke des Dio von Prusa*, pp. 43-62.

verse from the Philoctetes; *ἀσχυρὸν σιωπᾶν, Ἰσοκράτην δ' εἰς λέγειν*, by which Aristotle justified his excursion into rhetoric. It resolves itself into a comparison of philosophy and rhetoric, and a vilification of Aristotle for choosing the lower of the two professions. This polemic like the preceding is part of the inheritance of the Epicurean School; Epicurus, we know, was particularly bitter against Aristotle.² Perhaps the most remarkable part is his exaltation of Isocrates; "while Aristotle descended from philosophy to rhetoric, Isocrates rose from rhetoric to philosophy." This passage must rest on a misinterpretation of Isocrates' use of *φιλοσοφία*, a misinterpretation which must be deliberate on the part of Philodemus, and not due to any love of Isocrates, but to a desire to take a fling at Aristotle. Beside the general criticism of rhetoric which forms the bulk of the passage, Philodemus gives three reasons alleged by Aristotle for the study of rhetoric and politics: it wins friends, it helps produce a stable government which is favorable to philosophy, the present evil conditions in politics demand the help of the philosopher. The first two are answered and the third is under discussion when the fragment ends.³

I, 270. Of fragments I-XVII the only parts that give even a gleam of meaning are fr. XI and XII. Here from the contrast of *διαλέγεσθαι* and *λόγον ἐκτείνειν* it appears that the discussion is turning on the relative merits of rhetoric and dialectic, which we found discussed at some length in Book V (*πελαγίζειν*, κτλ. I, 239) and which appears below, col. XLIII. A little light breaks through in fr. XVIII. This is the end of a paragraph. Philodemus sums up with There is no art which treats of forensic eloquence, corresponding to the art of music. (From here to fr. XXX nothing consecutive can be made out.)

I, 283, col. II. It is evident that he⁴ used the word 'rhetoric' with reference either to sophistic or to political rhetoric, or to the power to decide on an advantageous course of action. Grant that as many erroneously think, rhetoric is the ability to select an advantageous course of action. . . .

² Cic., De Nat. Deor. I, 33, 93: Cum Epicurus Aristotelem vexarit contumeliosissime.

³ For details v. Sudhaus, Aristoteles in der Beurtheilung des Epikur und Philodem, Rhein. Mus. XLVIII (1893) pp. 552-564. Gomperz, Zeit. f. d. öst. Gymn. XXIII (1872) p. 31, holds that Philodemus may have had before him Aristotle's dialogue, Politicus. Philodemus also criticizes Aristotle in the *Περὶ ποιημάτων*, on which v. Gomperz in Wiener Eranos (1909) 1-8.

⁴ Sudhaus, Rhein. Mus. XLVIII (1893) p. 334, thinks that Philodemus is quoting from Metrodorus *Πρὸς τοὺς ἀπὸ φυσιολογίας λέγοντας ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι ῥήτορας*.

If some of the rhetorical sophists because of their political insight or experience can choose an advantageous course, we must not assign the credit to rhetoric but to some other source. I, 284, col. III.

It is not plain how one is to pass from general truths to the application of these truths in particular instances.⁵ I, 284, col. IV.

ἐνθυμήματα differ from *σημεῖα* and *πιστώματα*.

The relation between truth and its opposite is not the same as between two probabilities, one more probable than the other. I, 285, col. V. I, 285, col. VI. We must have either truth or falsehood. Would one accept probability in place of truth except in cases where truth is impossible of attainment?

A man should examine carefully and search for truth, and not use vain enthymemes. For it is clear that one who states the actual good points of which the accuser denies the existence, and thus lessens the exaggeration in the minds of the judges, would attain the useful result of expressing the full content of the argument which comes from a study of nature. I, 286, col. VII.

A study of nature does not give one a knowledge of the "good," the "true" or the "just." I, 287, col. VIII.

One who claims that a knowledge of what course of action to pursue comes from a study of the universe, ought to specify [how it is done]. I, 287, col. IX.

It is necessary to make choices with a view to happiness, and not with some vain hope. They ought to show that *φυσιολογία* leads to happiness, because most people think that *φυσιολογία* is far removed from what is useful in life. I, 288, col. X.

In the interval between the publication of the first and second volumes Sudhaus discovered that this papyrus formed the upper half of the original, and that the lower half was Hercul. Voll. coll. alt. tom. VII, fol. 44-67. He combined the two fragments in the second volume. From this point therefore I follow vol. II.

He (Nausiphanes) said that the natural philosopher and the "wise man" will persuade their audience. He left no doubt that by wise man he meant himself. But the essence of method lies in concealing the method. . . . II, 1, col. XI.

Certainly he will not expect such a task to belong to the rhetorical sophists or the statesmen. II, 2, col. 2.

⁵ I. e. how a knowledge of the laws of nature derived from a study of science can enable one to decide a particular point of political policy.

- II, 3, col. XII. If the hearer comprehend with sufficient intelligence and zeal the one who knows how to lead the argument in any direction he chooses, there is a science and faculty [of guiding the argument] not whither the speaker, but whither the hearer wishes.⁶
- II, 4, col. 3. Who can persuade with the help of natural philosophy? Nausiphanes says, "Rhetoric strengthens and supports in time of trouble."⁷
- II, 4, col. XIII. II, 5, col. 4. A man blames his neighbor for his own troubles; consequently people will hate the rhetor for their political ills. Nausiphanes did not dodge this; for he says that the philosopher will practice rhetoric or statesmanship [if his audience is intelligent] [This method then applies] only to the intelligent and interested (cf. col. XII). The majority of people are not interested in all methods of persuasion, and they have not the patience to wait for the great blessing promised by the rhetor, but want something immediately.⁸
- II, 5, col. XIV.
- II, 6, col. 5. Aside from this they are ill disposed to one who has such power, and fear that his tricks of reasoning will serve them ill. For he does not say, "I wish to persuade you to do what is for your good," but he merely says⁹ that he can persuade his audience to do what *he* wishes.
- II, 7, col. XV. An audience to whom such an announcement is made would never be persuaded by the speaker. Even if he made a logical presentation they would distrust him. Again, how does a knowledge of human nature enable the natural philosopher to persuade? Does he know of what elements we are composed?
- II, 7, col. 6. How can it be that when one speaks of persuading the multitude one would persuade them by leading them to this (i. e. a condition of trustfulness) when after meeting with many misfortunes the people will refuse to be persuaded again?

⁶ This is Philodemus' answer to the claim of Nausiphanes that the scientist can lead the audience whither he will—provided that the audience is intelligent.

⁷ Von Arnim reads (p. 50) *Βεβαιούται μὲν, φησὶν, ἐν τοῖς κατὰ προαίρεσιν μείναι ὁρθήν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς μεγίστοις κακοῖς κούφίζεται καὶ ἀναπνέεται, ῥητορικῆς ἂν τι προσποῖθῃ δυνάμει.*

⁸ Reading with von Arnim, p. 49, *οὐδ' ἔστιν ὅπως τῷ σοφῷ κάγαθῷ προσμεῖναι τι ποιῆσαι τὸ πόρρωθεν οὐχ ὅσον ἀμυδρᾷ συναισθήσει προσδοκῆσαι τι μεγάλειον, ἀλλ' ἤδη τι βούλοντ' ἔχειν.*

⁹ Reading *λέγει* for *λέγειν* l. 12, with Fuhr, Rhein. Mus. LVII (1902) p. 434.

What does this sort of persuasion amount to except a knowledge of pleasure and pain in a given case? It means treating men like animals.

The persuasive element is the knowledge of the source of advantage. . . .

What about desires in particular cases about which men plan well or ill? If you ask directly, "Do you desire pleasure or pain?", all will say, "Pleasure." The difficulty is to know their desires in particular cases.

They are vexed [says the natural philosopher] that the natural philosopher alone knows what nature desires, and is able to speak and argue relative to man's desires.

One cannot know what to do to please the people, for there are many things to change their minds quickly. And if the natural philosopher always has the same end in view, why does he not [succeed]?

If their art is a power of persuasion, it cannot depend on arguments from physical facts. They however deny that it is conjectural; for then there is no need of presenting a case persuasively.

If they desire everything which the people wish, then it is impossible to ascertain the desires of the majority.

He (i. e. the natural philosopher) cannot acquire any power to speak. For they will say that the rhetor speaks accurately and favorably if they will agree to obey him, or it is impossible to escape (the logic of his words). How can the natural philosopher know the opinion of his audience?

Furthermore they will not listen to him even if he seem to speak according to their desire; much less will they follow whatever he says. For they will be troubled at the thought of recurring disaster because his advice has already resulted unfavorably.

If he means that they try to say what the people wish, and what will not cause them to repent, he is foolish. For it is hard to know that the people will not repent, even if an action has been performed to suit them. They cannot see what serious mistakes we make in our own affairs.

They do not say that if they are fully persuaded in their own minds they will find many to agree with them; but simply that by the art of persuasion they can persuade an audience to do

what they wish. Nor can one know what the populace rejoice in as they depend on opinion and not on the natural end or object; nor if we could know it could any one persuade them. For the mob changes and repents quickly.

II, 18,
col. 14.

This column is practically hopeless. Von Arnim has a highly doubtful restoration on page 55.

Col. XXIV.

Their proposition to persuade reduces to a knowledge of justice and advantage which he (i. e. the natural philosopher) is best able to adapt to the common advantage.¹⁰ In the first place he cannot observe the relations of the subject, but will be excelled by one who has been engaged in public affairs and has practiced pleasing the people and advising them to do things that are within their power. Yet this resembles the doctrine of Nausiphanes. . . .

II, 19,
col. 15.

On the length of time one must spend with another in order to know him thoroughly.¹¹

II, 19, col.
XXV.

[And he seems to agree with us] for he says that persuasive power comes from knowledge of affairs rather than from personal investigation. But enough of him.

II, 20,
col. 16.

Let us take up the next division. It is supposed that the natural philosopher is the best rhetor inasmuch as it is possible for a study of natural philosophy to give political experience and skill. "If," he says "he should add experience in political affairs, and learn the habits of the people as the philosopher studies natural philosophy." Does this art produce ability to make political speeches by giving experience from which one may deduce what is of advantage to the people, or do they think it produces immediately a state of mind, so that the natural philosopher needs no practice or further study? If the former is the case they ought to show that one can become a political rhetor by experience. But no one would grant that any one who had acquired a knowledge of natural philosophy can make political speeches. We must understand the statement as if we

II, 21, col.
XXVI.

II, 22, col.
XXVII.

¹⁰ Cf. col. IV.

¹¹ "If one has a natural philosopher living with him for a year and associating with him for a considerable time each day, he will be able to acquire such a knowledge of affairs as to make him a rhetor." This is von Arnim's interpretation of an exceedingly obscure passage. I do not feel at all sure that the details are right, or that we can assert more about the meaning of the passage than is given above.

were examining some of the natural philosophers and not the art or products of the art. For we are not examining politics, but exhibiting what has been done by others; nor is his statement true that the natural philosopher will be best able to use the λέξεις διδακτικῇ when that is needed to explain some difficult question to the people.¹² The political scientist (so-called) has no experimental knowledge of the peculiar facts of politics; so when he attempts to make a speech he [goes astray] because he does not take due account of ἡθῆ and πάθη. How can a natural philosopher become a politician and rhetor? He is exactly like a sophist who has no fundamental principles. Nausiphanes then . . .

II, 22, col.
XXVIII.

II, 23, col.
XXIX.

"How is it possible that if one has the power to govern the state he will not desire to do so."¹³

II, 24, col.
XXX.

[The art of rhetoric] does not lead to ease nor does it produce the best in the life of its possessor, nor incline him to improvement.

II, 25, col.
XXXI.

. . . partly from custom imposed from without, partly from the motions of the spirit within, there results a condition which forces our language to say what is false and empty.

II, 26,
col. 17.

"He did not imitate the common metaphors of those foolish men who have nothing better to do than listen to contests in the schools of oratory."¹⁴

II, 26, col.
XXXII.

Amazing is the style of the natural philosopher "composed for the delight of his audience, adorned with metaphors best designed for explaining the new subject, not in an empty style fixed by rule, but according to nature and sanctioned by custom," a style which we found neither useful nor practicable, but vicious and almost deadly. Wherefore not even if the philosopher has something better to say will the people listen to him. For the speech of the philosopher does not differ from that of the statesman in its adaptation of the useful to the common needs of the city, but in its relation to the individual.

II, 27,
col. 18.

II, 28, col.
XXXIII.

The soul of the ordinary man is blind to it (the "natural" style of the natural philosopher) and so it has no power over the

II, 29,
col. 19.

¹² I adopt the reading of von Arnim for l. 9; καὶ μὴδὲ τὸ οὐδαμῶς διδακτικῆς λέξεως ἀποπεῖν.

¹³ This is the argument of Nausiphanes.

¹⁴ A quotation from Nausiphanes.

multitude. But this is no disadvantage, unless it can be called a disadvantage that they are not adapted by nature to receive the highest life.

II, 30,
col. 20.

The philosopher does not choose his profession for the same reason that one chooses military or political power. The latter with a slowly acting mind is willing to accept any power, while the former by syllogisms and memory of resemblance and difference, and a consideration of consequences, and especially by the use of his sharpness of intellect, rejects everything that does not tend toward happiness, and shares in them only as he uses the necessary arts for the tasks that arise. For to say positively that military and political power is the result of geometrical reasoning is vicious and is the product of a system that cannot reason or produce happiness. The philosopher is not of such a character but in every matter uses his keen mind, with which he is able to see when the ambition or idleness of men goes wrong, and neglects everything which is not useful for happiness.

II, 31, col.
XXXV.

II, 31,
col. 21.

II, 32, col.
XXXVI.

The aforementioned makes a foolish argument because in asking if the philosopher is adverse to lawmaking or military life or political economy he sees none of the advantages of wisdom, nor considers for what evils a man is responsible himself, and for what his neighbor is responsible. Nor has he stated in what respect the philosopher is adverse to such subjects, nor distinguished how far the multitude can be helped, and in what way man is superior to the animals; but thinking that what the opinion of the people honors in political cleverness and virtue falsely so-called is the only thing to be sought, he considers that to have led one to that condition is the best proof of sound reasoning. On this assumption he tries to show that some advantage is contributed by the so-called politicians, and at the same time attacks the lawmaking of the ancients, which was the cause of men's living together justly. Moreover it is necessary to purify the desires; this cannot be accomplished by statement and patterns or guidance by political principles and laws, but by reasoning about wholes starting from the first clear evidence.

II, 33,
col. 22.

II, 33, col.
XXXVII.

II, 34,
col. 23.

On account of the various faults of mankind it is right for the rhetor to guide and correct the community . . . ¹⁵

¹⁵ On the phrase at the end of the column *οἱ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰς πολιτείας γράφοντες τῶν σοφιστῶν* Gomperz, Zeit. f. d. öst. Gymn. XXIII (1872) p. 32,

To sum up; by no means should the philosopher acquire political experience, or rhetoric of that sort. II, 35, col. XXXVIII.

It is evident that it is the height of folly to say that a study of nature produces a *ἔξω* of political oratory, especially since they introduce into the scheme of philosophy example and enthymeme, and in political speeches use syllogism and induction which the dialecticians pride themselves on using accurately. II, 36, col. 24.

If he thinks that philosophical and political arguments differ only in form why does he not show that the political rhetors who have learned the truth according to nature, agree with the philosophers in thought and differ only in the form of their arguments? What is the value of syllogism and induction if they are equivalent to enthymeme and example? Did they think that in a case in which one can properly use example and enthymeme, the philosopher will be able to use syllogism and induction equally well, or did they think that the geometrician is the best statesman since such forms of reasoning are used in geometry? II, 36, col. XXXIX.

But, as it seems, if one is to consider political questions, the first requisite is a knowledge of affairs; consequently he must add that the natural philosopher possesses a knowledge of statecraft. For even though he seems to himself to be acting like a statesman, he will not necessarily produce the same results as a statesman. He may use procedure analogous to geometry, but he will not be a geometrician. For everyone who studies some obscure problem by means of his senses, reasons out the obscure by means of the evident. Statesman, physician and geometrician use the same form of syllogism, but one cannot solve the other's problems. How then, if he has sense can he say that reasoning from the evident and existent to the future [and unknown] is always useful, and that the ablest political leaders use this form of reasoning. II, 37, col. 25.

II, 38, col. XL.

II, 38, col. 26.

compares Isoc. Phil. 84; *τοῖς νόμοις καὶ ταῖς πολιτείαις ταῖς ὑπὸ τῶν σοφιστῶν γεγραμμέναις*, which is an attack on Plato. He thinks that Philodemus may have used the attack on Plato and Aristotle made by the Isocratean Cephisodorus; v. Numenius ap. Euseb., Prae. Ev. XIV, 6, 9-11, 270, 12-13 Dind. I am inclined to consider that Philodemus is referring to the activities of some of the followers of Isocrates who continued their master's practice of broadening their instruction in rhetoric by theoretical work on the science of government of which the works mentioned form a part.

II, 39, col.
XLI, l. 14.

On investigation we shall find that what they call enthymemes are mere padding and provoke applause because the multitude is foolish (col. 27). How can he consider that reasoning from the evident to the obscure in political matters is the same process as interpreting the evident from the past, so that he has left no form of reasoning for any speech except strict induction.

II, 41, col.
XLII.

How do they dare to say that they will interpret political facts better if we philosophers use example instead of induction.

II, 41,
col. 29.

The *ιδέαι* (i. e. the fundamental facts) are partly common to all partly different for each city and nation.¹⁶

II, 42, col.
30, l. 12.

Something about the effect of division of speeches.

Therefore the rhetor is like the dialectician. For the one who is able to use successfully a long connected speech, will be best able to use the method of question and answer, and vice versa; for knowing how long to continue speech to make the idea clear to the audience is equivalent to being able to know how long to make the series of questions which lead the respondent to grasp the new idea.

II, 43,
col. 31.
II, 44, col.
XLIV.

Experience is the only guide to forecast the future.

A philosopher (apparently Metrodorus v. infra col. 32) says that it is a nuisance to observe all these rules about divisions and length, and commends his own philosophy, the reward of which is not pay but freedom from false opinion, which will bring happiness to everyone.¹⁷ Therefore Metrodorus considering the claim that the same condition enables one to be both (natural philosopher and statesman) and ridiculing those who consider the dialectic method more accurate, says, "In the case of statesmen and natural philosophers the difference is not the same but the statesman cannot solve the problems of the natural philosopher nor the natural philosopher those of the statesman."

II, 45, col.
XLV.

What! in accordance with that foolish change will the statesman make example become induction, or the philosopher do the same, if the subject matter is the same and only the words differ? But in their zeal for such things they laid claim to this, and at the same time they say that these men are not statesmen, so that

¹⁶ On the meaning of *ιδέαι* cf. the author's *The Influence of Isocrates* etc. p. 6 ff.

¹⁷ This is largely imagination on my part. What is the antecedent of *ὅν* l. 21?

one wonders what state of political knowledge the philosopher has reached. We do not deny that we lead our pupils in a different direction from politics, but they are led astray by sophists and pay them money merely to get the reputation for political ability. For "effect" and "deduction from premises" must be subsumed under the knowledge of the wholes, and can come in no other way. Nor does he show how he can know to what extent the audience understands by means of experience, and to what extent by means of dialectic, the man having been previously wretched and obscure.¹⁸ For all such things are derived from physics, and from a weighing of the obscure and reasoning from the existent, and by no other means; so that they travel along a regular route, and are not guided by the experience of some who have no knowledge of affairs. He did not analyze the next point. It should run as follows; "One may be potentially a rhetor if not actually one. For we say that the power of building resides in others besides the actual builders when we regard not the performance of the act but one's ability to use the builders' tools; the same is true of medicine and other professions. Consequently why should we not say that rhetoric is the attendant of the natural philosopher if when subjects are proposed he can speak as well as any statesman or rhetor?"¹⁹ Perchance he might reason about them as well as the rhetors, but he could not make as good an appearance in public as an experienced rhetor. The experienced man can speak when he wishes, the theorist only after long practice. Furthermore the one does many things by the rules of his art—for one cannot learn the carpenters trade otherwise—the other does nothing by rule; for they say that the ability comes from philosophy, not from the political activity itself.

After due consideration of the mad proposition of Nausiphanes we must conclude that he does not provide a proper philosophical introduction to rhetoric.

Now let us take up the story about Aristotle, that he taught rhetoric in the afternoon, saying, "'Tis a shame to be silent and allow Isocrates to speak." He showed his opinion clearly enough

II, 46,
col. 33.

II, 47, col.
XLVI.

II, 48,
col. 34.

II, 48, col.
XLVII.

II, 49,
col. 35.

II, 49, col.
XLVIII.

II, 50,
col. 36.

¹⁸ Practically all the important words in this sentence are conjectures; the sense is, to say the least, obscure.

¹⁹ The passage is much mutilated, and not at all satisfactorily restored.

by writing treatises on the art of rhetoric, and by making politics a branch of philosophy.

II, 51,
col. 37.

II, 51, col.
XLIX.

II, 52,
col. 38.

II, 53,
col. L.

II, 54,
col. 39.

col. LI.

II, 55,
col. 40.

col. LII.

II, 56,
col. 41.

He alleged many reasons for engaging in politics; first, that one who has no knowledge of what is done in governments finds them unfriendly to him; secondly, that a good government will be favorable to the growth of philosophy; thirdly, that he was disgusted with most of the contemporary statesmen and their continual rivalry for office. One banished to a country where the people admire rhetoric but lack²⁰ the most necessary education (i. e. philosophy) if he had some experience in rhetoric might lead them in a short time to the realms of philosophy.²¹ But we object that to practice rhetoric is toilsome to body and soul, and we would not endure it. [Rhetoric] is most unsuitable for one who aims at quiet happiness, and compels one to meddle more or less with affairs, and provides no more right opinion or acquaintance with nature than one's ordinary style of speaking, and draws the attention of young men from philosophy the true horn of Amalthea and directs it to the sophistical rhyton.²² . . . If he knew that he could not attain the highest position or become a philosopher because of various hindering circumstances, he might propose to teach grammar, music or tactics. For we can find no reason why anyone with the least spark of nobility in his nature should become a sophist, as one *could* find reason for pursuing practical rhetoric; for the claim that the former leads to the latter is ridiculous. Consequently Aristotle's practice and his remark were not philosophic. Why is it more disgraceful to be silent and permit Isocrates to speak than to live in a city and allow Manes to dig, or to stay on land and allow the Phoenician trader to be tossed by the waves, or to pass one's life in safety as a private citizen and allow Themistocles to enjoy the perils of a general? He ought to have refused to rival Isocrates, in order that he might not seem to be acting from envy. Either he judged it disgraceful by the standards of the multitude, or by natural standards. If by the latter why did he not consider it naturally disgraceful to speak on the public platform like a hired rhetor, rather than to speak like the divine

²⁰ Reading l. 4, 5, [ὅντας δὲ] τῷ [ν ἀναγ[κ]άλων [ἐ]νδεε[ς].

²¹ Still the argument of Aristotle.

²² The rest of the sentence seems to lack coherence.

philosophers. Why did he abandon his exhortation of the young, II, 57, col. LIII. and attempt the road to ruin which was followed by Isocrates' pupils and by other sophists? Why did he prefer to make collections of laws, constitutions, etc., in short to be a polymath and teach all manner of subjects? In this he was less noble than II, 58, col. 42. the rhetors, in that the rhetors try to provide power, and offer rhetorical hypotheses not merely for the calm of the soul but col. LIV. also for the health of the body. In short he became a more dangerous and deadly foe of Epicurus than those who openly engaged in politics. If he was searching for truth, why did he choose Isocratean rhetoric rather than political rhetoric which II, 59, col. 43. he considered different from that of Isocrates? If it was the political branch that he was practicing, it was ridiculous for him to say that it was a disgrace to allow Isocrates to speak, if he did not intend to speak like him. I do not mention the fact that none of his pupils could succeed in either art, because II, 59, col. LV. Isocrates had forestalled him; and Isocrates after teaching rhetoric devoted himself to the quieter and as he said, more wonderful study—philosophy. He had strange reasons too for urging them to a study of politics. First that if they acquired experience and undertook a political career immediately, because of their occupation in it they would appear lacking in a proper philosophical training. But if they had no experience they could II, 60, col. 44. not be statesmen unless they studied a very long time, and if they waited for the state to become orderly they were neglecting the means of making it orderly (viz. philosophical politics).

Not even a woman would be so foolish as to choose the worse II, 61, col. LVI. when the better is present. He urged Philip not to aspire to be king of Persia.

There is no use for one who rules badly what is near him, and can rule well what he is not permitted to rule. Of the reasons II, 62, col. 45. why he urges that one who has the ability to govern should go into politics, the first applies to himself rather than to one who takes no thought for the community. For if he thought that one who took no interest in current events would have no friend, as a matter of fact he had none, or could not keep a friend any length of time. Philosophy does not prevent a man's advance; it did not prevent Aristotle. If prevented from obtaining anything, philosophy is not brought into contempt, because it needs no help from any man.

II, 63,
col. 46.

His second reason was dissatisfaction with political conditions. But the golden age is past and sudden improvements are impossible.

col. LVIII.

We shall answer, if opportunity offers, his remarks on *λέγεις* directed against us, dividing the problems about these subjects and all connected with them.

BOOK VII.

This book offers little that is new to one who has perused its predecessors. Its theme is a comparison of rhetoric and philosophy, and after the fashion of Philodemus the discussion is largely a criticism of other works on rhetoric. Mention is made of Aristo (I, 328, fr. XII, 360, col. LXXI), and of Diogenes (Babylonius), (I, 346, col. XLVII, 347, XLIX, 355, LXIV) and a considerable portion of the book appears to be a discussion of the Stoic attitude toward rhetoric. Another section deals with the kinds of proof, those subject to the rules of art, and those not so subject, and this seems to be a criticism of Aristotle. But the fragments are too scanty to allow us to trace the details of the argument. In brief it is as follows: rhetoric finds its only field for usefulness in public, and there rhetors are of more hindrance to a state than advantage; philosophy, however, leads the way to a happy life in private, removed from the cares of politics.

I, 326, fr.
VII.

He said emphatically at the beginning, "One must pursue that which produces a painless life."

I, 327, fr.
VIII.

There is no art of persuasion.

I, 327, fr.
XI.

. . . the former (i. e. questions of advantage and disadvantage considered abstractly) they will consider the task of philosophy, the latter (i. e. persuading the people) the task of rhetoric. However the questions of advantage which he mentions are questions of interest to the people if it is a question of turning the city over to the enemy, or of confiscating the goods of the powerful citizens, and this cannot be decided by a philosopher.

I, 328, fr.
XII.

. . . he appears to have spoken briefly and unsatisfactorily about rhetoric, and in treating of philosophy to have relied on some of the works of Aristo.

I, 329, col.
III.

. . . to be able to praise persuasively a mode of life which we prefer, and again to censure the same mode of life if we see fit; so that the argument that the mode of life which we advise

is healthful persuades, or rather that mode of life persuades one who wishes to be well. Such power might be useful to one who is to practice medicine, but does not make one healthy.

. . . if few of the statements depending on opinion are true—we ought to say on vain opinion—his remarks are foolish, "not referring to clear evidence" and "the rhetors are not wholly lacking in this." But for treating the subject under discussion his example from music seems of no value.

The arguments of philosophy are not conjectural but rigorous. Speeches may be pleasing and beautiful, but one would not care for them unless they are useful.

Encomium may be a proper field for guesswork, but cannot be called a science.

All their training is directed toward speaking before crowds and courts. But none of them practices saying anything for himself or his kin. If they have an action involving five minas they study and strain to persuade; but the one who is going to spend a talent on evil pleasures because of vanity, and waste himself as well as the talent, [him they do not try to persuade].

For they profess to make new statesmen, and useful to the state and their friends; in the same breath they defend their art by saying that the *art* is not bad, but errors come from those who use it badly, as if it were possible for men who fulfill the ideal of usefulness to city and friends to use the power of rhetoric unwisely.

Imagine a general planning the strategy of the battle of Marathon. "You have visited Marathon?" some one asks. "No." "You have a detailed description of the place?" "No." "Then why do you try to plan strategy when you do not even know if the place exists?" Such are the counsellors who seem to be clever in cities.

[A rhetorician says] sometimes some wicked men use the art. But if they fulfil the ideal of being useful to city and friends, it is impossible for them to use it unwisely, nor can the unwise and scoundrels and receivers of bribes be useful to city and friends.

Discusses whether or not a rhetorician is a philosopher.

The rhetors never having served as generals are not thought likely to conquer, so that some speak more distinctly than . . .

I, 329, col.
VI.

I, 330, col.
VIII.
I, 331, col.
IX.

col. X.

I, 332, col.
XV.

I, 333, col.
XVII.

I, 333, col.
XVIII.

I, 334, col.
XIX.

I, 335, col.
XXI.

I, 336, col.
XXIII.

I, 336, col.
XXVII.

For we do not know of anyone very brilliant before Pericles and Callistratus and Demosthenes, unless he calls impressiveness brilliance.

I, 337, col.
XXIX.

We insult the gods as Oileus did.

I, 337, col.
XXX.

We must see that none of the young lose their desire for rhetoric.

I, 338, col.
XXXI.

. . . they do not profess to put justice into operation but to be able to follow what anyone demands. Not only do the rhetors not profess this but many, both of former generations and the present, are not able though willing and conversant with what is just and true.

cols.

XXXII-
XXXVI.

(Nothing intelligible.)

I, 340, col.
XXXVII.

. . . by making the science subject to rules of art, and making similar concession to philosophy, not being able to help himself otherwise . . .

I, 341, col.
XXXVIII.

If rhetoric produces bold, daring, shameless men, or teachings which lead to these qualities, he can find no occasion for the art, and is left in the lurch.

I, 341, col.
XL.

. . . says that shamelessness is an important aid to rhetoric; this remark was not ironical.

I, 342, col.
XLI.

In his speech about judges he mentions the man who appeared without pay for Aristippus, since he could not speak for himself; to one who asked Aristippus what good Socrates had done him he replied, "Enabled me to have such men appear in my behalf as will please my fellow philosophers."

I, 343, col.
XLII.

[Many who have composed such treatises] are outdone, not only in action but in speech by laymen; nothing is so persuasive as truth and experience in affairs.

I, 343, col.
XLIII.

It appears to me that the most ignoble thing of all is to persuade the weakness of the crowd, and concoct some reason for doing anything.

I, 344, col.
XLIV.

The philosophers though able [to do these things] order them passed on to those who have toiled and danced,¹ to publicans and sinners. If he had said not to yield but to claim their results as our own . . .

I, 344, col.
XLV.

Rhetoricians quarrel and philosophers are wicked.

I, 345, col.
XLVI.

It is [not] proven that the art of medicine does not produce health when the physicians are outdone by laymen who have

¹ Referring to Aeschines says Sudhaus in the index, s. v. χορεύω.

discovered some specific for disease. The rhetors of marked ability are not often outdone in speaking by laymen, but are frequently outdone in action.

It is not rhetors but Diogenes and his like who say that only the philosopher is a rhetor. For they have seen what is truly advantageous to the state.

I, 346, col.
XLVII.

Demetrius of Phalerum made a distinction between the acts of the two Philos.

I, 346, col.
XLVIII.

Also on the difference between an experienced rhetor and an inexperienced political philosopher.

[Some] are deceived by Diogenes and others who speak in his style; the rhetors do not lead men astray but persuade them aright.

I, 347, col.
XLIX.

Someone collected instances of failure [in rhetoric].

I, 347, col. L.

Speeches bolder than those of pathics, as Aristophanes says, expressing it lewdly, as was his wont. Therefore cities often make serious errors when they listen to such advice.

I, 348, col.
LI.

The great ancient rhetors maintained their position by means of political intelligence.

I, 348, col.
LII.

On the proper preparation for public office.

I, 349, cols.
LIII, LIV.

Xenocrates says that the Athenians alone are able to be silent, and alone know how to speak. For it takes the same man to do both. Good heavens! We must certainly believe that Xenocrates spoke thus before Antipater as Demetrius of Phalerum has recorded in his *Περὶ ῥητορικῆς*.²

I, 350, col.
LV.

The greatest of the practical statesmen, Pericles and Demosthenes for example, received assistance from philosophers; and to associate with Socrates was better for Alcibiades and Critias than to study an art.

I, 350, col.
LVI.

The [sciences] introduce no reasoning which is aimed to deceive, but all the principles of the rhetoricians are aimed exclusively at that, and according to Heraclitus rhetoric is the prince of liars.³

I, 351, col.
LVII.

² This passage is discussed by Crönert in *Kolotes und Menedemos*, p. 67f. comparing II, 173, fr. XII, and Papyr. ined. 453, fr. IV, also Plut., Phoc. 27: *ἔπειτα λέγειν ἀρξάμενον οὐχ ὑπομένων, ἀλλ' ἀντικρούων καὶ δυσκολαίων ἐποίησεν ἀποσιωπῆσαι*. Xenocrates' speech displeased Antipater, and he was ordered to be silent, hence the taunt in this passage.

³ On the meaning of *κοπῆς* v. Gomperz, *Zeit. f. d. öst. Gym.* XVII (1866) p. 698.

- I, 352, col. LVIII. . . . that each one be confused and excited; wherefore Aristophanes compares them to pathics.
- I, 352, col. LIX. . . . to one starting to write history he seems to offer the history of an ignoble man. He roused not only Alexander, but the comic poet who began it all by mentioning this attack on rhetors.
- I, 353, col. LX. . . . attacking unexpectedly and for the nonce adopting the philosophic style, he presses the philosopher into a quandary. But we shall put a damper on such arguments if we are compelled by these people to answer them.
- I, 353, col. LXI. To say that there is no harm in knowing how to make the worn appear new, and how to cut purses, but that one should not use this power against men except when need arises, is the same as saying that there is nothing . . .
- I, 354, col. LXII. The [sciences] introduce no reasoning which is aimed to deceive, but all the principles of the rhetoricians are aimed exclusively at that, and according to Heraclitus rhetoric is the prince of liars. How is it possible to say anything apart from showing that all their arguments tend toward that end?
- I, 355, col. LXIII. . . . perhaps it gives some an occasion to deceive the audience. But, some one objects, arms do not give occasion to deceive. "We ought not, then," I shall say, "to claim that this is the characteristic of all the principles of rhetoric, but of some."
- I, 355, col. LXIV. Many things such as wealth, strength, beauty, offer an opportunity for wrong-doing, but are honored for the good they do, and are called useful even by Diogenes.
- I, 356, col. LXV. How is it possible for the Stoics—not to mention all the philosophers—to claim to be of this character, and to demonstrate that some rhetors are not of this character?
- I, 357, col. LXVI. [Rhetors are the cause of much trouble] as he charged that rhetors were shown to be in Lacedaemon. I pass over the fact that he could show that some with philosophical training have been guilty as well as innocent of the same charges. They will be able to show that rhetors have replaced tyrannies by democracies, and performed similar good offices.
- I, 357, col. LXVII. Nor if he says that at Athens rhetoric was a strong bulwark against tyrants, where there were more rhetors than in the whole world put together, can it be said truly that no democracy has been replaced by a tyranny through the aid of a rhetor.
- I, 358, col. LXVIII. If Aeschines rebuked the Athenians because they did not treat

Demosthenes like the captain of a capsized ferryboat, but refused to try him for capsizing Greece, they will say that Diogenes is wrong in saying that the Athenians do not use the same rhetors repeatedly.

They will try to show that the statements of Demosthenes and Lycurgus about the acts of Harpalus are false, and to copy their statements from the most trustworthy historians; and they will assert that he was insignificant and shameless.

If some cities have forbidden the entrance of rhetors, not to mention receiving advice from them, yet others continually avail themselves of their services. And not all rhetors are boastful.

But we have got more out of this than perhaps was fitting, even if the book of Aristo is longwinded.

He says that one should not abstain wholly from rhetoric, only from excess in it, nor wholly from politics. And he says that the rhetor should not pretend to be a pilot. His position is that of a boatswain.

He says that the whole system depends on deceit; consequently a veracious person should avoid it. In reply I say that leaving out of the question sophistical rhetoric, even if I could speak about it, and the Technae of Aristotle—and yet I could show that others of his followers have written against him with all the trickery of sophistical rhetoricians—the rhetoric of Pericles and Callisthenes and Demosthenes . . .

If he meant "probable conjecture" or "an approach to truth," he used the word *πιθανόν* to denote what could not be true. On which subject, as the rhetors say, I am ashamed of not producing a demonstration.

Boldness and impudence are the offspring of rhetoric.

At least rhetoric is the ability to persuade the people in assembly and forum.

Rhetoric provides the necessities of life; by means of rhetoric men become famous.

Inasmuch as they think the philosopher should enter public life, on the principle that politics is philosophy he claims that rhetoric [is also philosophy].

Their remarks are not consonant with their opinions concerning political activity; these they abandon and support their position by the other activities of philosophy.

Prudent jurors are rare.

I, 366, col.
LXXXII.

[This must be used] in general if the practical rhetors consider it opportune, but not immoderately; and in the eyes of those who know he urges to avoid generally that kind of pleasurable appeal in order to save exertion.

I, 367, col.
LXXXIII.

[Adapting oneself to the refutation for which they say they have explained the details] the rhetor is able to praise and blame.

I, 367, col.
LXXXIV.

Why should we not marvel at them? For they will not say that the statesman [gets his power from experience] or if they acknowledge this why do they not show that his experience differs from that of the rhetors.

I, 368, col.
LXXXV.

[How can he say that the statesman who] speaks about advantage is master of others and the rhetorician master of none, if he is of the same character?⁴ For he is acquainted with all⁵ such forms of advantage as is the thoughtful statesman, and with the popular ideas of honor and justice.

I, 368, col.
LXXXVI.

The largest part of this depends on natural ability; what comes from study and instruction cannot be imparted "in the brief portion of a day." Of a like nature are the remarks about attention. And since the chief virtue of the narrative is clearness, and the clearest narrator is the one who has studied most, rhetoric [cannot be of] immediate [use] to the rhetor.

I, 369, col.
LXXXVII.

The *πίστεις ἀτεχνοί* are common to all; of the *πίστεις ἐντεχνοί* probability, and sign, and necessary inference are not the property of the rhetoricians, but the sign is peculiar to one who has followed a particular calling; e. g. in diseases it is known by the physician, in storms at sea by the captain etc. Probability can be ascertained by one who has considered how . . .

I, 370, col.
LXXXVIII.

In regard to *πάθη* and *ῥήθη* which move juries, the most important part is to know how these emotions are aroused and allayed. This alone, judging that it is none of their business, the rhetors have not borrowed from Aristotle, though they have borrowed everything else.

I, 370, col.
LXXXIX.

. . . like those who try to heal the sick by foolish means . . . not claiming to persuade all, since they do not add themselves or lover or friend, for these they say are friendly.

I, 371, col.
XC.

. . . to a fitting character⁶ which as a result of its peculiar

⁴ Punctuating the sentence ending in I, 8 as a question.

⁵ πάντων for πολιτῶν; or should we read πολιτικῶν?

⁶ Reading φύσιν instead of οὐσαν.

nature is with a person for all the rest of his life, and does not come "in the brief portion of a day."

. . . possible to say that he is going to make even the people understand him in a short time. We may wonder that if he knows this, he did not likewise see that there is a difference between the educated and uneducated in that a clearer statement must be made to the latter.

I, 361, col.
XCI.

Consequently, expecting to hear similar statements about other forms of expression when he says that the *πίστεις ἀτεχνοί* such as evidence, torture, are the common property of all, let us say that the knowledge of these belongs to laymen, but their use depends on opportunity, not on knowledge.

I, 372, col.
XCII.

For just as the physician knows what is probable in disease. and the pilot knows what is probable in weather, so the rhetor considers the course of political events, when something is going to occur in the state, and from this knowledge he says he is going to persuade the people.

I, 373, col.
XCIII.

The rhetor does not combine his proofs after the fashion of a dialectician or philosopher; for probably this would be displeasing to the multitude.

I, 373, col.
XCIV.

If they bring means able to rid them of many troubles they will have the philosopher in agreement with them. Making them such offers, those who give advice or plead before a court, then express pity and anger. . . .

I, 374, col.
XCV.

. . . with whom the majority wish to include the rhetor because of his cringing; for he says, "Let him persuade justly and wisely, let him divert their desires, calm their passions and persuade them individually as friends."

I, 374, col.
XCVI.

Rhetors prefer to live in a democracy, the worst form of government.

I, 375, col.
XCVII.

[A competent pilot] who did not know where or how or when to sail would be dangerous, fully as much so as the rhetor [who should try to sail a boat in a storm]. For he could not reason about advantage and harm, as such, even if some one has charmed him into thinking that power over all is teachable.

I, 375, col.
XCVIII.

[If instead of this] he claims that rhetoric is an art because the rhetor produces a certain effect on the emotions, then his shift is not honorable, because it is false that the rhetor possesses universal knowledge, since all poorer artists have wiser men to judge them.

I, 376, col.
IC.

I, 377,
col. C.

It is idle to introduce the phrase "wiser men to judge them" whom the rhetor was unwilling to serve, and toward whom his faculty is useless. For he will introduce as a reply a similar remark applying to the statesman who has experience in these matters, alluding to the art which produced Themistocles and Pericles.

I, 377, col.
CI.

Potentates even more than democracies pity and almost admire those whom they subdue if they possess the charm of these virtues, e. g. Philip and Python,⁷ Ptolemy and Demetrius of Phalerum.

I, 378, col.
CII.

In addition let it be said that the most powerful speech is that with rigorous proof, i. e. with the characteristics of philosophy rather than of rhetoric, since "most powerful" seems to mean "most powerful in reference to some object."

I, 379, col.
CIII.

. . . so that to exclude these [qualities] is to exclude politics, and like rhetoric few things, and these decisive, have these [qualities].

I, 379, col.
CIV.

In regard to the third point let it be said that even if the speech be very persuasive, if the possessor of this power does not know how and whom and when to persuade, he is as useless as if he were a rudder.

I, 380, col.
CV.

For even if Pericles easily persuaded the people to do what was lawful, another would not in turn succeed in currying the favor of the mob, and the populace would never endure philosophy.

I, 381, col.
CVI.

For he says it is as if a runaway slave expelled the master of the ship, and let it drift down stream . . . with the boldest to serve as pilots and please the passengers.

I, 381, col.
CVII.

Since he is like one who feigns grief for the loss of property he never possessed, no one would pity him. But we know of masters and pilots who have even been killed as well as banished by fugitive slaves.⁸

I, 382, col.
CVIII.

. . . by the statute laws not of philosophers but of rhetors. But what sort of philosophers does he mean? If we urge him to indicate one of the political [philosophers] they cannot be considered statesmen.

⁷ Probably the pupil of Isocrates and orator of distinction who acted as Philip's emissary to Athens in 343 B. C.

⁸ Runaway = rhetorician; masters = philosophers.

. . . they guided states aright, and the philosopher could not rule these. I, 382, col. CIX.

. . . Philosophers are unable to help cities, nor have they ever framed any laws with all their virtue. I, 383, col. CX.

Power of persuasion is not helpful but destroys the persuader himself with his city. P. 385.

FRAGMENTA INCERTA.

The *fragmenta incerta* do not contribute much of Philodemus' thought that is new. I have deemed it worth while, however, to include a translation of the most important of them, as they contribute interesting bits of information, and have been the occasion for some of the most brilliant conjectures that Philodemus has brought forth.

a

(Nothing.)

II, 168, fr. I.
fr. II.

According to the philosophers this ought to be known, but because of our ignorance, as they are always dinning in our ears, it is impossible and inconsistent with life for everything to be predestinate. . . . For the philosophers like to have their joke and imagine a community of cities and friends and goods and wives and children.

For one would not say with Anaxagoras that everything exists in everything, nor with the Chian Metrodorus¹ acknowledge that he knew nothing, nor even that he knew nothing, nor with Parmenides and Melissus that the universe is one, and because perceptions are false. . . .

II, 169, fr.
III.

. . . exhorting to what is noble and of advantage . . . dissuading from what is shameful and harmful.

II, 170, fr.
IVa.

Philosophers have been found flattering their states.

II, 170,
fr. V.

(Nothing.)

fr. VI.
II, 171, fr.
VII.

For all these reasons, if they chance to be distinguished for any cause, one would not trust their statements; if through mistaken reasoning or under compulsion of a lover, they intrust such matters to children, certainly Persaeus and Eudemus and Lycon and the like. . . .

¹ In I. 5, Wilamowitz, Hermes XXXIV (1899) p. 636, restores *Μητρᾶς* a shortened form of Metrodorus, comparing Antiphanes p. 129, Meineke. A Metrodorus of Chios is mentioned in Diogenes Laertius IX, 10, 58, *ὅς ἐλεγχε μὴδ' αὐτὸ τοῦτ' εἰδέναι ὅτι οὐδὲν οἶδε*.

- II, 171, fr. VIII. . . . it is an indication of fair speech; perchance that is the meaning of the wand or heralds staff. For he says, "golden, with which he charmeth the eyes of men whom he will, and others sleeping he waketh." Wherefore Amphiarus was one of the seven leaders against Thebes, Nestor of those against Troy.
- II, 172, fr. IX. A sophist at the games, catching sight of an idle rich youth, said to his companions, "There is my treasure chest." In a similar way, when Aeschines was an actor and a clerk he was poor, but when he took up rhetoric he became a great entertainer, and awfully rich.
- fr. X. (Nothing.)
- fr. XI. Some philosophers openly advise community of wives and children.²
- II, 173, fr. XII. . . . voted that he should speak among the first because of his age and rhetorical experience. But Xenocrates addressed Antipater in the same style that he was wont to use in a philosophical discussion in the Academy, and Antipater rejected his plea.³
- II, 174, fr. XIII. . . . punishing those who misappropriate public funds or do some other wrong, opposing even potentates on the most important matters.
- fr. XIV. Philosophers teaching in a corner.⁴
- II, 175, fr. XV. A hare cannot be safe among dogs, according to Aristotle, nor can one keep a surly and contemptuous attitude among men. Philosophers always appear like this; therefore they are liable to the attacks of sycophants and undesirable citizens.
- fr. XVI-XVII. (Nothing.)

β

- II, 176, fr. I. If one should seize you and drag you to prison, claiming that you are guilty, though you are innocent, you could not help yourself, but would stand giddy and agape, not having a word to say; and though your accuser be a mean fellow and not good

² Cf. fr. II.

³ I follow the restoration proposed by Crönert, Kolotes und Menedemos, 67; 1. 2 διαψη]φίσασθαι. 1. 3, ἐν πρώτοις, 1. 9, διεξέρ]χεσθαι καὶ τὸν, 10, λόγον πρὸς τὸν Ἀντίπα[τρον ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως οὐ δε]ξαμένην δὲ ἀποτυχεῖν.

⁴ Cf. Plato, Gorgias 486, Cic. De Orat. I, 13, 57, Fuhr. Rhein. Mus. LVII (1902) p. 436.

for much, you would die.⁵ How is it wise if an art takes a noble man and renders him worse.

We should not hate and banish the teacher—for he taught with a proper object in view—but it is right to kill the one who uses it improperly. Polus in the rest of his defense explains about the art.⁶

(Nothing.)

γ

Isocrates received from the Cyprian twenty talents, and from Timotheus the son of Conon he received ten more.⁷

(Nothing.)

Rhetoric alone makes laws.⁸

They (rhetors) have been and are our counsellors in war and peace.

A slave on being scourged informed against Anaxagoras, and Cylon of Crotona had Pythagoras fined and banished, and burned his disciples in a body; and Socrates⁹ . . .

Therefore let us pass over this unless there are more sensible comparisons to be made between philosophy and rhetoric. It is the height of folly to maintain that rhetoric is the science of choosing between what is advantageous and disadvantageous, and of deciding questions of music and geometry.

(Nothing.)

He was still more ridiculous in adding comparisons between rhetoric and philosophy.

Men persuade in a variety of ways; by beauty, by music . . . by appeal to the ear.

Some of the sophists would not allow rhetoric to be called a condition productive of success; and those who say they have political ability. . . .

(Nothing.)

⁵ Cf. Plato, Gorgias, 486A, B.

⁶ Cf. Plato, Gorgias, 456D, 457B, 461B ff.

⁷ Cf. Fuhr in Rhein. Mus. LVII (1902) p. 430; Hubbell in Class. Phil. XI (1916) p. 407.

⁸ Cf. Isocr., Antid. 253 ff.

⁹ This is part of a list of unfortunate philosophers compiled by some rhetorician. Cf. Radermacher in Rhein. Mus. LVI (1901) p. 214.

II, 177, fr. II.

fr. III.
fr. IV = fr.
IV, II, 170.

II, 178,
fr. Ia = fr.
IX, II, 172,
II, 179, fr.
II.

fr. III.
fr. IV = fr.
XII, II, 173,
fr. V.

II, 180, fr.
VI = fr.
XIV, II,
174, fr. VII.

II, 180, fr. I.

II, 181, fr.
II.
fr. III.

II, 182,
fr. IV.

fr. V.

fr. VI.

- II, 182, fr. VII. Therefore we must say that the rhetor is not a flatterer, and rhetoric is not flattery; for the statesman was said to practice what would help all the citizens.¹⁰
- fr. VIII. [Plato] showed that rhetoric produced pleasure, and shared this quality with cookery and personal adornment, and showed in addition that one produced something not noble, and another something disgraceful.¹¹
- II, 184, fr. I-III. (Nothing.)
- fr. IV. I pass over the fact that they criticize Gorgias, and ask him to submit to an examination on Greek usage, since all sciences depend on words for their power.¹²
- fr. V. (Nothing.)
- fr. VI. . . . he knows what weaving and music and medicine deal with, but inquires about rhetoric, because he does not know.
- fr. VII. (Nothing.)
- fr. VIII. Plato in the Gorgias. . . .
- fr. IX—fr. XIV. (Nothing.)
- II, 187, fr. II. Sardanapallus . . . deeds in war. And yet some mythographers introduce stories about him.¹³
- II, 188, fr. III. Themistocles¹⁴ . . . that marvelous wall around the city as Sardanapallus surrounded Anchiale and Tarsus. For if they pride themselves on this, every man would be a statesman.
- fr. IV. One thing I do not think worthy of notice, that he considers it not to be the task of a statesman to make a small city great.
- fr. VI. This grammarian having observed what has escaped notice everywhere, has not failed to collect examples of cocks who

¹⁰ Cf. Plato, Gorg. 463A, 464B.

¹¹ Cf. Plato, Gorg. 462C.

¹² Cf. Plato, Gorg. 450D.

¹³ The phrase *ἡμέρα μὴ* which I have not translated refers to the building of Anchiale and Tarsus in a single day; Arrian, Anab. II, 5, 4; Strabo XIV, 5, 9, p. 672; Athen. XII, 530b quoted by Fuhr, Rhein. Mus. LVII (1902), p. 429, and previously by Gomperz, Zeit. f. d. öst. Gymn. XXIII (1872) p. 24.

¹⁴ *Θεμιστοῦ κλέους*. He is also referred to in fr. IV infra *πόλιν ἐκ μικρᾶς ποιῆσαι μεγάλην*. The restoration was made independently by both Wilamowitz, Hermes XXXIV (1899) p. 636, and Fuhr, Rhein. Mus. LVII (1902) p. 429.

lower the crest and look at the tail. Let us praise him because he attends to the slanders of the opponents of Demosthenes who did not receive a fifth of the votes, and does not attend to the Athenians who disfranchised the accuser.¹⁵

η

- Beating his father or refusing him food or shelter. II, 189, fr. I.
- The prolepsis of rhetoric is less limited. fr. III.
- He did not make his investigation systematic, but either by the lack of differentiation of the idea which he has subordinated to the names or . . . II, 190, fr. V.
- They thought that most of the philosophical rhetors devote their energy to this one part and the following part; that those who attack rhetoric insist that it is no art. fr. VI.

θ

- . . . art is the art of beautiful speech, by which they mean persuasive speech; and the art was the art of beautiful speech, so that speech came by nature, but beautiful speech by art. II, 190, fr. I.
- How when they have come thus far, can they profess to teach that few arts involve imitation? II, 191, fr. III.
- To speak in any random way is the work of nature; to speak beautifully is the work of art. This seems true to me, and you also hold the same opinion. . . . All the so-called conjectural arts . . . fr. IV.
- One may accidentally speak beautifully now and then; but to attain this end frequently requires art. II, 192, fr. V.

ι¹⁶

- About the end of art, and whether it is theoretical or empirical. II, 192, fr. I.
- (Nothing.) II, 193, fr. II.
- Metrodorus teaches in regard to rhetoric that it does not arise from a study of science. fr. III.
- (Nothing.) fr. IV.

¹⁵ Gomperz l. c. p. 25 suggests that the anonymous author here quoted had collected all derogatory passages in Aeschines, and that reference is here made to Timarch. cap. 23, 25 (about cock fights). Wilamowitz l. c. reads *κλίνοντας* for *χαίνοντας* quoting Phrynichus fr. 16 l. 5 *ἐπιτηξ' ἀλέκτωρ δούλον ὡς κλινὰς πτερόν*.

¹⁶ This section is erroneously designated by Sudhaus as ζ.

II, 194, fr. V. Since this is so what do they mean by trusting to foreign . . . , or what has Anacharsis said on this subject? For we acknowledge that rhetoric is of foreign extraction.

fr. VI, VII. (Nothing.)

HYPOMNEMATICON.

For a statement of the relation of the Hypomnematikon to the *Περὶ ῥητορικῆς* see the Introduction p. VII.

II, 196, fr. I, II. (Nothing.)

II, 197, fr. II. No artist can perform the task of another artist; a commander of cavalry cannot command a ship, etc.

fr. IV. . . . Theophrastus lived all his life in the privacy of philosophy, ignorant of the affairs of kings.¹

II, 198, fr. V. [Rhetoric is] the best assistant for all the villainy in this world.

fr. VI—IX. (Nothing.)

II, 199, fr. X. Advantage and disadvantage. . . . It is evident that we shall find that the argument amounts to this; "The wise man has knowledge of these and other things."

fr. XI. (Nothing.)

II, 200, fr. XII. (Nothing.)

fr. XIII. Critolaus, it seems, taught strategy, the duties of kings, equitation and navigation.

fr. XIV. (Nothing.)

II, 201, fr. XV. If they search for the mighty rhetors, surpassing all others, they are carried back to the time of Corax in whose day Themistocles and Aristides flourished. The ability possessed by Odysseus, Nestor, Solon, Themistocles and Pericles we do not call rhetoric; . . .

fr. XVI. (Nothing.)

fr. XVII. . . . they happened to have conversed intelligently, powerfully and nobly.

Coll. I-XXIV attack the Stoic doctrine that the philosopher is the only orator. Passages are quoted from Diogenes of Babylon and refuted in turn.

II, 202, col. I. According to Diogenes there has never been a perfect statesman, such as you² say they ought to be, not even Phocion whom Demosthenes called the pruning knife of his speeches.³

¹ Or, more probably 'of political affairs,' reading *πολιτικῶν* in I. 8.

² Addressing the Stoics.

³ Wilamowitz, *Hermes*, XXXIV (1899) p. 637, reads in line 26 *σφ[αγίδα]*. For the anecdote cf. Plutarch *Phoc.* 5, *Dem.* 10: Demosthenes said of Phocion as he mounted the bema, *ἡ τῶν ἐμῶν λόγων κοπίς ἀνίσταται*.

The rhetor imagined by the Stoa has never existed, and will never exist. II, 203, col. II.

After this he⁴ makes the following incredible statement: "We see that statesmen like Cimon did not waste time or money on such things, nor subject themselves to professors of such subjects." How this can be true I do not see. For the noble rhetors who have successfully held the preëminence in their states have spent time and labor and endured hardships to gain their positions. One could instance Themistocles who walked in front of the generals quarters at night,⁵ and could not sleep for the trophy of Miltiades; or Pericles who in order to be a successful statesman spent much time, and studied with the philosophers of his generation; Demosthenes who was said to have studied with Plato and Eubulides, and set up a cheval-glass, and reproached himself because he slept until aroused by the sound of artizans, and turned his lisping into correct speech; many others might be mentioned who have toiled to become prominent. However success in some lines requires a suitable length of time, and expense and subjection to masters; others demand time only; now all require time, and not all require expense or subjection to masters—and one of these is politics. II, 204, col. III.

. . . that Demades took those who wished to study with him to the true teacher, i. e. the people. II, 207, col. V.

As for saying that the rhetors spend all their time in examining and being examined, and serving what is bitter in the character of mankind—we know that the distinguished rhetors have brought others to examination and submitted to examinations themselves, and such is the natural condition of political life. But the philosophers also examine one another in order to arrive at the truth.

If Diogenes said that no rhetor was ever systematic,⁶ but acted strictly from a desire to please, distributing the public money in theoric funds, he speaks as one who has never investigated the lives of the rhetors. Some of them have been as he II, 208, col. VI.

⁴ Diogenes—from whom the following quotations also are drawn.

⁵ Fuhr, *Rhein. Mus.* LVII (1902) p. 429, compares *Cic. Tusc. IV. 19, 44, noctu ambulabat in publico Themistocles*, and *restores*, I. 28, *νύκτωρ πρὸ τοῦ στρατηγίου*.

⁶ I. e. no rhetor ever followed a definite consistent course of conduct, but simply strove to satisfy the momentary desires of the people.

describes, but the majority have given practical advice showing deep thought, and have acted with great boldness in opposition to those who favored such distributions, and history will bear us out.

After this he says, "The statesman ought to be able to fill the offices in the state; the rhetor cannot do this, and is not fitted for statesmanship."

II, 209, col.
VII.

The term statesman, properly used, is not stretched to include the general or admiral; similarly, one able to advise, and plead causes receives his name from his possessing this particular form of experience, even if he is not able to speak well. But if, as oftentimes happens, one called a statesman in the narrow meaning, knows how to be a general, or fill other offices, he will not receive the power in this line, nor does the ability in this profession far removed from his own come to him as a result of his political ability.⁷

II, 211, col.
VIII.

(Diogenes speaks:) "The philosopher is not only a good dialectician, grammarian, poet and orator, in short skilled in all arts, but knows what is useful to cities, not Athens alone but Lacedaemon. For in the philosophic state there is no law, but the divine precepts of the philosophers and truth prevail. The philosopher will be general and admiral, treasurer and tax-collector, and can fill all offices, since the statesman must have a knowledge of all these matters."

II, 212, col.
IX.

But if we must express our opinion about this, the successful statesmen who have never studied the Stoic philosophy⁸ seem possessed of rhetorical ability; Pisistratus and Clisthenes were orators, and Themistocles the greatest general of them all, and Pericles who made Athens powerful and rich and famous, and Pausanias who won the battle of Plataea, and Cimon who showed by his victories on land and sea how to increase the power of the state, and Alcibiades who defeated the Peloponnesians, and Timotheus the pupil of Isocrates.⁹

⁷ The implication is that neither does rhetorical ability imply any military ability, a denial of the claim of Isocrates for rhetoric; cf. De Pace 54, Panath. 143.

⁸ I should prefer to read at the beginning of col. IX, *τὴν Στωικὴν φιλοσοφίαν*, and make this Philodemus' reply to the Stoic argument of the preceding column.

⁹ *Τιμόθεος ὁ μαθητὴς* was suggested by Fuhr, Rhein. Mus. LVII (1902) p. 430.

Some select the deliberative branch of rhetoric, others the forensic, others that which pertains to experience in principles, as is the case in medicine and other arts. Demosthenes and Demades worked out the deliberative and forensic branches.

They ought not to judge Callistratus and Pericles and other political rhetors by the technical treatises written by those who are also called rhetors.

II, 213,
col. X.

II, 215, col.
XI, l. 22.

"The Lacedaemonians," he says, "expelled rhetoric, and managed all their affairs with the help of their natural ability in speaking." In the first place one will not grant that the Lacedaemonians managed all their affairs with the help of their natural ability in speaking, nor were they successful ambassadors, nor for this reason would one grant they did not study rhetoric, but this is a careless remark of Diogenes. And if we grant that they were successful ambassadors, how does this prove that they did not study rhetoric?

II, 216, col.
XII.

"Nothing is more puerile than the speeches of the ambassadors trained in the rhetorical schools, who still keep up the ancient pride in the Tyndaridae and Atridae. Rhetoric claims to be able to persuade in diplomatic negotiations by speech, not by power or bribes or dignities or anything else an ambassador might possess." What if the Spartans possess natural aptitude with which they persuade in diplomatic negotiations? Shall we say that rhetoric is of no assistance to them in speaking as ambassadors?

II, 217, col.
XIII.

If some who are not rhetors make good ambassadors, how does that prove that the art of rhetoric is not the art of politics?

II, 218, col.
XIV.

"Even the Athenians, though fond of rhetoric are tired of periods, and those who savor of art and school rhetoric." It is ridiculous to say that the Athenians are tired of this. Why are they more tired now?

"But not all of them savored of art and school rhetoric, Aristophon and Aeschines for example, and they did not use loose sentence structure."¹⁰

[Since] there are philosophers who are accustomed to talk nonsense—men like you and Critolaus—listen to [Zeno?] saying; "The experience of political rhetors which depends entirely on opportunity, teaches one at one time to make a lengthy speech,

II, 219, col.
XV.

¹⁰ For *λελυμένοις* Sudhaus made in the index *κεχυμένοις*. Radermacher, Rhein. Mus. LIV (1899) p. 356, suggests *καταγυμνμένοις*.

at another to make a short discussion (or dialogue), and again not to say anything." Therefore as he takes away from science and experience what they especially have to give, when one fails he himself is ridiculous." "Why! if they are able to reconcile cities and make alliances they ought to be better able to reconcile friends who have quarreled, or sundered families; for the same experience will serve to unite two individuals as well as multitudes; just as the same skill is required to tune one harp or many." How can they reconcile a wife to her husband, as they persuade the multitude? Only a man who knew little philosophy would think that the two tasks were the same.

II, 221, col.
XVI.

II, 222, col.
XVII.
II, 222, col.
XVIII.

(Nothing.)

Quite the contrary; Socrates knew how to reconcile individuals, but could not win the multitude for one man;¹¹ neither could Antisthenes nor Zeno nor Cleanthes nor Chrysippus. If he says that [the rhetor] will be able to stop quarrels and wars between states, as the musician can tune one lyre to harmonize with many, we should say that the rhetors do not aim at abolishing war.

"Scarcely a single ambassador," he says, "has been of service to his state."

II, 224, col.
XIX.

He slanders the Greeks—thousands of whom have been useful ambassadors, were prudent in their advice, were not the cause of disaster, did not speak with an eye to gain, and were not convicted of malfeasance in office.

"Why not one of them is recorded as having been a good citizen . . ."

II, 225, col.
XX.

Not only many rhetors, but many private citizens as well have become good political rhetors without philosophy.

"Many, you say, if not all are wretched, not one is upright, kind, patriotic or distinguished by ordinary virtues, let alone the higher ones." Yet given natural endowment and training it is granted that one can become a political rhetor without philosophy.

"Not one," he says, "rhetorical . . ."

II, 226, col.
XXI.

. . . men may become great artists. Whence they say that the rhetor cannot guide the state successfully without philosophy, even if he has experience. Pericles, who, he said, was the most enduring of the rhetors, studied under Anaxagoras and other

¹¹ Is he thinking of Alcibiades?

philosophers, but he never studied Stoicism, but principles contrary to these. According to Diogenes, only Stoicism makes good citizens.¹²

If we cannot call Pericles a tolerable citizen I do not know whom in the cities he called good. II, 227, col. XXII.

One should not attend to the doctrines of the Stoics, but study with good men. II, 228, col. XXIII.

Now that this subject is finished, perhaps some one will say . . .

. . . says that Demosthenes, Callistratus and Themistocles and all the other rhetors were not statesmen. After this he says that the Epicureans make clever speeches on many subjects, and these are they who have experience in leading cities; and he grants earnestness to the rulers of cities, and does not class them with the wicked. II, 229, VIII², fol. 89, col. XXIV.

At the end of col. XXXI p. 230 is found a phrase which by comparison with I, 122, 17 can be restored to read, "From a study of political affairs we can discover what is of advantage to the multitude." In I, 122 this is part of a quotation from Metrodorus' work attacking the views of Nausiphanes. Nausiphanes' doctrine recurs in col. XXXII "The best rhetors are trained by a study of natural science," to which Philodemus (Metrodorus) replies: "It is foolish to say that natural scientists make the best rhetors." The name Metrodorus occurs again in col. XXIII, l. 20, coupled with Epicurus. A part at least of coll. XXV-XXXI dealt with Nausiphanes' principles, and an idea of its contents may be gained from Book VI, particularly vol. II, pp. 24 ff. What follows is fragmentary up to p. 240.

Demosthenes, Lycurgus and Demades are not classed as statesmen. II, 231, col. XXXII.

What is more violent than saying that rhetoric promises nothing except the power of speaking. It is plainly false that the power of speaking cannot include any of the other qualities which it professes to include. . . . rhetoric is better designed for the transaction of private than of public business. II, 232, col. XXXIII.

Power of speech can be considered from different standpoints. When he mentions Themistocles and Pericles he means statesmen like Phocion; if he named Isocrates and Matris he makes II, 233, col. XXXIV.

¹² On the relation of this theory to Cicero and Quintilian v. Radermacher, Rhein. Mus. LIV (1899) p. 290. Diogenes originated the idea of the orator as being *vir bonus dicendi peritus*, and so starts a succession which extends to Quintilian.

a partial error. For Themistocles and Pericles have always been considered consummate rhetors. If Matris and his school are called rhetors, as he said, he ought not to apply this term to the political rhetors but to the other class, just as we would confine the term rhetors to Demosthenes and Callistratus and others of their class, who are said to have possessed political power, of whom we spoke in another section.

II, 234, col.
XXXV.

Now changing our subject we shall show that the so-called sophists seem to us to have more power in political rhetoric than the theorists in politics. Now we have already treated in a previous section the idea that sophistic or panegyric or whatever it may be called, by means of which some exercise the power of speech in assembly and forum, may easily be called rhetoric. That statement "He is a good rhetor" simply means that he is experienced and skilled in speaking. For as we say "good rhetor" we say "good artist" meaning "skillful"; "good rhetor" might also mean "morally good."

II, 236, col.
XXXVI.
II, 237, col.
XXXVII.

(Nothing.)

. . . of those who were statesmen and had acquired this faculty, and of those who do not have it but succeed by dint of experience, of these many are better in character, many are very good, some have private virtues; some who have studied philosophy are justly considered more attractive than these.

II, 238, col.
XXXVIII.

In examining political matters he is not accurate, as we have shown in the passages referring to his statements. And when he considers rhetoric and the rhetor equivalent to politics and the statesman, he is inaccurate.

II, 239, col.
XXXIX.

We shall inquire whether rhetoric is politics, and if there is a faculty which produces rhetors and statesmen; and again whether politics is exactly equivalent to rhetoric; and we shall make a careful inquiry as to whether the art of rhetoric is also the art of politics. We meet these questions as follows; sophistical rhetoric does not include a study of politics, and it is not political science; the rhetorical schools do not produce the political faculty or statesmen prepared for practical speaking and success in ecclesia and other public gatherings; and rhetoric *qua* rhetoric is not politics, and the rhetor is not a statesman and public speaker; and by no means do we agree with the statement made by some that rhetoric is politics; and we deny that the rhetor is always a statesman, not even in the

II, 241, col.
XL.

narrower sense of the word among the ancients by which every one who spoke before the people was called a rhetor. Each of these topics we shall try to explain more fully.

Now it is made clear by Epicurus in many passages in his book *Περὶ ῥητορικῆς* written with reference to those who are able to persuade, and by Metrodorus in the first book *Περὶ ποιημάτων* that by rhetor the masters of the Epicurean school¹⁸ understand a person possessing technical training who has political experience, and is able to discover what is of advantage to states. But we are content with the passage quoted just above (i. e. in the gap coll. XXV.-XXXI) against Nausiphanes, in which to a certain extent the word is used in accordance with accepted usage. For he divided the term rhetoric, and made it refer to panegyric, and to the faculty, "by which from experience and investigation of political events one could perceive well what is advantageous to the multitude." . . . the phrase "as such" is added, and besides the phrase "there is no need of much argument." . . . We shall prove that if by rhetor he considered one who has political experience, if he adds the sophist's art to his equipment, it is plain from mere examination that rhetoric possesses something over and above politics, and the rhetor something over and above the statesman—namely effectiveness of speech; he certainly possesses experience in politics.

II, 242, col.
XLI.

According to Greek usage one does not call Demosthenes and Callistratus and the like statesmen more than rhetors, and in that they are called rhetors they are called statesmen; but those who deliver epideictic orations and speeches more charming than theirs are not called rhetors in the same sense that these are called rhetors, or if they are so called it is because one speaks after a common form of concept. Consequently why is it not possible to call all rhetoric politics, in so far as it is rhetoric, and to call the rhetor a statesman? Why not call a rhetor *qua* rhetor a *δημηγόρος*. For the phrase "in short he is a *δημηγόρος*" means in so far as he is called *δημηγόρος*, and not differently from the rhetor, in as much as the *δημηγόρος* is also called rhetor. Therefore Metrodorus says that Callistratus and Demosthenes, in so far as they possessed rhetoric were *δημηγόροι*; but in the first

II, 244, col.
XLII.

II, 245, col.
XLIII.

¹⁸ By τοὺς ἀνδρας I. 18 he means the great Epicurean authorities particularly Epicurus, Hermarchus and Metrodorus.

book *Περὶ ποιημάτων* he appears to disagree saying, "There is no faculty and science of persuading the multitude."

The art of politics then is understood to be experimental knowledge of constitutions and laws, and a knack which enables one to accept the guidance of states. Rhetoric is considered to include along with this the equipment and faculty for speaking. Now whoever has this experience, but lacks effectiveness in speaking, evidently possesses the political faculty and is a statesman, but he cannot be a rhetor, because though they possess experience in government and much greater knowledge of constitutions and laws and revenues and other things which pertain to the management of states, than the rhetors have, and actually do govern their countries, many who possess this experience do not possess the rhetorical faculty or such equipment as do those who are properly called rhetors; many in fact have no rhetorical ability at all.

The rhetors on the other hand would not seem to anyone to lack rhetoric, which is the proper possession of a rhetor. For none of those called by common consent powerful and noble rhetors can be found without political experience and faculty. But it is not one of the attributes of sophistical rhetoric *qua* rhetoric to be the art of politics, nor is the sophistical rhetor, *qua* rhetor, a statesman; nor is the statesman *qua* statesman, a rhetor, as is evident from what Epicurus says in his *Περὶ ῥητορικῆς* and Metrodorus in the first book *Περὶ ποιημάτων*, and Hermarchus in an epistle to Theophrides.

Now if every art has its own peculiar field, we shall not expect navigation to produce geometricians and grammarians, nor is the knowledge of these sciences an attribute of a sailor. Why should we any more expect that statesmen or men prudent, courageous and highminded should be produced by this rhetoric *qua* rhetoric, and that such qualities are peculiar to rhetoric? For as we certainly would not say that the majority of people possess these qualities in so far as they possess the rhetorical faculty, but that they are good geometricians and grammarians, brave and just, and philosophers in a greater rather than in a less degree than those who possess the rhetorical faculty; and that many who have the advantages of rhetoric plainly lack the abovementioned sciences; in similar fashion, since many who not only have not

acquired the rhetorical faculty, but have not studied at all with the sophists, nor have acquired a technical knowledge through practical study with a rhetor, still speak powerfully in public, and to use the term in its common meaning are artists and possess technical ability [whereas many from the schools can not speak successfully]. . . . Many of those trained in sophistic after the fashion of Isocrates have no political capacity or experience, and are unable to speak in public. If they ever attempt it the audience die a-laughing; since this is true, as geometry and grammar have no need of rhetoric, and it cannot produce these sciences, so the art of politics is not the property of the rhetorical sophist, and they do not produce statesmen.

Some one will say, "If because some are able without study of rhetoric to speak ably, we separate statesmanship from rhetoric on the ground that it is not peculiar to rhetoric, take away too the panegyric style of rhetoric which the rhetoricians practice both in writing and in the spoken word. . . . For many could imitate this, though they have not studied with the sophists, but merely because they are talented; and without having the technical treatises composed in the schools, would imitate the work of some sophist."

"Charm really helps in public speaking. Some who have acquired a rhythmical style from these schools have become considerably more pleasing in public assemblies."

The same is probably true of studies in poetry and philosophy. Some would certainly be harmed by rhetoric; certainly many sacrifice their natural gifts and character, and what they learn in the schools is not persuasive or successful with their audience.

Such is our discussion of the subjects mentioned. If anyone reproaches us with poverty, we shall be content with what we have, and shall not take up rhetoric to make money.

But when they say, as Anaximenes does, that people would not pay the rhetoricians for instruction unless they acquired completely the power to speak in public they speak stupidly. For by this line of reasoning one could prove that soothsaying and . . . are arts, and have greater right to be called arts than philosophy because the professors of these arts receive larger pay than the philosopher. It is senseless to compare faculties in this way, nor does the fact that some pay money to

II, 247, col.
XLIV.

II, 248, col.
XLV.

II, 249, col.
XLVI.

II, 252, col.
XLVIII,
l. 23.

II, 253, col.
XLIX.

II, 254, III²,
col. XLIX,
22 = IV¹,
col. II, i.

II, 256, col. IIIa. rhetors¹⁴ prove that statesmen are produced by rhetoric. One must not think that we have mentioned this proof merely for the sake of talking, but that it is true, and that those are mistaken who pay money to sophists. Epicurus says, "Whenever they listen to their displays and panegyric speeches, and are beguiled because the speech is not about a contract nor public policy as it is in assembly and court (for in these they pay close attention to the speaker, because they have something at stake in the assembly, and they are bound by an oath if they are sitting on the jury, whereas in the case of sophistical displays they care nothing for the oath, for they have not sworn to judge fairly nor do they care whether what is said is advantageous to the state or not, for it is not a question of war and peace, such as they have to vote on at times; and if the speech deals with war or peace or some other subject discussed in assemblies, it does not deal with a timely or pressing question, consequently they listen to displays without any feeling of anxiety) whenever they listen to such a speech they give no heed whether it is advantageous or disadvantageous, or even true or false, but are beguiled by the sound and the periods, parisoses and antitheses and homoioteleuta, and think that if they could talk like that they would succeed in assembly and court, failing to recognize that they would not endure anyone who spoke like that in assembly or court. That is why they spend money on sophists. Then immediately they recognize that they have lost their money, for they get no result but hard feeling and worry; hard feeling because they have been trained in rhetoric, and if their speech is successful they are thought to mislead the jury; but if they fail they think they have paid the sophist in vain; they are anxious about these very points, and still more how they will seem to come off with the speech, or about not misleading the jury by appearances. They have these troubles, and besides they have to attend carefully to conjunctions and cases, not abiding by their own rules but by those of others. For these and other reasons some study with the rhetoricians; in some of these they are deceived more than in others as we have stated above.

II, 258, col. Va.
II, 259, col. VIa.

The rhetors among the sophists behave no better, not even when they say that one can prove that their art produces states-

¹⁴ Here *ῥήτωρ* apparently is equivalent to *ῥητορικός* or *σοφιστής*.

men from the fact that some of their pupils are able to plead causes and conduct themselves properly before the assembly, in the same way that one could prove that the art of grammar produces people able to read and write from the fact that those who have attended the school can do this. Their argument works against them rather than for them, since everybody who studies the art of grammar learns to read and write, and no one learns without studying. But many who study rhetoric cannot speak in public, in fact this is true of the majority, and many who have not studied can speak—they outnumber those who have studied. Therefore we must agree that those who have studied and are statesmen, are such not by virtue of acquiring the faculty which the sophist professes to impart, but from other reasons. Such would be remarkable natural ability for acquiring the rhetorical faculty, and ardor in practicing in politics when once they have shown themselves desirous of rhetorical instruction, and have filled themselves with political speeches which involve a considerable degree of imitation, and, last of all, a spirit of meddling, which is the source of most political experience. There are many other causes, consequently their statement is unsound. And so, although there is such a connection between these studies, nevertheless rhetors skilled in swaying the passions are not produced by these studies any more than by such studies as grammar and philosophy. It thus appears vain to claim that these studies produce the political faculty; just because some statesmen come from these schools one cannot claim that rhetoric produces them. So much for that.

II, 260, col. VIIa.

II, 262, col. VIIIa.

II, 263, col. IXa.

When they ask, who is a statesman if we cannot call the rhetors statesmen, it is easy to answer, laymen, but they are not the only ones or the majority, but the rhetors are the statesmen, however these are not the panegyric rhetors, but those who engage in real contests; also many are statesmen who are not rhetors but possess the political faculty. But it is foolish and senseless to inquire what this faculty is, to say that it is the faculty which produces statesmen, and then to add that rhetoric is the art of politics, and produces statesmen.

When they argue as follows: "It is the task of the statesman to govern the state, to advise, to have experience in embassies, constitutions, decrees, etc., and the rhetor understands all this," grant that this can be proven, and let us allow for the sake of

II, 265, col. Xa.

argument that rhetors *qua* rhetors possess knowledge and ability in these matters, yet it must be objected that some statesmen who are not rhetors possess all these qualifications. If by rhetors they mean those trained in the schools, we shall simply laugh at them; if they mean the practical rhetors, they will not find us opposing them. For they claim for themselves nothing ridiculous.

II, 266, col.
XI^a.

When they say that it is ridiculous to separate the political faculty from perfect rhetoric, for it is included in the concept of rhetoric, just as those skilled in the art of medicine possess a knowledge of what is healthful and harmful, they are exceedingly amusing. For how can that which is not acknowledged to include politics be granted to include politics by preconception? But the announced claims of rhetoric do not include this; only a confusion of thought includes this with rhetoric without proving that it belongs to rhetoric. There is no need of further argument in reply to the claim that states have been managed by rhetors. For even if we grant that it has been done by the political rhetors, *qua* statesmen, we shall not grant that it has been done by the rhetoricians, and if by them, not *qua* rhetoricians. It is the same way with the claim that it is the rhetors, not the philosophers, who have busied themselves with political affairs. They may use this argument against others, we grant that philosophy does not produce statesmen. Some babblers they produce who use the same words that the statesmen use, but not for that shall we grant that it produces the political faculty. If we worked on this principle we should soon be granting every thing which they profess to write about.

II, 267, col.
XII^a.

Now that we have finished this chapter, it remains for us to discuss the question whether the rhetor because of his rhetoric would become a *good* statesman. As for the rhetor produced by the schools, how could we say that *qua* rhetor he could become a good statesman, seeing that *qua* rhetor he is not a statesman at all? In regard to the political rhetor we think the case stands thus: the phrase "good statesman" means either a capable and experienced statesman, or one morally good. According to the former interpretation, *qua* rhetor, we say that he is a good statesman, just as we call the artistic flautist, *qua* flautist, an artistic flautist, and so a good flautist. According to the second interpretation we no longer say that the rhetor *qua* rhetor would be a

II, 268, col.
XIII^a.

good statesman. In the first place he is estimated according to his experience in what is advantageous to the state, and in speaking, just as the physician is estimated according to his knowledge of what is healthful and unhealthful. If he possesses this, no matter what his character is, there is nothing to prevent his being a rhetor. The same must be understood of one who is not a rhetor but a statesman. There would be objection if he had to be good, *qua* rhetor. For the expression *qua* rhetor means that in this he is a rhetor, and from the same condition and no other can a rhetor arise; but it is plain to all that many are capable rhetors, but bad morally. "*Qua*" is of this nature; if it is added it cannot be removed. Since this is so, we do not consider the political faculty by itself useful either to those who possess it or to the states, but that it is often the cause of irreparable dissensions in the sense that what gives the impulse is the cause. If it is accompanied by uprightness of character it often contributes great blessing to states, and sometimes greater good to its possessors than to private citizens, but oftentimes greater woe, as is proven by their lives. And if anyone says that the good statesman ought to have many virtues, and that states are saved not by rhetors *qua* statesmen, but by good statesmen, he will be right. It would be well if the statesman studied philosophy in order that he might be more actively good, and for this reason we say that philosophy if it were associated generally with the political state of mind and in individual cases made suggestions applicable to political management, would produce a wonderful improvement. He would be a good rhetor and statesman who possessed kindness, uprightness and temperance in his private life, education, wisdom which is the outgrowth of his natural ability, and combined with all these, astuteness.

II, 270, col.
XIV^a.

II, 271, col.
XV^a.

II, 272, col.
XVI^a.

Fragmenta Hypomnematici

a

(Nothing.)

When mentioning such a statesman he says that he is experienced in what is helpful and harmful, and possesses all virtues, and that the rhetors know none of these things, and do not claim to know them, but possess simply boldness and garrulity.

II, 273, fr. I.
fr. II.

. . . by this line of argument how could Lycurgus, Demos-

II, 274, fr.
III

thenes and Hyperides be considered practical? In the first place not only was any appearance of order lacking in the speeches which they delivered, but it did not appear even in their writings, and it is plain that they did not avoid empty talk. Quite the opposite; if any have talked discreetly and powerfully. . . .

II, 275, fr. IV. The public speakers say that the political art is nothing but rhetoric. . . . Critolaus says that the art of politics demands only time.

fr. IX. (Nothing.)

II, 275, fr. X. Anyone with common sense would say that the rhetors wrote the laws, and that now states do not entrust lawmaking to philosophers, but to rhetors. . . . If any philosopher ever made any laws he must have been one of the old philosophers. He certainly had no connection with the Peripatetics.

fr. XIII, fr. XVII. (Nothing.)

II, 278, fr. XVIII. Sardanapallus (cf. II, 188).

fr. XIX. Separate politics and rhetoric (cf. II, 66, col. X*) . . . there is no use for it in politics; for persuasion is not needed for everything.

fr. XX, XXI. (Nothing.)

II, 279, fr. XXII. Many rhetors will be found who have performed proper and righteous acts.

fr. XXIII. (Nothing.)

β

II, 279, fr. I. If he takes from rhetoric experience in what is advantageous to the state, and assigns it to philosophy, let us not be vexed. Yet to turn to something with which they agree . . . that the rhetors have need of a knowledge of character, and acquire this from philosophy, which some said was to be acquired from the sophists . . . which Demosthenes. . . .

II, 280, fr. II. (With *παρωρικέναι τὰς ἐπιθυμίας* cf. II, 271, fr. I.)

fr. III. . . . nevertheless as such he is better than the majority of rhetors, by nature . . . however one who is called a good artist is not of this nature.

II, 281, fr. IV. . . . possessing one part of the science, but lacking the other. "According to these, and those who speak as befits themselves, rhetoric cannot produce men just and prudent."

fr. V—VII. (Nothing.)

II, 282, fr. IX. Justice is not peculiar to a state, but belongs to any association.

fr. XI. But experience, speaking plainly testifies that they do not wear

out states by selling their interests. Now states have recognized their ability, for the power of the state is increased under their rule.

The first is false. What he has not learned himself how could fr. XII. he teach another who has never studied the question of advantage? How could one refrain from accepting bribes, and from base gain and deceit?

γ

The rhetor ought to be earnest. The perfect statesman is II, 283, fr. I. acquainted with what is advantageous to the state.

(Nothing.) fr. II.

Demosthenes . . . Aristodemus.¹⁵ fr. III.

—Diogenes seems to have seen this; for all their attempts, fr. IV. so to speak, are reducible to this one demonstration, that the statesman always possesses all virtues. . . .

Thus they will try to say that rhetoric is the same as the art II, 284, of politics, however it is not self-sufficient for successful states- fr. V. manship, but needs some assistance in calming the passions.

The huckster and the pilot ought to be vigorous and brave, fr. VI. even if one adds "good."¹⁶ He will be in still greater error, and will run equal risk if he judges from the lives of those only partly trained in philosophy who have lived wickedly, that philosophy does not produce a happy life.

If it is advantageous and proper for the statesman to be just II, 285, fr. and brave, the statesman would wisely be just and brave and VII. prudent. Likewise he demonstrated a third point, as follows: One cannot be a statesman, unless one is brave and just, and in the possession of all virtues.

The rhetors executed Socrates, by making most wicked II, 286, fr. charges against him, as Plato says in the Apology— VIII.

(Nothing.) fr. IX—XI.

Management of states in the hands of cobblers. II, 288, fr. XIIa.

[Having shown] that rhetoric is not an art. . . . we shall fr. XIIb. now try to present the common faults found in most speeches, some of them perhaps in all. Our manner of refutation will be

¹⁵ Gellius, XI, 9, tells the story of Demosthenes receiving a bribe from Miletus and boasting of it to Aristodemus.

¹⁶ Cf. II, 233.

more methodical if we proceed from some principles in making our divisions.

II, 289, fr.
XIIIa.
fr. XIIIb.

No philosopher is able to speak in public.

The rhetor ought to possess Hermes' wand "with which he soothes the eyes of men whom he will, and others sleeping he awakes," and the embroidered girdle of Aphrodite "in which there is love," i. e. speech which is not without charm, which is the peculiar product of rhetoric. And he ought to be acquainted with constitutions, laws, edicts and customs, and in addition to this decisions reached in assembly and court.

II, 290, fr.
XIV.

Rhetoric has said nothing to us about freeing us from love of glory, but rather increases it by praising its advantages, and holding out glory as a prize.

II, 291, fr.
XV.

. . . the aforesaid logographers and the comic poets of their day, and the writers of biography. They demonstrate that these men have been servants of their own states and of the rest of Greece.

II, 291, fr.
XVI.

If the rhetor cannot guide his own household, consisting of wife, children, slaves and free servants, how can he control the greater ship, the state, consisting of more children and women?

fr. XVII.

(Nothing.)

II, 292, fr.
XVIII.

It takes the same skill¹⁷ to tune one lyre as to tune many in unison, and the results are evident. Scarcely one of these is recorded to have served his country well on an embassy, some are convicted of malfeasance, and others, if they accomplish anything, do not accomplish anything useful.

II, 292, fr.
XIX.

In order that some may not think that we pass over in silence what has been written, matters of no importance or small points savoring of Stoic toil, we shall present the arguments on both sides.

fr. XX.

(Nothing.)

II, 293, fr.
XXI.

He will say what is advantageous; and will agree that what is advantageous is good, and the same for private citizens and communities; contrariwise, what is harmful is evil. But only philosophy possesses the knowledge of these subjects, and it must be said that this is not productive of statesmanship.

fr. XXII.

(Nothing.)

¹⁷ Cf. II, 221, 223.

But one who cannot guide his own skiff successfully, would not be able to pilot the triremes of the state.¹⁸

II, 294, fr.
XXIII.

(Nothing.)

fr. XXIV.

When they write as if there were need of both we shall make the proper reply when we think the explanations given by the other worthy of fitting answer.

II, 295, fr.
XXV.

(Nothing.)

δ

fr. III.

Constitutions and laws and customs and the like. For it is clear that some of them manage their states by means of their acquaintance with these things. Many are willing to depend on mere sham, as will be evident when we come to that section. . . .

II, 296, fr.
IV.

While they say that the political faculty is not the political art unless it is conjoined with philosophy, they do not deny that there is need of philosophy, but you do not disprove that rhetoric involves the political faculty. In another way they will not be at a loss even according to Stoic principles to give a characteristic answer.

fr. V.

Neither physician nor pilot nor painter is an artist, for they have no proper (special) knowledge, nor do they possess the faculty, because often they do not attain their desires: the pilot does not save but wrecks his ship, the painter does not produce beautiful but ugly pictures.

II, 297, fr.
VI.

Just as a physician can be good, and so can an architect and a pilot, so a statesman can be good.

fr. VII.

(Nothing.)

fr. VIII.

ε

Just as we speak of inexperience and ignorance in relation to philosophy, so we speak of people as good in relation to character.

II, 298,
fr. II.

If he wishes to consider that statesmanship is not a part of philosophy, he will be right. We agree with him.

fr. III.

He says that philosophy does not produce artists.

II, 299, fr.
IV.

As among the Gauls those unable to bear arms became trumpeters, so those who cannot manage political affairs become sophists, and blow their trumpets in the midst of crowd.

fr. VI.

Pericles is said to have been the disciple of Anaxagoras.

fr. VII.

(Nothing.)

fr. VIII, IX.

¹⁸ Cf. II, 291, fr. XVI.

ζ

- fr. II—VII. (Nothing.)
 II, 302, X², "The Athenians though fond of oratory are offended by peri-
 fol. 67-70, ods, and those who savor of scholastic rhetoric."¹⁹ There is
 fr. III. need of opportunity in diplomacy.
 fr. V. Since every virtue, not that which existed in the time of the
 heroes, but in the time of Pythagoras and men of earlier gen-
 eration. . . .
 fr. VI. (Nothing.)

EXCURSUS.

The rise of teachers of the art of oratory in Greece marks the beginning of a movement in Greek literature which is of the highest importance in determining the course of Greek thought for the succeeding centuries; in fact through its influence on Rome and those modern literatures which derive largely from Rome it has shaped much of the thought and expression of the modern world. The movement seemed destined from the very first to be unusually significant. The enthusiasm with which the new study was welcomed by the youth of Greece showed that the sophists had accurately judged the needs of their public. The importance of the new teaching is shown no less by the violent opposition which it encountered. It was an unerring instinct which led the enemy of Athenian democracy and Euripidean tragedy to direct one of his most vigorous attacks against the teaching of the power of speech which was so intimately connected with the other objects of his aversion. Aristophanes is our sole extant example of a feeling which was general in the latter part of the fifth century among conservative classes that the teaching of the sophists was a detriment to the community. Tricky and even lying speech there had always been, and would always be, but it seemed incredibly monstrous that men should undertake to train others in the art of deception.

At first the attack was couched in general terms, and was aimed at the immorality of the new profession without attempting to analyze its principles or methods. But the growing skill and subtlety in argument, and a more precise limiting of the spheres of the professions by specialization gave to the con-

¹⁹ Cf. II, 218.

troversy a technical character which it was not soon to lose. It is to Plato that we owe the origin of this as of so many other lines of thought. In attempting to set off for himself the field of "philosophy" he is led in the process of defining the limits of his field to exclude rhetoric. In doing this he introduces a new turn to the attack by denying that rhetoric is entitled to be called a *τέχνη*. We may suppose that the sophists had referred to their occupation as a *τέχνη*, in the broad use of the word which is nearly equivalent to the English "occupation." Certainly their written works on rhetoric were styled *τέχναι* or "systematic instructions." The tacit assumption in all this is that speaking proceeds by certain rules and can be reduced to a system in the same manner that stone cutting or carpentry can. Plato, therefore, goes to the heart of the matter by declaring in the *Gorgias* and *Phaedrus* that rhetoric is not *τέχνη*, but *ἐμπειρία* or *τριβή*. He does not define "art" in the precise fashion of his successors, but implies clearly enough that the prerequisites for art are a knowledge of the nature of the "materials"—whether animate or inanimate—treated by the art, and of principles of action based on scientific acquaintance with cause and effect¹; to this he adds that an art always aims to produce a beneficial result. Tested by all of these principles rhetoric is found wanting. At the same time he grants the possibility of a true rhetoric which aims to produce justice in the souls of the people.² In a sense Plato merely continues the old popular prejudice against rhetoric as a pursuit detrimental to the best interests of the community; but by introducing the question whether rhetoric deserves to be called an art, he opened the way for a controversy which extends through several centuries. It is a controversy in which some of the philosophical schools are at times found on the side of rhetoric, but in the main, the division between philosophers and rhetoricians, initiated by Plato, remains throughout the life of the philosophical schools. In all its ramifications it is an interesting and oftentimes puzzling chapter in the history of human thought, on which much has been written; much more however waits on the discovery of a new papyrus, or a new interpretation of an old fragment. It is my purpose in

¹ *Gorgias* 501A.

² *Gorgias* 504D.

this excursus to discuss merely certain phases of that part of the controversy which deals with the question whether rhetoric deserves to be called an "art."

Aristotle's attitude toward the question of "art" admits of some dispute. True in his extant work there is no doubt that he regards rhetoric as an art; in fact the *Rhetorica* is a scientific treatise on rhetoric along the lines laid down by Plato; it rests on a study of psychology, and discusses the means of arousing the emotions and convincing the intellect. It differs from Plato in that it takes little account of the question whether the art is beneficial; a natural difference since Plato regards rhetoric as the art of persuasion; one who professes to persuade his people makes himself responsible for their welfare; whereas Aristotle extends the field of the art only to include the discovery of the persuasive elements in any case. So far the position of Aristotle is plain. But in his lost dialogue, *Gryllus*, he attacked the right of rhetoric to be called an "art." Quintilian, who is our authority for the contents of the dialogue, suggests that it was a mere tour de force, an attempt to maintain a paradox.³ This seems somewhat improbable, and I should suggest three possible explanations of the inconsistency between the *Gryllus* and the *Rhetorica*. 1) The *Gryllus* may have been a dialogue in which both sides of the question were presented, with the conclusion that rhetoric is an "art." This seems hardly deducible from Quintilian's words, which imply that Aristotle's position in the *Gryllus* needed to be harmonized with that of the *Rhetorica*. 2) The *Gryllus* may have been an attack on certain phases of the contemporary teaching of rhetoric, certain perversions of the art, as Aristotle may have thought. Here again Quintilian's words might mean this, but are more naturally taken to mean that the attack was unqualified. 3) The *Gryllus* may be from the earlier period of Aristotle's teaching. We know that rhetoric was a relatively late addition to the curriculum of the Lyceum, whether or not we credit the story that he was driven to adopt it by the competition of Isocrates. It may well be that in his early career, while still under the influence of Plato, he wrote against rhetoric, and later adopted the position which he holds in the *Rhetorica*.

³ II, 17, 14; Aristoteles, ut solet, quaerendi gratia quaedam supilitatis suae argumenta excogitavit in *Gryllo*: sed idem et de arte rhetorica tris libros scripsit, et in eorum primo non artem solum eam fatetur etc.

The post-Aristotelian schools differed somewhat in their attitude toward rhetoric. The Peripatetics followed the lead of Aristotle until Critolaus broke with the tradition of the school, and ranged himself with the Academics who had remained true to the Platonic position. The Epicureans consistently opposed rhetoric, with a slight inclination to favor the epideictic branch with the honor of being an art. The Stoics from the very beginning regarded rhetoric as an art, but with a Stoic reservation which nullified much of their concession. The hundred and fifty years following the death of Aristotle were, however, not productive of much controversy on this point. The most influential of the philosophical schools had included rhetoric as a part of their philosophical system; men were more interested in the novel tenets of new philosophical sects than in the rehearsal of old controversies. But a more important reason for the lack of conflict was the decline of the rhetorical schools. The effort of Isocrates to maintain rhetoric on a par with philosophy had been in vain, and the rhetoricians sank into mere declaimers, scarcely deserving an attack. It is not until rhetoric begins to assume once more its old vitality that the controversy begins again, this time conducted with even more subtlety and much greater animosity. The period is the second century before our era; the *Rhetoric* of Hermagoras is only one, though perhaps the most influential one of many works which placed rhetoric once more in a position to be considered a worthy successor of the "philosophy" of Isocrates. As soon as rhetoric raised its head once more, the philosophical schools opened fire. The old arguments are furbished up, and the Platonic method of definition is pressed to its limit. The dispute turns largely on the old question whether rhetoric is to be regarded as an art. The addition which two centuries of philosophy have made is that the definitions of art are much more precise, and that the debate is very largely a series of quibbles. Verbi enim controversia iam diu torquet Graeculos homines contentionis cupidiores quam veritatis.

The history of this later stage must be gained by piecing together notices in many later authorities, of which there are four of prime importance: the rhetorical fragments of Philodemus, particularly the first and second books; Cicero's *De Oratore*, Quintilian's *Institutio Oratoria*, and Sextus Empiricus *Πρὸς ῥήτορας*. The material here presented was discussed some

years ago by Olivier in his dissertation *De Critolao Peripatetico*, and more systematically by Radermacher in the preface to Sudhaus' *Supplementum Philodemi*. My excuse for a renewal of the discussion must be found in the fact that Radermacher did not take into account the notices in Cicero, and was thus led to assign to Critolaus a share in the debate which is larger than he seems to deserve. It is with the idea, therefore, of supplementing the work of Radermacher rather than of joining issue with him on his main thesis that I present the following pages. A comparison of the arguments used by our four authorities will reveal that they drew from common sources, some of which can be identified, but most of which must be classed as part of a store of commonplaces which were familiar to all educated people. So well known was the general form of argument employed that as Radermacher acutely observed, Lucian could base one of his richest parodies—*Περὶ παρασίτου*—on the old lines of the discussion whether rhetoric was an art.

At first sight the discussion appears more than unusually futile. Of what account was it whether rhetoric was *τέχνη* or *τριβή*? But the question was evidently felt to be of vital importance, and we may not be far from wrong in assuming that the bread and butter of many a philosopher and rhetorician was at stake. So long as the rhetorician was a mere declaimer, there was little danger that he would attract any considerable portion of the student class. But the rejuvenated rhetoric of the last days of the Roman republic claimed to be a complete education in itself, supplanting philosophy, or at least reducing philosophy to the position of a handmaid of rhetoric. To combat the new rival philosophy put forth its utmost strength. The question of "art" was of vital importance, for it was assumed that only "arts" can be taught; once it was proven that rhetoric was not an art, it followed that the rhetoricians had nothing to offer the prospective student. The situation offers some parallels to certain educational questions much debated a few years ago, and still, I believe, not entirely settled. It was once the fashion to claim that certain studies offered exceptional "mental discipline," or general training of the mind. Investigations in psychology have tended to show that there is no "general" discipline, but only special disciplines. Mathematics, for example, does not increase the ability to study law, but only improves the

mathematical faculty. This theory, whether correct or not, was seized by the opponents of certain studies to claim that in the new light of psychology these studies could no longer claim a place in the curriculum. Substitute "mental discipline" for *τέχνη*, and many of the arguments of Philodemus have a remarkably modern sound.

Those who denied that rhetoric was an art took two positions. The milder group granted that there were some principles of rhetoric which could be imparted from teacher to pupil, but that they were the result of the teacher's observation and experience, and needed the supplement of the pupil's own observation, and were thus subjective and individualistic, and did not possess that generality which characterized the arts. This is the position of Philodemus toward the forensic and deliberative branches of rhetoric.⁴ This is the view which Cicero puts in the mouth of Antonius when he wishes to represent him as all but granting that rhetoric is an art.⁵ On the other hand the more severe critics of the art termed it a *κακοτεχνία* or perversion of art.⁶

Philodemus and Quintilian have in common the well known argument from design: the perfect product implies the existence of the artist and the art. If a vase is evidently the product of an art, much more must the sublime products of the orator be the result of art.⁷ There is no indication in either author of the source from which they drew.

⁴ I, 40, 18 = Suppl. 21, 7. Some unnamed rhetorician is arguing that in rhetoric there is a transmission of knowledge from teacher to pupil; "Ὡς περ ἐμ μουσικῇ καὶ γραμματικῇ παραδόσεις τινῶν εἰσιν ἀγνοουμένων, οὕτως καὶ ἐπὶ ρητορικῇ, καὶ οὐκ ἀμέθοδος ἢ μελέτη γίνεται." Philodemus replies, *Παραδόσεις ἀγνοουμένων δύνανται τινες εἶναι, κὰν μὴ κατὰ τινὰ τέχνην ἐγγίνωνται, κατὰ δὲ ἱστορίαν ἢ παρατήρησιν ἢ τινὰ τοιοῦτον τρόπον.*

⁵ *De Orat.* II, 57, 232; *Observatio quaedam est earum rerum quae in dicendo valent.* Cf. I, 23, 109; *Sin autem ea quae observata sunt in usu ac tractione dicendi, haec ab hominibus callidis ac peritis animadversa ac notata, verbis definita, generibus illustrata, partibus distributa sunt—id quod video potuisse fieri—, non intellego, quam ob rem non, si minus illa suptili definitione, at hac volgari opinione ars esse videatur.*

⁶ Sextus Emp. 12, 49, and 68. It is ascribed by him to Critolaus and Plato. The same expression was used by Epicurus *teste* Ammiano Marc. 30, 4.

⁷ Quint. II, 17, 3; Philod. I, 44, 16 ff. = Suppl. 23, 5 ff. Quintilian repeats the idea in summing up the arguments for rhetoric, II, 17, 42.

An argument was based on the relatively late appearance of formal treatises on rhetoric. There were orators, they said, before Corax and Tisias, and better orators, too. The implication, carried out somewhat fully by Quintilian, is that if there were orators without the so-called "artistic" training, men might still become orators without studying with a rhetorician, or reading any of the manuals of rhetoric. If a speech can be produced without the "art," then the pretensions of the "art" are false, there is no art. This appears in Quintilian and Philodemus, and is answered by both in the same way. I give the passages in parallel columns.

Phil. I, 27, 6

Πρὸ τοῦ καταβληθῆναι τὰς τέχνας
βέλτερον ἐρητόρευον, ἐφ' οἷς δὲ συν-
έστησαν χεῖρον.

Τούτῳ μὲν γὰρ τῷ τρόπῳ καὶ τὴν
ποιήτικὴν καὶ τὴν ἱατρικὴν καὶ
πολλὰς ἄλλας οὐκ εἶναι τέχνας
λέγωμεν.

Quint. II, 17, 7

Deinde adiciunt illas verborum
cavillationes, nihil quod ex
arte fiat, ante artem fuisse;
atqui dixisse homines pro se et
in alios semper; doctores artis
sero et circa Tisiam et Coraca
primum repertos . . . aut
tollatur medicina . . . nec
fabrica sit ars . . . nec
musica.

Such must have been the original kernel of the argument, and the regular reply of the rhetoricians. Philodemus, however, almost obscures the reply by interpolating his favorite argument that rhetoric is the product of natural ability plus experience, hence one might expect the ancients to be better than the moderns. For Philodemus is an enthusiastic *laudator temporis acti*.

An argument of similar nature is drawn from the fact that there have been successful orators who have had no rhetorical training. This occurs in Philodemus, Quintilian, Sextus, and Cicero, with just enough suggestion as to its ultimate source to make a puzzling problem. I give in parallel columns the passages from Philodemus, Quintilian, and Sextus, reserving Cicero for a separate discussion.

Quintilian
II, 17, 11

Quo illud quoque ex-
cluditur, quod dicunt,
non esse artis id,
quod faciat, qui non
didicerit: dicere au-
tem homines et qui
non didicerint. ad
cuius rei confirma-
tionem adferunt *De-*
maden remigem et
Aeschinen hypocriten
oratores fuisse.

Philodemus
II, 97, fr. VIII

Σαφὲς γὰρ λέγει ὅτι
Δημάδης οὐκ ἔμαθεν,
ὥς δ' αὐτῷς Αἰσχίνης
ἦτοι καὶ παρ' ἄλλων ἢ δι'
αὐτῶν τὰ μεθοδικὰ τῆς
ῥητορικῆς οὐτ' ἀπλάτα τὸ
πλῆθος ὄντα προσκαρτερή-
σεώς τε πολλῆς οὐ δεόμενα.
τὸν μὲν γὰρ Δημοσθένην
πάντες κεκράγασιν οἱ κατ'
αὐτὸν τεχνίτην εἶναι, καὶ
Κριτόλαος οὐκ ἀπαρνέεται.

Sextus
Adv. Rhet. 16

Εἴπερ τε ἐνδέχεται γε-
νέσθαι ῥήτορα μὴ μετα-
σχόντα τῆς ῥητορικῆς
τέχνης, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τις
τέχνη ῥητορική. ἐνδέχεται
δέ γε ἱκανῶς καὶ κατὰ τὸν
τρόπον ῥητορεύειν μὴ
μετασχόντα ῥητορικῆς, ὥς
καὶ περὶ Δημάδου πα-
ρειλήφαμεν. κωπηλάτης
γὰρ ὢν ὁμολογεῖται ἄρι-
στος γεγονέναι ῥήτωρ, καὶ
σὺν τούτῳ ἄλλοι παμπλη-
θεῖς. τοίνυν οὐκ ἐστὶ τέχνη
ἡ ῥητορική.

The similarity of thought is striking, and the employment of Demades as an example by all three, and Aeschines by two of our authors makes it almost certain that we are dealing with material drawn from a common source. There are two possibilities to be considered. Philodemus mentions Critolaus in the sentence following the reference to Demades and Aeschines. This sentence is to the effect that Critolaus did not deny that Demosthenes was an artist. This seems to imply that Critolaus did deny that some orators owed their success to art, and hence it is a plausible conjecture that the preceding statement that Demades and Aeschines were self taught is also part of the argument of Critolaus.

The situation is somewhat similar in regard to the passage in Sextus. Critolaus is not specifically mentioned as the author of the argument, but he is mentioned shortly before (10) and immediately after (20). This in itself is not sufficient ground for supposing that the argument under discussion is also derived from Critolaus, but the combination of the references in Philodemus and Sextus led Radermacher to infer that he was the source from which they both drew. But the occurrence of the name Critolaus in section 20 of Sextus does not lend as much

support to his view as appears at first sight, for Sextus adds the names of two Academics, Clitomachus and Charmadas. The case for Critolaus is thus to some extent weakened. If the argument from juxtaposition means anything, the thought we are considering might derive from Charmadas as well as from Critolaus. And this possibility receives support from the passage in the *De Oratore* alluded to above. The passage is the long speech of Antonius beginning at the eighteenth section of the first book. He narrates a debate which he had heard at Athens between the champions and opponents of rhetoric. The incident may be true, or more likely, merely a fiction designed to establish a personal connection between Cicero and Charmadas from whose published works he is drawing the material for his argument.⁸ Cicero represents Charmadas as making the principal attack on rhetoric. His argument that we are so constituted by nature as to be able to be orators without the assistance of "art" was supported by examples of successful orators who had never studied in the schools of rhetoric. The argument is the same that appears in Sextus, Philodemus, and Quintilian; the only point we miss is the reference to Demades and Aeschines. I suspect that the lack is due to a definite purpose of Cicero's in adapting his sources. Antonius is represented as one who looks with mild contempt on the learning of the Greeks. Hence the scornful *nescio quo* with which he dismisses Corax and Tisias (91). It is in keeping with this assumed indifference that he sums up the examples of Charmadas with *innumerabilis quosdam*. In place of these Greek examples he makes Charmadas substitute a Roman example, Antonius himself. This is Cicero's trick of working over his Greek source so that it appears as if it were really composed for a Roman audience. This method may be illustrated, and our conjecture on this passage supported by comparing a passage in the long digression in the third book of the *De Oratore*. Cicero is developing the thought that before the rise of the Socratic schools the term philosophy was not confined to abstract speculation, but covered the whole field of intellectual activity, so that the oratorical power of a Pericles,

⁸ This method is used more than once by Cicero; for other instances see Hendrickson, *Literary Sources in Cicero's Brutus and the Technique of Citation in Dialogue*. Amer. Journ. Phil. XXVII (1906) p. 184.

or the shrewd statesmanship of a Themistocles were as much the products of "philosophy" as the mathematical subtleties of Pythagoras. Cicero is drawing from a Greek source which ultimately goes back to Isocrates. From this source he derives a triad of Greeks who combined deep speculations with power of speech. They are Lycurgus, Pittacus, Solon. (*De Orat.* III, 15, 56.) He parallels these by a list of Romans, Coruncanius, Fabricius, Cato, Scipio, thus clothing the thought in Roman dress. This same method he has followed in the passage in the first book, by putting into the mouth of Charmadas a Roman example, Antonius, instead of the Greek examples, Demades and Aeschines which Charmadas really used.

Cicero thus distinctly points to Charmadas as the source of this thought; Sextus may be interpreted to favor either Charmadas or Critolaus; Philodemus is slightly in favor of Critolaus, but not enough so to outweigh the definite statement of Cicero. The possibility must be considered, however, that both Critolaus and Charmadas may have used the same line of thought and the same illustrations; Quintilian implies that the kernel of the thought "*rhetoricen . . . observationem quandam esse, non artem*" is as old as Lysias, hence it would be common property by the time of Critolaus and Charmadas. Moreover the rapid rise of Demades from a common seaman to a position of political leadership was well enough known to pass into a proverb. At least this is the most probable origin of the expression, *Ἀπὸ κώπης ἐπὶ βῆμα*, From the oar to the rostrum, found in Apostolius III, 65. I am inclined to believe, however, that whatever may have been the ultimate origin of the idea, the form in which it appears is due to its use in an attack on rhetoric published by Charmadas. It is quite likely that this was in dialogue form, and that the chief persons were Critolaus, Diogenes, and Carneades, the master of Charmadas. Such a debate would be highly natural, suggested perhaps by their association on the embassy to Rome. Moreover the assumption of such a dialogue removes any difficulty that may be felt in regard to the references to Critolaus in our Greek authorities, which have given some color to the claim that some work of his was the source of this argument. Cicero refers to Charmadas, because he was known to be the author of the dialogue, and the ideas might be assumed to be his also; Sextus and Philodemus mention Critolaus because these argu-

ments had been put into his mouth in the dialogue. It is possible, also, that the quotations from Diogenes in the second book of Philodemus come from the same work of Charmadas. The two detailed accounts of the embassy are in Cicero, *De Oratore* II, 37, 155 ff., and Gellius VI, 14. Both deal with the rhetorical aspect of the embassy, and discuss the three styles as exemplified by the three philosophers. Cicero and Gellius evidently draw from a common source, and a source which contained technical discussions of style. This fits in with our hypothesis that Charmadas used the philosophical embassy as a setting for the presentation and discussion of current views on rhetoric.

After proceeding to a certain length in his discussion of this question Quintilian attempts to confine himself to the most general forms of argument; the opponents of rhetoric, he says, are many, Critolaus, Athenodorus, Agnon, Epicurus; their arguments are numerous, but reducible to a few general lines of thought. At the head of these arguments he puts the question of the subject matter, or "raw material" of rhetoric. In brief this is that every art has some definite material with which it works; the carpenter works in wood, the smith in metals; the orator, say the critics, has nothing which is peculiarly his own; if he discusses medicine he is invading the field already occupied by another art; if he discusses either politics or ethics he is met by the claim that these belong to the philosopher. Quintilian dismisses the subject with a curt "*quod esse falsum in sequentibus probabo*," a promise which he fulfills in the twenty first chapter. He follows Cicero in holding that the field of rhetoric is all subjects which at any time arise for discussion; not that the orator is by virtue of his rhetorical training acquainted with the subject matter of all arts, but that if he has to speak about music, for example, he can acquire the necessary facts from the musician, and present them in a form which will be more persuasive than the crude statements of the unlettered musician. So much for the main outlines of the thought. It is, as Quintilian says, a commonplace of the rhetorical controversy; we have seen it in Cicero from whom Quintilian derives his main arguments; it appears in Philodemus, quoted from an unnamed philosopher; II, 123, fr. VI. ἡξίωσε πᾶσαν ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν ἰδίαν ὕλην, περὶ ἣν στρέφεται, τὴν δὲ ῥητορικὴν ἐπειρᾶτο δεικνύναι οὐδεμίαν ἔχουσαν ὕλην. In Sextus it is given one of those queer twists which were the

result of the intensity of controversy. From the very beginning of the discussion there had been a division of opinion as to whether words or things were the subject matter of rhetoric. But the rise of the sceptical philosophy made it more advantageous for the purposes of polemic to assume that rhetoric dealt with words. Accordingly Sextus disregards all phases of the question except this. He assumes that rhetoric deals with words (48), and on the lines of the sceptical philosophy he proves that as words are composed of syllables, and syllables do not exist, therefore words do not exist, and as there can be no art of a nonentity, there is no art of rhetoric. (*Adv. Grammaticos*, p. 131 ff.)

In the collection of arguments which Philodemus has assembled in his second book there is one which appears also in Sextus, and which is confused by Quintilian with another similar but different argument. In Philodemus it runs as follows: "In other arts the rules are true, in rhetoric they are false"; to which Philodemus replies that the same phenomenon occurs in medicine or music which every one grants are arts; and even in philosophy men sometimes enunciate principles which prove to be false, but that does not vitiate all philosophy.⁹ This passage may be illustrated by comparison with Sextus 10-12, who gives the reason why rhetoric cannot be an art if its rules are false. He adopts the Stoic definition of art; Πᾶσα τοίνυν τέχνη σύστημα ἐστὶν ἐκ καταλήψεων συγγεγευμασμένων καὶ ἐπὶ τέλος εὐχρηστον τῷ βίῳ λαμβανόντων τὴν ἀναφορὰν (10). The second part of this definition, that an art is useful, agrees in thought with Plato's requirements given in the *Gorgias* 501B, and was recognized as fundamental Academic doctrine (Sextus 43). Sextus continues to argue that rhetoric is not an art because it is not a σύστημα ἐκ καταλήψεων, for there can be no perception of the false, but the rules of rhetoric are false—ψευδῆ δὲ ἐστὶ τὰ λεγόμενα τῆς ῥητορικῆς εἶναι θεωρήματα. He then gives examples of the false rules οὕτω παραπειστέον τοὺς δικαστὰς καὶ ὁργὴν κινητέον ἢ ἔλεον καὶ μοῖχῳ συνηγορητέον ἢ ἱεροσύλῳ.

The other argument occurs in several places in Philodemus,

⁹ I, 22, col. III = Suppl. 12, 18; "κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας τὰ θεωρήματά ἐστιν ἀληθῆ, ψευδῆ δὲ κατὰ τὴν ῥητορικὴν." Διὰ τοῦτο οὐδὲ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν τέχνην ῥητέον οὐδὲ τὴν ἰατρικὴν κτλ.

all in fragments of the second book. The sense of them all is as follows: rhetoric aims at times to deceive; but the rhetorician is just as liable to be deceived as he is to deceive. A single example will illustrate: II, 90 fr. XVIII, 1. 12 πῶς οὐχὶ τὸν ἐξῆς ἐπιθωμάσεις τοιοῦτον ὑπάρχοντα; "εἴπερ ἀπατῶσιν οἱ ῥήτορες, καὶ αὐτοὶ φῶνι ἀπατῶσιν, ἀπατῶνται, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἄλλως γίνεται ἐν ὁράσει οὐδ' ἀκούσει· εἰ γὰρ ἄλλω συμβέβηκεν ἢ ἀπάτῃ, καὶ αὐτὸς ἀπατᾶται· οὐ μᾶλλον τοῖνυν ἀπατῶσιν ἢ ἀπατῶνται". For the answer to this argument cf. II, 88, fr. XVI. . . . ἀλλ' ὅτι συμβέβηκεν τὸ ὁρᾶν, οὐχ' ἕνεκα τούτου καὶ αὐτὸς ὁρᾶται· τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀκοῆς οὐδ' ἄρα διὰ τοῦ τοὺς ῥήτορας ἀπατᾶν καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀπατῶνται. So much for the argument in Philodemus; it does not occur in Sextus, and appears in Quintilian in combination with the preceding argument. This "contamination" will now require our attention.

Quintilian starts by quoting the first argument that no art rests on false principles, because there can be no "perception" of what is false. Section 18 is a close parallel to Sextus 10.

Quintilian II, 17, 18

altera est calumnia nullam artem falsis adsentiri opinionibus, quia constitui sine perceptione¹⁰ non possit, quae semper vera sit; rhetoricen adsentiri falsis, non esse igitur artem.

Sextus 10

Πᾶσα τοῖνυν τέχνη σύστημα ἐστὶν ἐκ καταλήψεων. . . . ἡ δὲ ῥητορικὴ οὐκ ἐστὶ σύστημα ἐκ καταλήψεων, ὥς παραστήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶν ἡ ῥητορικὴ. τῶν γὰρ ψευδῶν οὐκ εἰσὶ καταλήψεις, ψευδῇ δὲ ἐστὶ τὰ λεγόμενα τῆς ῥητορικῆς εἶναι θεωρήματα.

The proper sequence to this argument in Quintilian is a discussion of the *θεωρήματα* or *opinioniones* of rhetoric to prove that they are true. This would be parallel to the claims of Sextus that such principles as οὕτως ὁργὴν κινητέον (II) are false. But Quintilian replaces this by the reply to the argument which we found in Philodemus that rhetoric deceives and is therefore deceived. His general reply is (19) ego rhetoricen nonnumquam dicere falsa pro veris confitebor, sed non ideo in falsa quoque

¹⁰ *Perceptio* is the translation of *κατάληψις* as is shown by Quintilian's translation of this definition later in the chapter, section 41; *artem* constare ex *perceptionibus* consentientibus et coexercitatis ad finem utilem vitae; and by Cicero's equation in *De Fin.* III, 5, 18. *Rerum* autem cognitionem quae vel comprehensiones vel perceptiones, vel si haec verba aut minus placent aut minus intelliguntur, *καταλήψεις* appellemus licet.

esse opinione concedam, quia longe diversum est ipsi quid videri et ut alii videatur efficere. This he supports by several examples: Hannibal tricked Fabius into believing that the Carthaginians were retreating, but he did not deceive himself; Theopompus put on his wife's clothing and passed his keepers without being detected; Cicero befogged the jury in the Cluentius case, but he saw the truth clearly enough himself. These are all answers to the claim that rhetoric is not an art because it deceives; but by a confusion arising from the use of *falsa* to represent the Greek words *ψευδῇ* and *ἀπατῶνται* Quintilian has been led to combine what were originally two separate arguments.

Quintilian cites and discusses several arguments which are found in the *De Oratore*. The first two are closely related; (30) nullam esse artem contrariam sibi, rhetoricen esse contrariam sibi; nullam artem destruere quod effecerit accidere hoc rhetorices operi. Both of these are alluded to in passing by Antonius in rejecting the claim that rhetoric is an art (II, 7, 30). The argument is utilized by Sextus (68) who reduces it to the question whether rhetoric can decide between the true and the false; (71) ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ καὶ ἐπιστήμην αὐτὴν ἀληθῶν τε καὶ ψευδῶν γίνεσθαι, τοῦ πράγματος μὴ οὕτως ἔχοντος. In none of these three discussions is there any indication of the ultimate source of the argument.

Quintilian next quotes from Cicero the rest of section 30 of the second book of the *De Oratore* in which Antonius adds to the statements previously quoted the claim that an art must depend on knowledge, whereas rhetoric is concerned wholly with opinion. This claim is treated at greater length by Cicero in the first book (I, 20, 92). *Artem* vero negabat esse ullam, nisi quae cognitis penitusque perspectis et in unum exitum spectantibus, et numquam fallentibus rebus contineretur. Haec autem omnia quae tractarentur ab oratoribus dubia esse et incerta etc. This is marked as a quotation from Charmadas. So far as I know, no trace of this line of thought occurs in Philodemus or Sextus.

Beginning at section 22 Quintilian discusses two charges which are closely related: 1) that rhetoric has no "goal" as all true arts have, and 2) that if it has a goal it seldom reaches it, whereas an art should reach it always or in the majority of cases. We have parallels to this in Philodemus in two small fragments of the second book.

II, 105, fr. XI, 1, 4 Πάσης τριβῆς καὶ παρατηρήσεως ἔτι δὲ ἀσκήσεως ἔστιν τι τέλος, ἐφ' ὃ πάντα τὰ μέρη συννεύειν ὀφείλει, τῆς δὲ ῥητορικῆς οὐδὲν ἔστι τέλος". This corresponds to the first argument in Quintilian. The other fragment in Philodemus is evidently the second in a series of quotations unfavorable to rhetoric, and inasmuch as it is the counterpart of the second argument in Quintilian, it seems reasonable to suppose that it belongs after the fragment just quoted. It runs as follows: II, 125, fr. IX, Τοιαύτης δὲ τῆς πρώτης ἀποδείξεως πεφυκυίας βλέπεται τὸ δημαρτημένον ἤδη καὶ τῆς ἐκδεχομένης, καθ' ἣν ἐλέγετο πᾶσα τέχνη τυγχάνειν αἰ τοῦ τέλους ἢ κατὰ τὸ πλείστον, ἢ δὲ ῥητορικὴ μηδετέρου γένους μετέχειν κτλ.

The same thought occurs in Sextus 13—15; in none of the three places however is there any hint of the source from which they come. The two illustrations which Quintilian uses to prove that rhetoric deserves to be called an art are drawn from navigation and medicine; the captain and physician as well as the orator have a definite end in view; whether they attain or not may depend on circumstances beyond their control, but they nevertheless work "artistically" when they do all in their power to attain the desired end. These illustrations occur again in Philodemus, I, 19=Suppl. II, 1 Ἐνίοτε γὰρ οἰκοδόμος οἰκίαν καταφθείρει καὶ ζωγράφος πίνακα καὶ ναὺν περιτρέπει κυβερνήτης καὶ ἰατρός ἀνθρωπὸν ἀποκτείνει μεθοδικῶς κτλ. The close parallelism of examples suggests that they are replies to the same argument. Now the passage just preceding this in Philodemus is too fragmentary to prove anything. It is worth noting, however, that one of the few distinct words, *κατορθοῦν*, (I, 18, 28) might very well correspond to Quintilian's *praestabit* (*hunc finem*) (23). I am inclined to believe therefore that this passage in Philodemus follows II, 125, and that the three fragments thus put together form a complete parallel to Quintilian.

Sudhaus thought that Critolaus was the author of the argument which is answered in I, 19. He inferred this from Sextus 10—12. But Sextus refers there to Plato as well as Critolaus as author of the argument which he discusses; and furthermore it is very doubtful if the thought of Sextus 10-12 is a proper prelude to the answer given in Philodemus I, 19. Sextus argues that rhetoric is not a system of "perceptions," that its principles are false and deceptive. That does not seem to fit Philodemus' answer so well as the following paragraph in Sextus: 13-15

καὶ μὴν ἐπεὶ πᾶσα τέχνη ἥτοι ἐστηκὸς ἔχει τὸ τέλος καὶ πάγιον, ὡς φιλοσοφία καὶ γραμματική, ἢ τοῦ ὡς τὸ πολὺ ἐχόμενον, καθάπερ ἰατρικὴ τε καὶ κυβερνητικὴ, δεήσει καὶ τὴν ῥητορικὴν, εἴπερ ἐστὶ τέχνη, τὸ ἕτερον τούτων ἐπαγγέλλεσθαι. If it be assumed that Philodemus is answering this argument, as I think I have shown above is reasonably probable, then there is no indication of the source, for Sextus gives no hint of the authorship of this particular form of the argument.

Philodemus and Sextus supply us with the next argument. It is stated like so many others in the form of a syllogism. States do not expel those who practice arts; some states, notably Sparta and Crete, have banished rhetoricians, therefore rhetoric is not an art. This appears in Philodemus four times, in each case in a short and incomplete fragment.¹² But it is given at considerable length in Sextus (20-26) who reveals the course of the controversy. The argument originated with Critolaus, and was adopted by the academics Clitomachus and Charmadas. The rhetoricians countered by attacking the major premise; cities do banish artists says Philodemus. "The Spartans put the ban on perfumers and dyers; and physicians, musicians and even philosophers have been considered harmful enough to be banished." Sextus attempts to answer this, but has difficulty in making a plausible defence. It is not philosophy as a whole, he says, which suffers indignity, but only certain sects; for example the Epicureans are banished because they teach hedonism. But when he acknowledges that Socrates was the victim of popular judgment about the value of "arts," he practically destroys his own case.

Sextus in section 51 advances the argument which is based on the definition of rhetoric as *ἐπιστήμη τοῦ εἰδὲ λέγειν*, a definition formulated by Xenocrates and adopted by the Stoics (Sextus 6). Every artist can speak well, he says, about his own art, but this speaking does not make him a rhetorician. The argument is an old one; it is hinted at in the Gorgias, but not fully developed. Just what was the history of the argument till the time of Philodemus we can only conjecture, for none of our authors mention

¹² I, 14, fr. V; I, 16, fr. IX; II, 65, fr. II; II, 100, fr. III; it occurs also in Quintilian II, 16, 4 in connection with the discussion of the usefulness of rhetoric, but without reference to its bearing on the controversy over *τέχνη*.

a source. At some time, however, the principle has been illustrated by the speech of Philo the architect on the arsenal at Athens. We know from several sources that this was erected during the administration of Lysurgus and that the speech referred to was in the matter of accounting for the work. Philodemus seizes this instance of a man apparently without rhetorical training who was capable of making a creditable speech on his special line of work, and uses it to back his claim that rhetorical training is not necessary for effective speaking.¹² Philodemus is quoting from an author whom he refers to as οὗτος αὐτός, who had introduced into his work this speech of Philo. Who this was we are not told, but as he states in another passage (I, 346, Col. XLVIII, 1) that Demetrius of Phalerum discussed a Philo in his treatise on rhetoric, it may be that he was the first to use Philo as an illustration. The turn which Philodemus gives to the argument must, however, be due to some philosopher unfriendly to rhetoric, and it can hardly be original with Philodemus, because the use of Philo the architect as an argument against the necessity of a knowledge of rhetoric was known to Cicero.¹³ Now it is hardly to be maintained that Cicero was answering Philodemus; the case is rather that Philo had become a stock illustration to use when attacking the claims of rhetoric.

The definition of rhetoric as the power of persuasion which Plato ascribes to Gorgias contained an ambiguity which gave an opportunity for reply. Other things, the opponents said, persuade,—wealth, beauty, reputation. Hence rhetoric cannot be an art, for an art has an exclusive field (v. Philodemus I, 19, 12 = Suppl. 11, 7). Phryne whose beauty did more to win her case than the pleading of Hyperides, became a stock illustration for this phase of the controversy. She is cited by Philodemus, Sextus and Quintilian,¹⁴ who give the natural and normal

¹² I, 192, 15. Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τοὺς ῥήτορας εἰ κατορθοῦν ἐν τοῖς ῥητορικοῖς ἔλεγεν, ἢ πρὸς τὸν διαλεκτικὸν, ἔλεγεν, οὐ τὸν ἑλεγχον ποιοῦμεν, ὁ δ' ἔφη προσδεῖσθαι τῆς ῥητορικῆς, ἢ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους πεπαιδευμένους, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ τεχνίτας ὧς, οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ πλείω τούτων ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις φυλάττεσθαι μανθάνουσιν, ὥς καὶ Φίλωνα τὸν ἀρχιτέκτονα περὶ τῆς σκευοθήκης οὗτος αὐτὸς εἰσῆγαγεν δημηγοροῦντα.

¹³ De Orat. I, 14, 62; Neque enim si Philonem illum architectum, qui Atheniensibus armamentarium fecit constat perdiserte populo rationem operis sui reddidisse, existimandum est architecti potius artificio disertum quam oratoris fuisse.

¹⁴ Philod. I, 20, 4; Quint. II, 15, 6-9; Sextus, 4.

answer that it is not persuasion but persuasion by speech which is the end of rhetoric. In the absence of any indication of origin, we must regard Phryne with Philo as part of the common store of illustrations.

Philodemus quotes several arguments which appear in none of our other authors. They are of little interest or importance; none of them can be traced to a source, and they can best be classed with that mass of arguments which Quintilian assigns without distinction to Critolaus, Athenodorus and the other philosophic opponents of rhetoric.¹⁵

Both Quintilian and Philodemus devote sections of their discussion to proofs that rhetoric is an art. In a way this division of the discussion into refutation and confirmation is artificial, for most of the arguments in favor of rhetoric have been exhausted in replying to the attacks of its enemies. In fact it is hardly conceivable that any rhetorician was ever concerned to prove that he possessed an art until the philosophers began to question his position. Consequently all the pleas for rhetoric are colored more or less by the criticisms of it. For example Quintilian undertakes to show that rhetoric conforms to all definitions of art. It has "method," it is based on a body of perceptions applied to the attainment of a useful end, it involves investigation and practice. But all these definitions were formulated for controversial purposes if not for the express purpose of excluding rhetoric. It has been shown how Sextus employed the Stoic definition to refute the claims of rhetoric, and the same argument has undoubtedly been used before.

Philodemus carries the debate one step further than Quintilian, for while the latter aims to prove that rhetoric is an art, Philodemus is equally interested in refuting arguments pro and con; for his position is that all theories of rhetoric whether advanced by rhetorician or philosopher are false except those proposed by his group in the Epicurean sect. There is one line of thought which perhaps deserves more than cursory attention, as its course can be traced with some distinctness. That is the relation of rhetoric to dialectic. Aristotle had said that rhetoric was the counterpart of dialectic, and made the grouping, συλλογισμός ἐνθύμημα, ἐπαγωγή παράδειγμα. The same idea underlies Zeno's

¹⁵ They are Suppl. 12, 6; 13, 5; 13, 21; 14, 10; II, 83, fr. VII.

example; closing his fist and then opening it he said the first was dialectic, the second, rhetoric (Sextus, 7; Orator, 32, 113, and elsewhere). Quintilian, however, seems to have been the first to revert to the argument from the similarity of the two subjects, that if dialectic is an art, as all acknowledge, then rhetoric must be also.

In following the course of the debate as exhibited in our principal authorities, we have come upon a few names such as Critolaus, Charmadas, who can be safely designated as the originators of certain phases of the argument. More arguments are assigned to less definite sources, Academics, Stoics, Peripatetics, without any designation of persons. And still a larger share while common to several of our authors are entirely anonymous. The reason is as I have intimated before, that the chief points in the controversy were developed very early, and became commonplaces of literary discussion everywhere; the only room for originality was in varying the expression and illustration of the arguments, and as we have seen in the case of Phryne and Philo, these, too, soon became stereotyped.